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Abstract 
This thesis contains three studies which provide theoretical analysis and empirical evidence on 
the decision-making of farm households under shocks and imperfect markets in Vietnam. 
The first study attempts to investigate the effects of the 2007-08 global food crisis on the 
investment, saving and consumption decisions of household producers by using the panel data 
of the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS), covering 2006 and 2008. The results 
show that the high food prices had a positive effect on only fixed asset investments in the 
period of the crisis. When the price shocks are incorporated in the financial conditions, the 
findings reveal that the effects of household incomes, loans obtained and land sizes matter.  
The second study uses the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) of 2010 to 
assess the determinants of chemical fertiliser adoption for rice cultivation, and effects on 
productivity and household welfare. The analysis implements both nonparametric (propensity 
score matching) and parametric (instrumental variables) approaches. The findings show 
determinants affecting decision of adoption differ from those affecting decision of adoption 
intensity. The results show unsurprisingly positive impact on outcomes, but focus on advantage 
of using parametric approach to estimate these impacts.  
The third study employs a sub-sample from the 2008 VHLSS that is restricted to rural areas and 
to children from 10 to 14 years old to explore the relationship between farmland and the 
employment of children on their family’s farm. The hypothesis is tested in three models (the 
Tobit, Heckit and double-hurdle models), in which the dependent variables are examined for 
two stages of decision-making, including the probability of participation and the extent of 
participation. Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that child labour increases in land-
rich households and decreases in land-poor households. 
Keywords: Farm Households, Production, Shocks, Imperfect Markets 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Farm household’s decision-making in developing economy 
In developing countries, agriculture serves as a major source of income for the population. At 
macro level, agriculture ensures the food security of the country and is an important channel of 
foreign exchange earnings, which significantly contribute to the economic growth. In order to 
boost the agriculture sector and improve household welfare as well, it is ultimately essential to 
capture behavior at household level as the key unit in the sector. One of the underlying traits is 
that farm households constitute the  so-called semi-commercialized economy, in which they 
produce partly for their own consumption and partly for sale in the market.  Inherent to other 
characteristics of the low-income economies, where the markets are missing or incomplete and 
insecure under uncertainty, the decision-making patterns of farm households are not 
straightforward. Therefore, modeling agricultural households has been centered in 
understanding problems of the agricultural economy and evolved in a long tradition.   
This section briefly reviews the major trend of literature on farm household production in 
developing economy setting. Toward the objective of the thesis, I focus on the recent works 
that investigate how farm households allocate resources in for production choices in relation 
with shocks and imperfect markets. With various directions in the literature, I group roughly 
into three main tendencies of agricultural household model (Mendola, 2007). This division 
basically relies on the similarity in the set of assumptions in each approach.   
Profit-maximizing model  
Schultz (1964) proposes a crucial hypothesis that farmers in developing countries “efficient but 
poor” which has been widely both influential and controversial. Schultz argues that the low 
income levels in developing countries are resulted from low productivity of the availability 
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factors of production, and not from inefficiencies of their allocation. In this sense, the farmers 
behave to maximize the profit and in the condition of perfect competition. Thereby the 
principal policy implications are that the outsider experts (extension agents, farm advisers, etc.) 
could not help farmers increase their productivity by advising them to reallocate resources, but 
to invest in education to facilitate news factors and hence improve productivity.   
The key contribution of Schultz (1964) is not about efficiency that attribute to long-term 
equilibrium, but about his recognition of farmers’ willingness to adapt and innovate in response 
to changing economic conditions and opportunities (Ball & Pounder, 1996). On the other side, 
the hypothesis has drawn numerous criticisms which mostly imply that the poor in developing 
countries are characterized by particular features and dimensions. Myrdal (1968) argues that 
the people in developing countries are not primarily determined by motivation of costs and 
benefits. Recently, Ray (2006) develops the idea of an aspiration window. The window is 
formed of a cognitive world and may be multidimensional, i.e. some could aspire to a better 
material standard of living, but there are other aspirations: dignity, good health, recognition, 
etc. These aspirations may complement one another, or they may be mutual substitutes. E.  
Duflo (2006) also shows a tendency of new hypotheses incorporating insights of psychology to 
better understand economic decisions. By analyzing some empirical evidence, Duflo asserts 
that the poor do not always make choices that are in their best interest in the long run. Hence 
those arguments present a central contradict point at which farm households behave rationally 
toward benefit of outcome or other aspirations in the context of developing economies.  
Utility-maximizing model 
The utility maximization approach take into consideration of the dual-character of the farm 
household which the consumption and production decisions are interdependent. The pioneer 
effort is often credited to Chayanov’s work in 1920s. He formulates  the theoretical model of 
the peasant economy where he doubts about the profit-maximizing canons of either Marxist or 
neoclassical theories (Millar, 1970). Chayanov shows that the peasant farms are strictly family 
operated and the family labor allocation is found to be directly related to the ratio of 
consumers over workers in the family. The economic differences among peasants are more 
likely associated with the family size and composition rather than differential economic success. 
These features reflect an inconsistent approach to the hypothesis that farmers manage their 
farm to maximize benefits.  
Becker (1965) further extends this trend to model household decision and allocation resource 
by considering household as both a producing and consuming unit. The household maximize 
utility through consumption of all available goods including household producing goods, market 
purchasing goods and leisure, and which is subjected to the constraint of full income. Based on 
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the assumptions that markets are perfect and goods are tradable, prices are exogenous and 
production and consumption are decided independently. In this condition, allocation  of family 
labor is connected to market-determined wage since leisure time and working time are 
independent. While income is associated with both production and consumption. This decision 
making process is referred as recursive or separable model.  
Hence the recursive model is valid when markets are perfect. In the absence of labor market, 
for instance, the consumption and production decisions become dependent, and the 
separability property disappears.  This fact pervasively occurs in developing countries where 
markets are incomplete or missing. Thereby de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet (1991) develop 
a notable framework on modeling farm household behavior with missing markets. The 
household setting is still utility maximization of all commodities but bounded from constraints 
induced by missing markets. In this study, the authors show that in the situation of imperfect 
labor market and commodity market (i.e. food scarcity due to bad weather), households have 
to internally compensate by adjusting their labor allocation and commodity consumption. Then 
two set of decisions are linked through the endogenous price which satisfies the equilibrium 
between supply and demand.  Vastly empirical studies provide evidence to support this 
approach.    
Risk-averse model  
The above approaches are criticized for ignoring the prospect of uncertainty and assume that 
households are risk-neutral. Since the agricultural households are inherently exposed to 
uncertainty of risk and shock events, such as natural hazards, market volatility, policy changes, 
etc. The effects of those uncontrollable factors play an important role in agricultural 
production. Motivated by these factors, another line in literature models the behavior of farm 
households in which uncertainty and risk are involved in the process of decision-making. 
Regarding the context of risk, expect utility, which was elaborated by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern ( 1944) from the initial work of Bernoulli (1738), has been the principle for 
decision-making theory. The early exposition of expected theory to agriculture can refer to the 
work of Dillon (1971). Derived from Bernoulli’s principle, the study provides recognition of the 
personal nature of decision making in terms of belief and preferences, and that could represent 
the best possible to risky choice in agriculture. Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) contribute on 
commodity price stabilization issues, and explore the problems of risk in agriculture. In general, 
there are two approaches to capture the basic ideas of these works. First, the expected utility 
model allows household to make choices given preferences of outcomes and beliefs on 
possibility of occurrence. Second, the households are risk-averse, meaning that they prefer low 
risky choice than the high risky alternatives.   
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However, due to limited scope, the analysis of this thesis is relevant to the first two farm 
household approaches, which are profit-maximizing model and utility-maximizing model. The 
theoretical frameworks are developed and modified to appropriately explain and examine 
specific circumstance in each chapter. Therefore, the following part provides an overview of 
this case study of Vietnam that characterized by agricultural economy and its own features.    
 1.2. The context of Vietnam 
An overview 
Vietnam is located on the Indochina Peninsula in Southeast Asia. The country is bordered by 
China to the north, Laos to the northwest, Cambodia to the southwest and the East Sea to the 
east.  It covers a total area of approximately 331,210 km2. Vietnam is a country of tropical 
lowlands, hills, and densely forested highlands.  Mountains account for 40 percent of the 
country's land area, and tropical forests cover around 42 percent, and arable land accounts for 
around 20 percent.1 Due to a long shape, climate and seasons vary from locality to locality. 
Northern Vietnam has four distinctive seasons: spring, summer, autumn and winter. Southern 
Vietnam has only two seasons: dry and rainy. The monsoon season which brings high 
temperature, typhoons and heavy rain, is from June to November. 
According to the census in April 2009, the population of the country is approximately 85.8 
million of which male and female respectively account for 49.5 percent and 50.5 percent (GSO, 
2009). The rural population comprises 70 percent. Over the period of 1999-2009, the 
population rose annually by 947,000 people, or equaled to 1.2 percent. Around 66 percent of 
population fall into group between ages 15 and 60 years. This suggests that Vietnam is young 
population.  
Vietnam has 58 provinces and 5 cities, of which Hanoi is capital, and together with Hochiminh 
city are the most important cities. Those 64 provinces are categorized into 8 agro-ecological 
regions including: the Red River Delta, the Northeast, the Northwest, the North Central Coast, 
the South Central Coast, the Central Highlands, the Southeast and the Mekong River Delta. The 
country has 54 ethnic minority groups, and Kinh ethnic is the largest group and constitutes 86 
percent of the population (GSO, 2009).   
                                                     
1
 http://www.indexmundi.com/vietnam/geography_profile.html 
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Economic history 
Vietnam is currently classified as a developing economy. The Sixth Party Congress in December 
1986 embarked an economic reform program known as Doi Moi, or renovation in Vietnam. This 
landmark has made a shift from a centrally planned economy to a socialist-oriented market 
economy. Then the economy has experienced rapid growth. Market forces were introduced 
and central planning was eliminated for all but essential commodities. Vietnam rejected a 
model of heavy industrialization in favor of sectors in which had a comparative advantage: 
agricultural commodities (rice, coffee, rubber, cashew, etc.), natural resources (oil and natural 
gas) exploitation, and labor-intensive manufacturing.  The new mechanism has also accelerated 
establishment of private businesses and foreign investment, including foreign-owned 
enterprises. Efforts were also made to improve the managerial skills of government officials and 
quickly facilitate decentralizing planning. This was important and necessary for Vietnam since it 
lost the entire Soviet aid after the collapsing of USSR in 1991. Then Vietnam became a member 
of ASEAN and the United States removed its trade and aid embargo in middle of 1990s.  
The reforms succeeded partially. The economy slowed down by the early-1990s. Substantial 
cuts of subsidies for state enterprises, the elimination of the central state price system, and 
higher devaluation of the Vietnamese currency resulted in a short-term economic recovery. 
Vietnamese authorities determined slow process of the structural reforms to refresh the 
economy and produce more competitive, export-driven industries.   
Vietnam's economy has been followed the 1997 financial crisis in East Asia recession and the 
policy had been opted to emphasize macroeconomic stability rather than growth. While the 
country has shifted toward a more market-oriented economy, the Vietnamese government still 
has continued to control tightly over major sectors  of the economy, such as the banking 
system, electricity, telecommunication, and  areas of foreign trade (Vuong, 2010).  
In 2006, Vietnam became the World Trade Organization's 150th member. Vietnam's access to 
the WTO has provided an important boost to Vietnam's economy in liberalizing reforms and 
expanding trade. However, WTO accession also brings serious challenges, requiring Vietnam's 
economic sectors to open the door to increase foreign competition. 
The recent 2007-08 global food crisis and the followed global economic crisis had adversely 
affected on Vietnam’s economy, as almost other economies. The economic slowdown has 
suffered through three key channels: trade, investment, and capital mobility and financial 
market (Vo, 2008). With other underlying weaknesses, the crisis still has decelerated economic 
growth so far.  
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Figure 1.2 shows the annual rates of GDP growth and the GDP per capita over the period from 
1985 to 2011. The trends of these indicators demonstrate corresponding economic situation 
that are described above. Overall, the annual growth rate of GDP increased since economic 
transform, and the average annual growth rate over that period was 6.7 percent (scale on the 
right axis). The economic went down in early of the 90s, during the 1997-98 Asia crisis and the 
recent global crisis, at an annual rate of around 5 percent.  The average annual growth rates 
over the period 1992-97 and 2002-07 were remarkably high at 8.8 percent and 7.9 percent, 
respectively. In addition, the development of economy also is shown by constantly rising GDP 
per capita (at purchasing power parity). The GDP per capita was US$ 495 in 1985 and US$ 3412 
in 2011, which increased by nearly seven times over this period (scale of  GDP per capita on the 
left axis).  
Structural change by economic sectors 
The total economic growth was contributed by the all three sectors: agriculture, industry and 
services. Most of the fast-growing activities are using skill workers, foreign capital and 
technology (2008). However, the share of contribution to the growth differs across sectors. 
Figure 1.3 shows distribution of GPD in three economic sectors. The average annual growth 
rates of each sector were stable between the period  1990-99 and 2000-2010, at around 4 
percent in agricultural sector, 10 percent in industrial sector and nearly 8 percent in services 
sector. Hence, industry has been the largest contributor for economic growth. By that fact, the 
economic structure has changed toward an increase in industry and services and decrease in 
agriculture. Over the three base years 1990-2000-2010, the shares of agricultural sector in total 
GDP were 31.8 percent, 23.3 percent and 16.4 percent. This decrease was mostly offset by an 
increase in industrial sector whose GDP were respectively 25.2 percent, 35.4 percent and 42.4 
percent. While the proportion of services sector slightly declined from 43 percent in 1990 to 
around 41 percent in 2000 and 2010. Thus, industrial sector is not only the main force driving 
growth but also became surpassed services sector to be the main source of economic output.     
Along with economic structure change, labour distribution has shifted toward that movement. 
Figure 1.4 shows distribution of labour market in the country corresponding to the period of 
Figure 1.2. In early of 1990s, the country was dominantly agrarian economy, which composed 
by 73 percent of those employed in agricultural sector, 11.2 percent in industrial sector and 
15.8 percent in services sector in 1990. After two decades, the share of labour force in 
agricultural sector declined to 49.5 percent, and the share in industry and services sector rose 
up to 20.9 percent and 29.6 percent, respectively. Changes occurred more significantly during 
2000s than 1990s. In industry sector, the increased share was attributed largely from 
manufacturing and construction activities.      
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Structural change by ownership sectors 
As a centrally planned economy before the reform, all the economic activities was planned and 
controlled by government. There were two sectors: government and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs, including co-operatives). Labour market also was monitored and allocated by respective 
administrative units. The reforms therefore had pushed a pressure to reshuffle the ownership 
structure toward a market-oriented economy, which basically was to reduce monopoly power 
and controlled areas of government in the economy. The privatization program was initiated in 
1992. Approximately 2,600 SOEs  were privatized over the period of 1992-2005 (Sjöholm, 
2006). The number of SOEs dropped to 2,176 in 2007 (CIEM, 2007).  
However, the fact is that the state still reserved large shares in privatized firms and maintained 
corporate governance and regulations. Contrary to experiences of transition economies in 
Eastern Europe, where the considerable reform in state sector was implemented as the 
ownership transferred to private stakeholders (Frydman, Gray, & Rapaczynski, 1999), the 
fundamental ownership structure has been insignificantly changed by the privatization. The 
private enterprises were approved for legal existence and were slowly emerged under the less 
favorable conditions during 1990s (Mac Millan & Woodruff, 1999). Whereas the SOEs enjoyed 
some competitive advantages over non-state sector, such as: land use and location, investment 
and access to credit, monopoly positions, etc. (Le, 1996). The state ownership still dominated 
the economy. This is shown in Table 1.1 that contribution of state sector (government and 
SOEs) to GDP reduced from 40 percent in 1995 to around 34 percent in 2010, while share of 
labor declined only one percent. Decrease of proportion in GDP’s contribution from state and 
non-state sector (collective, private and household) was balanced by substantial increase from 
foreign investment sector, from around 6 percent in 1995 to 19 percent in 2010.  
Agricultural sector and household welfare 
As those facts, Vietnam nowadays is an agrarian country since around 70 percent of population 
living in rural areas and a half of labor force working in agricultural sector in 2010. Agriculture is 
the main source of employment and livelihood, especially in rural areas. Agricultural also plays 
an important role in ensuring food security, providing raw materials for industry, and earning 
foreign exchanges from export.  
The remarkable achievements in agricultural sector also were attributed to market-oriented 
reforms. Before 1986, Vietnam was one of the five poorest countries in the world and suffered 
widespread food shortage. The first critical policy reform was initiated in agricultural sector 
(Glewwe, 1998). In 1987, price controls started to be removed for agricultural products and 
goods, and farm households were permitted to sell their products on the market with prices 
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they want. In 1988, an important decree in Land Law issued that allowed households have the 
right to use agricultural land for 15 years or more, and households had to pay taxes for the 
plots they received. This essential step enabled households to take decision-making power on 
their production, and gradually left input and output markets liberalized. This change is referred 
as “one of the most radical land reforms in modern times”, in which 80 to 85 percent of 
agricultural land area of the country were de-collectivized over a relatively short period   
(Ravallion & van de Walle, 2008).  A further step was taken through the 1993 Land Law that (i) 
granted tenure of land for a longer period, i.e. 20 years for annual cropland and 50 years for 
perennial cropland; (ii) issued certificate of land use rights; (iii) and permitted the land 
transaction: i.e. transfer, exchange, mortgage and inherent. Another extension from the 1998 
Land Law removed restrictions on size of landholdings and on the hiring of agricultural labour.  
These fundamental changes, which considered farm households as the key unit of production, 
privatized land rights, and freed input and output markets, led to dramatic success in 
agricultural sector in particular, and in the economy in general. The average annual growth rate 
in agricultural sector achieved around 4 percent during the period 1990-2010 (Figure 3). 
Together with major reforms in investment and foreign trade implemented in late 1980s, the 
restrictions on internal and external trade have been relaxed.  In 1992, Vietnam became the 
world’s third largest rice exporter from its rice importer in mid-1980s (Glewwe, 1998), as rice is 
most important food in diet of local people and among exported crop.  Figure 1.5 shows 
evolution of agro-food trade in Vietnam from 1997 to 2008. The value of agro-food exports had 
steadily risen. The values of agro-food imports also has been higher, however the net balance 
between exports and imports has increased gradually.     
The dramatic progress of economy and, in particular, of agricultural activities apparently 
accompanied by increase in household income and decrease in poverty rate. Figure 6 illustrates 
the rate of poverty headcount over the period 1993-1998 which is estimated from six waves of 
the Vietnam national living standard household survey. The national poverty rates fell 
consistently from around 58.1 percent in 1993 to 37.7 percent in 1993 and 19.5 percent in 2004 
and 14 percent in 2008. Like other developing countries, proportion of population below 
poverty line (based on living expenditure) and the proportion of absolute poor (based on food 
expenditure) are significantly higher in rural areas than in urban areas. In 1993, the poverty 
rates were 66.4 percent in rural areas and 22.1 percent in urban areas, which is more than two 
times higher. In 2008, the poverty rates declined to 17.7 in rural areas and 2.6 in urban areas. 
Since the population dominantly live in rural areas, the overall poverty reduction was 
contributed substantially from decline in rural areas.    
 Furthermore, progresses in household income and poverty reduction have been uneven not 
only between urban and rural areas, but also across regions. The remote and isolated areas, 
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where infrastructure is under-developed, are impeded in accessing social and economic 
conditions. Also those areas with less favourable conditions for developing agricultural 
production face more difficulties. Figure 1.7 depicts the spatial distribution of the poverty rate 
across provinces and districts in 2009. The uplands regions appear to be the poorest, while river 
delta regions have lowest poverty rates. More specifically, poverty rate in provinces of the 
Northern Mountain region were around 60 to 70 percent, and in provinces of Central Highland 
region were around 40 percent. The rates in Red River Delta and Mekong River Delta regions, 
where Hanoi and Hochiminh city are located, were only around 10 percent. The geographical 
disparities hence widen the gap between rural and urban areas.        
Although the whole country has gained in poverty reduction and living standard, the group of 
rural households or agricultural households are lagged behind due to various impediments. This 
lower progress has been theoretically and empirically documented and studied through various 
causes in literature. Relying on reports of Centre for International Economics (2002) and 
Poverty Working Group (2000), I briefly summary and add recent evidence about the major 
challenges as the following:  
(1) Market access constraint: The farm households reply on market to sell their labor, 
products and to finance their investment. First, the physical location limits the possibility to 
assets these markets (Aksoy & Dikmelik, 2007; Tran, Hossain, & Janaiah, 2000; Van de Walle, 
1996). The infrastructure system in rural areas are underdeveloped, especially the poorest 
regions in Northern Uplands and Central Highland regions. Second, lack of information also 
confines their ability to take advantage of market opportunities by growing incomes, expanding 
markets and diversifying product (World Bank, 2000). Third, the limited access to capital 
prevents the households from participating in the markets. With access to credit, the 
households are able to invest in the fix assets and to be active in the market (Dufhues & 
Buchenrieder, 2005; McCarty, 2001; B. D. Pham & Izumida, 2002; Ranjula Bali, Nguyen, & Vo, 
2008).  
(2) Social infrastructure constraint: First, education is essential factor for development 
and poverty reduction (Poverty Working Group, 2000). Many rural people, women and ethnic 
minorities have less opportunities to access education (Fahey, McCarty, Scheding, & Huong, 
2000). The barriers are most likely to be: difficult transport to school, availability of school, high 
cost of schooling compared to their income, and heavy workloads. Second, the infectious 
diseases are prevalent in rural and remote people and health care is less accessed by the 
people in these regions (Castel, 2009; World Bank, 2001). The disease pattern is strong linked to 
geography, climate, socio-economic characteristics.  
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(3) External factors: First, the environmental shocks are the most relevant factors 
affecting the farm households and the poor (Conway, Turk, & Blomquist, 2001; Thomas, 
Christiaensen, Do, & Le, 2010). Due to of its location, Vietnam is frequently and severely hit by 
natural disaster, especially typhoons and floods. Second, the households lack of means and 
ability to cope with shocks, such as: illness, weather shocks, market fluctuation, changes in 
macro policy, etc. (Coxhead, Linh, & Tam, 2011; Fiona & Newman, 2011; K. T. Nguyen et al., 
2012) 
Therefore, the economy is growing from a low base and limited effective system, and need 
more effort to achieve sustainable and stable development, despite the fact that the economy 
has continued to expand.  
1.3. Objectives and structure of the thesis 
The evidence in previous section gives an overview of Vietnam’s economy, in which agricultural 
sector appears to dominate the economy in terms of labor market. The majority of labor force 
in agriculture participate in the market as self employment that is referred as farm or 
agricultural households. Under the barriers of market and social constraints, farms households 
are unable to take advantage of the economic growth as in other sectors. In particular, they are 
vulnerable and hindered in an exposure to risk and shocks. Therefore, the thesis attempts to 
understand better the challenges that prevent farm households from generating higher and 
stable growth.  
The analysis replies on the recent theoretical framework in microeconomics that adapted in 
developing economy setting. By modeling the existence of imperfect credit market, imperfect 
labour market, these frameworks allow us to apply for this case of farm households in Vietnam. 
Moreover, with a target to access the impact of risk and shock, the thesis uses data covering 
the period of the recent food and financial crisis from 2006 to 2010 which led to a slowdown in 
the economy and caused complex effects on farm households. Then econometric models, 
which are appropriate with assumptions in theoretical analysis and dataset, are employed to 
estimate the impacts. Thus, the thesis addresses three main issues organized in the next three 
chapters. Those chapters provide analysis and empirical evidence on decision-making of farm 
households under shocks and imperfect markets in Vietnam. The specific objectives are 
summarized as the flowing:  
(1) Vietnam is one of few developing countries which is found to be overall better-off on 
welfare from the effects of the 2007-08 global food crisis. This chapter attempts to further 
investigate the decisions of household producers on investment, saving and consumption by 
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using panel data covering the period from 2006 to 2008. The impacts are estimated according 
to the assumption of imperfect credit market which are represented by initial income, access to 
loan and land endowment. The study will test effects of the price shocks on investment, saving 
and consumption; in case of the overall effect and in case of the price shocks incorporated with 
those credit constraint factors.  
(2) Considered in the circumstance of the recent food crisis with rising global food 
demand, one of the key responses is to increase productivity under the resource scarcity 
(water, land, nutrients, and energy) by adopting technology and using input efficiently. In this 
case of Vietnam, rice is the most important crop for farmers and has contributed significantly 
for poverty reduction during the last two decades after the economic reforms. Accounting for 
more than 30 percent of total expenditure, chemical fertilizer adoption is an essential factor 
that effects on the productivity of crop. Moreover, Vietnam is harshly vulnerable to natural 
hazards, which negatively affect on farmers. Hence, the main objective of the study is to assess 
the impact of technology adoption and the degree of adoption on paddy cultivation in rural 
Vietnam in 2010 under different conditions of natural disasters.  
(3) This chapter uses the sub-sample in rural areas and for children from 10 to 14 years 
old of the 2008 Vietnam household living standard survey. Although the descriptive data shows 
the child labor are likely to occur in the low-income households, the study aims to test another 
factor, farm land, which may potentially affect on child labor. Based on the theoretical model in 
which allows to track the effect of imperfect labor market, the study tests the relationship 
between child labor and farm size of household. Child labor variable is decomposed into two 
stages of decision: the probability to participate in economic activities, and the level of 
participation conditional on working.  
Finally, the last chapter provides the concluding remarks that add evidence to the literature of 
this areas. This is accompanied with limitations that I failed to deal with, and suggestion the 
improvements for future search.  
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Tables  
 
 
Table 1.1: Ownership structure in Vietnam 
Panel A: Share of contribution to GDP, 1995-2010 
    1995 2000 2010 
State (Government & SOEs) 40.18 38.52 33.74 
Non-state 53.52 48.2 47.54 
 
Collective 10.06 8.58 5.35 
 
Private 7.44 7.31 11.33 
 
Household 36.02 32.31 30.86 
Foreign investment  6.3 13.28 18.72 
Total   100 100 100 
     Panel B: Share of labour market, 1990-2010 
    1990 2000 2010 
State (Government & SOEs) 11.6 11.7 10.4 
Non-state 88.4 87.3 86.1 
Foreign investment 0 1.0 3.5 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: Statistical yearbook of Vietnam and database online of General Statistics Office of 
Vietnam (GSO).  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: Vietnam regional map 
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Figure 1.2: GDP and annual rates of GDP growth in Vietnam, 1985-2011 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
Note: (i) Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency. 
(ii) GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product 
converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates.  
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Figure 1.3: GPD (trillion VND, at constant 1994 prices), share of contribution to GDP, and 
average annual growth rate across sectors in Vietnam, 1990-2010 
 
Source: Calculation from data of General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO).  
Figure 1.4: Shares of labour market across economic sectors in Vietnam, 1990-2010  
 
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) 
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Figure 1.5: The agro-food trade in Vietnam, 1997-2008 
 
Source: Data of UN Comtrade in 2010 from Cervantes-Godoy and Dewbre (2010) 
Figure 1.6: The poverty rate (%) in Vietnam, 1993-2008 
 
Source: Calculation from the 1993, 1998 VLSS, and the 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 VHLSS.  
Note: The poverty line based on the standard of Vietnam General Statistic Office, and it was 
adjusted over this period.  
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Figure 1.7: The poverty rate of provinces and districts in Vietnam in 2009  
 
Source: Estimation from the 2009 VPHC (Vietnam population and housing census) and the 2010 
VHLSS by Lanjouw, Marra, and Nguyen (2013) 
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Chapter 2 
 
The effects of food crisis on productive investment, 
saving and consumption  
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
An overview of the world food crisis  
The global prices of all agricultural commodities have experienced a dramatic surge in 2007- 
2008. Although the food prices have still fluctuated since that period, the historical peak in mid-
2008 has broadly drew attention to that situation and stimulated in measures to these 
problems. Figure 2.1 shows the monthly price indices of basic food commodities in the world 
market.2 The staple foods index appears  to show a higher rate of increase. The world 
benchmark of price index of cereals and oils peaked during the second quarter of 2008 at about 
270 percent of its 2005 base level, remained around this level until the final quarter of 2008. 
The price indices for dairy and meat rose less, peaking  at respectively 201 percent at the end of 
2007  and 150 percent at September of 2008.  
The claimed causes of the 2008 global food price crisis are numerous and relate to both the 
supply and demand sides of the market. The factors include: (1) rising biofuel demand in the 
U.S. and the EU which diverted food crops into energy uses (Mitchell, 2008; Trostle, 2008); (2) 
decline in productivity and stocks caused imbalance in supply-demand (Abbott, Hurt, & Tyner, 
                                                     
2
 The FAO food price index is a measure of the monthly change in international prices of a basket of food 
commodities. It consists of the average of five commodity (Meat, Dairy, Cereals, Oils and Fats, Sugar) 
group price indices, and weighted with the average export shares of each of the groups. These price 
indices are normalized at 100 percent in January 2005. 
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2009); (3) considerable growth in demand, especially from China and India (Headey & Fan, 
2010); (4) the high energy and fertilizer prices which drove up the cost of production and 
distribution in agriculture (Mitchell, 2008);  (5) climate and weather caused poor harvest in 
some main regions, particularly the 2006-2007 drought in Australia, Ukraine (Headey, 2011) ; 
(6) export restrictions of leading exporters and stockpiling of the importers (Dawe & Slayton, 
2010; Headey, 2011; Mitchell, 2008); (7) speculation in financial markets (Gilbert, 2010; P.  
Timmer, 2010); (8) the depreciation of US Dollar relative to other major currencies which play 
an important roles in global agricultural markets (Abbott et al., 2009; Charlebois & Hamann, 
2010).  
The global food crisis had affected on both macro and micro level of related countries, 
particularly the ones that significantly participated in or depended on the world market  
(Benson, Minot, Pender, Robles, & Braun, 2008; FAO, 2008). (1) At the national level, high food 
prices impacted local commodity markets, local labour markets, government fiscal balances, 
external balances and political activity. (2) At the household level, the effects are mostly seen in 
changed  real income and consumption. (3) At the individual level, the consequences occurred 
in nutrition, health care and education. The degree of impact depends on whether a country is 
net exporter or importer of resources and products, and whether a household is net buyer or 
seller of food commodities. These impacts finally transmit to individual level in households.  
Low-income countries apparently are more vulnerable to volatile situation than high-income 
countries. This is because food is a smaller proportion of household budgets and agricultural is 
a smaller proportion of GDP in high income countries. For this reason, discussions and 
assessments of the impact of the food crisis focus mainly on the developing world. The IMF 
(2008) reports that the median 12-month rate  of food price inflation of 120 non-OECD 
countries increased from 10 percent to 12 percent between December 2007 and March 2008, 
almost twice the rate of 2006. Although the increasing inflation was accelerated by both food 
and fuel factors, the average 2006 weight of food in CPI basket of 37 percent is far beyond this 
rate of fuel at around 7 percent. The World Bank (2009) also estimates the effect for developing 
countries that median inflation rose 12 percent in the first half of 2008.  Subsequently, with the 
fall in commodity prices, inflation declined below 10 percent in the second half of 2008.  
Surging food prices have generated severe effects for poor people in low-income countries. This 
is mainly because food expenditure often takes up more than 50 percent of people’s disposable 
income in developing countries, or even 70 percent among the poor (IMF, 2008; World Bank, 
2009). Since the majority of people in developing economies are involved in agricultural 
production, they are both consumers and sellers of agricultural commodities. Hence, the 
impacts of high food price on household welfare are mixed and depend on: (1) the relative 
share of commodities in production set and consumption basket, (2) the extent of price 
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changes, (3) the availability of suitable substitute food items, and (4) the extent of 
compensation between price shocks and income changes (Aksoy & Isik-Dikmelik, 2008; Lustig, 
2009).  
The food crisis from the loser’s side 
In general, the recent empirical evidence reveals that the net food buyers are prevalent among 
poor households which implies that the food price spike led to an increase in poverty rates, 
despite the fact that many poor households are involved in agriculture and are net food sellers 
gain from high prices. M. Ivanic and Martin (2008) estimate first-order welfare changes of 
households for a sample of ten developing countries across Asia, Latin America, and Africa. 
They find the overall effect of food price increases on poverty to be negative.  Wodon and 
Zaman (2008) find a similar effect in sub-Saharan Africa countries, as the negative impact on 
the net poor consumers surpasses the benefits to poor producers. Busjeet, Demombynes, and 
Sobrado (2008) also report an extremely rough estimate of the impact on poverty by using  a 
price index for the poor in Central America countries.  
Some other studies show the evidence of negative consequence on poverty or household 
welfare in specific countries, specifically: Ghana (Wodon, Tsimpo, & Coulombe, 2008), Mexico 
(Valero-Gil & Valero, 2008), Brazil (Ferreira, Fruttero, Leite, & Lucchetti, 2011), and the 
Philippines (Fujii, 2011).  
The food crisis from the gainer’s side 
Among empirical analysis of developing countries, Vietnam and Indonesia are found to have 
exhibited poverty reduction during the food crisis. As the leading exporters of some agricultural 
commodities, the revenue of those products form a large part of GDP. In the case of Indonesia, 
the commodities accounted for one fourth of GDP and it is the largest producer of palm oil in 
the world. The rising commodity prices from 2003 to mid-2008 accelerated a growth in total 
exports around 14 percent per year this period. High commodities price also lifted total income 
by an average 1.2 percent of GDP in the 2004-2007 period. Rural poverty declined by 2.2 
percent and urban poverty rate was unchanged with the result that  the national poverty 
reduction was at 1.7 percent (World Bank, 2011). Motivated by these facts, Nose and Yamauchi 
(2012)  recently estimated  the impact of food prices on agricultural production by using the 
panel data in 2007 and 2010 in seven Indonesian provinces. They find that price shocks create 
an incentive to save and invest - wealthy farmers invested more in productive assets, while 
poor farmers increased financial saving and consumption.  
While Vietnam is the second largest exporter of rice in the world. Rice also in the most 
important crops in agriculture. The agricultural sector accounted for 22 percent of GDP in 2007, 
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and the growth rate in 2008 is 3.8 percent. The total revenue of total exports rose 29.5 percent 
between 2007 and 2008. In particular, the contribution of  crude oil, industrial products and 
agricultural products to that growth rate respectively are 49.7 percent, 30 percent and 16.3 
percent. Regarding empirical evidence,  a number of studies show the overall positive impact of 
high prices on household welfare using different approaches. Applying a dynamic computable 
general equilibrium model, Thurlow et al. (2010) suggest that the 2008 food crisis increased 
employment and reduced poverty by favouring labour-intensive exports, especially in 
agriculture. Although the high prices resulted in most of households becoming worse off, the 
average loss of net buyers was lower than the average gain of net sellers (Vu & Glewwe, 2011). 
Looking at the decomposition, the greatest gainers appear in the quintiles 2 and 3 (D.T. Phung 
& Waibel, 2010). In the comparable of eleven developing  countries, the median welfare 
changes declined in urban areas of all countries, but only in Vietnam overall welfare still 
increased in rural areas (Zezza et al., 2008).  
Objective  of this study 
In recent literature, almost studies have quantified  changes on household welfare in terms of 
income and expenditure with a little attention paid on the effects on agricultural production of 
households. Households who gain and lose from high price might react differently in terms of 
investment in agricultural production. In particular, the group of net food sellers or group of 
households which gains from increasing commodity prices may be expected to boost 
investment. Nonetheless, in developing economies, imperfect markets and risk aversion might 
cause the opposite decision on investment. Hence, the impact on agricultural investment of 
households could be ambiguous and still a puzzle. 
Given this context, the paper aims to further investigate the response of Vietnamese 
households to commodity prices shock in relation to investment in agricultural production, 
consumption and saving. The short-term impact is investigated in order to understand how 
households use their income gained from price shocks in imperfect market conditions. The 
objective of paper is to examine these questions (Deaton, 1990; Paxson, 1991; Udry, 1995):  
(1) Do the farmers have incentives to increase productive investment, or  do they 
increase saving and consumption instead, if they gain additional income from positive price 
shocks? 
(2) Is there any impact of financial constraints on such spending decisions? 
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2.2. Theoretical model3 
Consider a household producer with two periods which produces entirely for the market. 
Household production follows the standard production function     . Household consumption 
is c1 and c2.  In the period 1, capital stock of household is     that is from past decisions. 
Household chooses its period 1 borrowing level    and net investment level      . For 
simplicity,  we assume there is no production uncertainty. The product price is    and    in the 
two periods where    is known but    is uncertain at the time of the borrowing and investment 
decisions. The long run product price is    and we consider the situation of a price spike so 
    
 . The budget constraints faced by the household in the two periods are:  
                                    
                                          
The rate of interest is  , the capital depreciation rate is   and the capital cost is   (all constant). 
The capital rental is therefore       . We suppose that the inherited capital stock    is 
exactly that appropriate for the long run price stock   , i.e.                 .  
The household maximizes the sum of current and future utilities over    and    
   
   
                           
where       is a discount factor. 
The first order condition with respect to net investment     is  
                
                           
The first order condition with respect to borrowing    is  
                
                    
Substitution of        gives  
                      
       
                 
We can expand  
                                                     
3
 I thank Christopher Gilbert for helping me to develop this part. 
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where    
   
      
      
  captures the extent of decreasing returns to capital. 
The price in the period 2 is expressed as:  
                         
     
               
Then we have: 
      
                  
            
        
              
where    
    
 
  
    is the proportional excess of the period 1 price over the long run price. 
Making these substitutions, we obtain:  
    
  
  
                    
     
      
         
                       
and using the condition for the initial capital stock 
    
  
  
            
     
      
         
  
     
     
               
We can transform to obtain:  
  
  
 
 
 
 
     
                 
           
         
 
                 
It shows that the higher the period 1 price above the long term average      and the greater 
the perceived likely persistence of these high prices is, the higher the investment-capital ratio  
      is.  
From the fact that farmers in developing countries often face with market imperfection. 
Indonesia or Vietnam also is not an exception (Nose & Yamauchi, 2012).4 Overall, poor farmers 
or households have less possibility to obtain credit in formal market and with lower amount of 
                                                     
4
 Distribution of access to credit in terms of share and amount in Indonesia and Vietnam is shown in Table 2.14. 
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credit. Hence the theoretical framework aims to consider a situation in which credit market is 
constrained.    
Suppose households face a borrowing constraint at    such that for       they pay a higher 
interest rate    .  The period 2 budget constrain becomes: 
                                                   
Optimal investment becomes:  
  
  
 
 
 
 
               
                 
           
         
 
                 
Since investment is declining in the rate of interest,  this will give rise to a corner solution at  
      where investment will be constant over a range of values of 1 . Over this range, 
household pays to borrow b  at the unconstrained interest rate r but not to increase borrowing 
and be forced to pay the higher rate (    ).   
Moreover, the imperfect credit market lead to liquidity constraint. We assume that the interest 
rate for saving is constant, but the interest rate for obtaining credit depends on initial welfare 
or asset. The interest rate is expected higher for smaller farm household in term of income and 
landholding which could serve as collateral or deposit. In other words, the less-capitalized 
households bear higher extra cost   for access to credit. So the households with lower income, 
smaller farm tend to decrease investment.   
The equation (5) refers to consumption smoothing. Farmers will borrow to invest. If they can 
not borrow, they will reduce consumption to invest. The appendix gives more detail of 
explanation.  
2.3. Context of the crisis 
The economy in this period overview  
Table 2.1 shows the economic structure of Vietnam in 2007. The industrial sector contributes 
the largest component in GDP accounting for 42 percent; followed by services and agriculture 
at 36 percent and 22 percent, respectively. However, labor shares are in the reverse order. 
More than half of labour force works in the agricultural sector, at 54 percent; while this rate is 
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26 percent in the service sector and is only 20 percent in the industrial sector. Crops account for 
the largest share of the labour force, at nearly 37 percent. These composition ratios therefore 
suggest that the farmers make up the majority of the labour force but generate the lowest 
share in GDP. Within the industrial sector, mining, which is mainly oil extraction, is the most 
productive area in which adding 11 percent to GDP through merely 1 percent of employment.   
Out of total export revenue, the share of raw agricultural production is more than 7 percent. 
Take into account of processing production, total agriculture-related value constitutes more 
than 20 percent. Clothing and textiles are the leading sources in export accounting for nearly 26 
percent. Crude oil also creates a substantial proportion of 19 percent. Looking within sectors, 
the ratio of export to total value of output is around 21 percent for agricultural production, 33 
percent for agro-processing, 69 percent for clothing and textiles, and as high as 83 percent for 
crude oil.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates the growth rates across sectors. The economy maintained a growth rate of 
7-8 percent over the period from 2000 to 2007. The industrial sector enjoyed the highest rate, 
at 10 percent. Services and agriculture achieved around 8 percent and 4 percent respectively. 
At the beginning of commodity prices shock stage in 2008, the total growth rate decreased 
arising from a sharp decline in industry and services. Only the agricultural sector managed to 
attain a higher growth rate by taking advantage of rising prices during 2008, before all sectors 
have moved to a downward trend as the result of the 2008-09 financial crisis.  
The price shocks and transmission 
As an agriculturally dependent country  and a leading rice exporter, the rise in international 
commodity prices might cause significant effects to both producers and consumers at 
household-level. The extent to which price volatility is transmitted to domestic market depends 
on the basket of export commodities relative to world market and the trade policies of the 
country. The prices in the world market turn to affect the households through the relative price 
of traded and non-traded commodities that households face in the market (Benson et al., 
2008). The world markets directly influence the former and indirectly influence on the latter. 
The indirectly impacts occur as consumers substitute toward non-traded products with 
relatively lower prices and producers substitute toward the traded products with relatively 
higher prices.  
In Vietnam, rice is an essential source for agricultural exports, as well as being the principal 
staple of local consumption. Figure 2.3 shows the price of rice exports between Vietnam and 
Thailand, which reflects the similar trend. As being a major world export of rice, Thailand is 
selected to observe the comparable movement of prices during crisis. All the prices are 
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normalized to 100 percent in 2005. The figure illustrates the export price index of 5% broken 
rice in Vietnam and Thailand on the base year 2005. Rice price started to increase from the 
beginning of 2007 and then surged from January 2008. Both countries hit the peak in the 
second quarter of 2008 (May) the extent of the rise being higher in Vietnam than in Thailand, at 
322 percent and 300 percent correspondently. Then prices both declined significantly in the 
second half of 2008.  
In the world market, the factors driven high price of rice were somehow different to other 
agricultural commodities. According to the argument of Dawe and Slayton (2010), the causes of 
rice price spike were not from market fundamentals. First, rice production and stocks were 
irrelevant to the turmoil in the world rice market. Since the growth in the world rice production 
was similar to the rate of population growth in Asia in 2005-07. Second, rice market was less 
closely connected with other cereals markets, since maize markets were associated with bio-
fuel policies and wheat markets were associated with bad weather. Third, an increase in  prices 
of fuels and other cereals cumulative pressures on the policy decision of the major exporters 
and importers.   Additionally, with a smaller share in the world market, as well as in the futures 
markets, and the important role of government, the price of rice markets were more volatile 
than maize and wheat market (P. Timmer, 2009). Therefore, policies and panic are claimed to 
be the fundamental factors induced significant and more rapid price increase on the world rice 
market. The price spike of the world rice market was largely triggered by export restrictions of 
India and Vietnam and stockpiling of the Philippines in 2007-08 (Dawe & Slayton, 2010).  In 
2007, India and Vietnam were the second and third largest rice exporters, and the Philippines 
was the largest rice importer in the world rice market. The price uncertainty was also 
contributed by interventions of others exporters and importers.   
In case of Vietnam, the government tightly regulates both international and domestic rice price. 
The government has monitored the volume of rice export as it entered the international market 
(Nielsen, 2003). The annual of export quota is adjusted in response to the domestic crop 
output. Normally, the annual quota is approved in late summer. Thus, by the end of July 2007, 
the quantity of rice export was determined, and no further supplement of rice export in end of 
2007 was anticipated (Dawe & Slayton, 2010). In 2008, in the atmosphere of the crisis, the 
government banned rice exports from late March to June in order to guarantee the domestic 
food security (H. N. Pham, 2010). Moreover, the relevant ministries also stabilized local market 
during the high price episode through adjusting tax, credit, and preferential interest rate  in the 
local market.     
In the domestic market, Figure 2.3 shows that the retail price of ordinary rice and farm gate 
price of paddy consequently rose upward but lagged behind the international movements both 
in terms of timing and extent. The local prices obtained peak in the third quarter of 2008, at 
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224 percent for retail price and 218 percent for farm gate price. This trend explicitly  reveals 
that the international price was partially transmitted to local market. Thus, the intervention of 
government in an attempt to mitigate the adverse effects of global demand on domestic prices 
played considerable role.  
In addition, Figure 2.4 shows the price indices of cereals and vegetables, which are the major 
crops behind rice, also experienced an increase along. The other staple commodities  include  
maize, cassava, potato and sweet potato. The price of cereals peaked to around 200 percent of 
its 2005 level in October where it remained until the end of the year, even slightly increasing 
during 2009. It is possible that this is the consequence of substitution effects from both 
demand and supply sides as discussed above.  
At the sub-national level, price volatility affected to different regions to different degrees 
depending on local supply and demand  characteristics. In 2007, the Mekong River Delta region 
provided 51 percent of total rice production, followed by the Red River Delta region with 18 
percent (GSO 5). The mountainous North West and Central Highland accounted for only 1.6 
percent and 2.4 percent of the total.  These two regions have high poverty rates compared to 
other regions, 49 percent and 29 percent in 2006, respectively (VHLSS 2006).  However, the 
mountainous and highland regions provide relatively high amount of maize which is the second 
important staple food in Vietnam. In 2007, the production of maize is 25 percent in the Central 
Highland, 18 percent in the North East,  and 13 percent in the North West (GSO). Thus, these 
regions with lower rice production could offset the volatility through their reliance on 
substitute food. Figure 2.5 depicts the rice price indices across regions. The North West and the 
North East exhibit the lowest degree of  price volatility.  The Red River Delta, the Mekong River 
Delta and the South East, where the large proportion of people reside in urban areas and are 
net food consumers, experienced the highest increase in price. Therefore, the effect of price 
shocks was transmitted through a variety of mechanisms with differing impacts across regions.   
2.4. Descriptive statistics 
2.4.1. Survey data 
After the economic transition in 1986, Vietnam conducted two important household surveys: 
Multi-Purpose Household Survey (MPHS) and Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS) during the 
1990s. The two surveys are partly overlapped, which motivated General Statistics of Vietnam to 
                                                     
5
 http://www.gso.gov.vn 
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merge MPHS and VLSS to become a new Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS). 
The VHLSS has been implemented biennially from 2000 to 2010, i.e. including four waves in 
2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 based on the same master sample, and with technical assistant 
from UNDP and the World Bank.  
Based on the relevant documents and manual instruction of Phung & Nguyen (2006) and GSO 
(2008), the survey could be briefly summarized as the following. The interviews in each survey 
were conducted from May to November in each year. Sampling was at three levels: 
communes/wards at the first stage, census enumerate on areas (EA) at the second stage and 
households at the third stage. At the first stage, the sample was selected from the master 
frame designed for four waves of the VHLSS in this period which included 3,063 
communes/wards from 1999 Population Census. At the second stage, wards and communes 
were partitioned into EAs and three EAs in communes/wards selected. Only one EA constitutes 
for each wave of survey and the two others are used for the sequential rotated waves. At the 
third stage, a sample of households was selected systematically with twenty households in each 
rural EA and ten households in each urban EA. This is technically a three-stage design (including 
the selection of   households), but it is operationally equivalent to a two-stage design since only 
one EA is selected within each commune for each wave of survey. The sample is rotated 50 
percent from one wave to the successive wave of the VHLSS based on the master sample. More 
specifically, the current survey keeps 50 percent of households in the previous survey, and 
randomly selects another 50 percent of households from EAs which are different to the ones 
used in the previous survey, as mentioned at the second stage.  
The paper relies on panel data of the VHLSS in 2006 and 2008. As this designed method, 50 
percent of households in the VHLSS 2006 were retained in 2008. Out of 9,189 households in 
each round of  the 2006 and 2008 VHLSS, 4,104 households in 2006 were re-interviewed in 
2008. The farm households involved in crop cultivation are extracted from this panel to analyze.   
2.4.2. Production 
In the survey, the agricultural crops are divided into five categories: (i) rice, (ii) other staples/ 
starchy and vegetables, (iii) annual industrial crops (soybean, peanut, sugar cane, tobacco, etc.) 
and perennial industrial crops (tea, coffee, rubber, coconut, cashew, etc.), (iv) fruit crops, and 
(v) crop by-products (straw, thatch, starchy stems, sugarcane leaves, etc). Due to the limited 
availability of  price indices, which is not contained in the survey, we confine attention in this 
paper examines to the first and second group of crops: rice, other staples and vegetables. These 
commodities are the main food of consumers in Vietnam and comprise the majority share of 
revenue of total crops. In the 2006 VHLSS, rice, other staples and vegetables contributed 80 
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percent out of total crop production (Table 2.2). It is therefore reasonable to capture the price 
volatility experienced by Vietnamese households by these three groups of commodities: rice, 
other staples (maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, potatoes), and vegetables. In the panel data, 
2,531 households in the 2006 VHLSS reported production of those crops, but only 2,303 
households continued to cultivate crops in 2008, and 168 households started cultivation in 
2008. The analysis  focus on those households who reported production of these crops in both 
2006 and 2008.  
Table 2.2 shows how the proportion of crops produced varies across regions. In the total 
sample, rice revenue accounts for 73 percent, whereas other staples and vegetables account 
for 15 and 13 percent respectively.  Rice is responsible for a larger share in the North River 
Delta and the Mekong River Delta regions, and a lower share in mountainous and highland 
regions. The shares of other staples are correspondingly are higher in mountainous and 
highland regions.  
2.4.3. Investment and household welfare 
Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics of sample used in the two surveys. I confine attention 
to the 2,303 households that continue to produce the three crops under consideration (rice, 
other staple and vegetables) in 2006 and 2008. Details of fix asset investment are shown in 
Table 2.4.6 The assets bought for crop cultivation are extracted from two sources of question. 
First, the small and non-durable agricultural tools and minor repair of assets are extracted in 
expenditure of total crop during the last 12 months. Second, the remaining of equipments and 
machineries are picked up from fix assets of household which have value over VND 500,000 
(around US$ 31)7 at time purchased.8  
Average cultivated land areas increased from 2.09 acres in 2006 to 2.32 acres in 2008. Total 
expenditure of crops and expenditure per acre of land also increased. This increase may be 
caused by rising investment or higher input prices, in particular fuels and fertilizers. As a 
consequence, total crop revenues increased but revenue per acre of land decreased.9 On the 
                                                     
6
 Distribution of fix asset investment is shown in Figure 2.8 and Table 2.13.  
7
 Use the average exchange rate in 2007 from the World Bank online database: USD/VND = 15,994 
8
 In particular, the second source is what household reported about total available fix assets and durable goods 
with information of the time of purchase (month, year), value at the time of purchase, quantity, and the 
percentage of household ownership. Then I picked up the ones related to crop cultivation and purchased in 2007-
08 only, calculated the total value of  household, and deflated with CPI to the base time January 2006 as other 
values.  
9
 Distribution of increase in crop revenue is shown in Figure 2.9.  
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other hand, the revenue per capita increased 26 percent in 2008 making a significant 
contribution to household welfare.    
To obtain more insight on financial flows of households over the period of the price shocks, we 
break down the different sources of income and expenditure for three groups of households. 
The group “ continuing households”  refers to households continued to cultivate during period 
of 2006-08, the group “out households” refers to those who stopped cultivating in 2008, and 
the group “in households” contains those who started cultivating in 2008. Table 2.7 summaries 
the total income and expenditure. Since the inflation in 2008 rose to a peak over the crisis, the 
nominal figures  exaggerate the real increase. All values therefore are deflated at constant price 
in January 2006.  
Total income is divided into three categories. The first source of income comes from: wages/ 
salaries, farm and nonfarm, and business activities. The second source of income is from: 
remittances, social welfare allowances (jobless, policy household, disaster, etc), pension, 
income from insurance, subsidies, and interests (savings, bonds, loans, shares). The third source 
of income comes from: (i) selling means of production (working cattle, reproductive pigs, 
machines, equipment, workshops), houses, assets, exchanging lands, etc; (ii) selling gold, silver, 
precious stone, jewelry; (iii) withdrawal from savings, stocks, obtaining debts, etc; (iv) 
borrowing on interest, advance payment; and other uncategorized items.  
Total expenditure also is grouped in four categories. The first category includes expenditure on 
foods and drinks. The second category consists the non-food living expenditure:  (i) daily non-
food (expenditure on housing, electricity, water and garbage; soap, shampoo, newspapers, 
flowers, entertainment, etc.); (ii) annual non-food (clothes, other garments, household items, 
internet, travel fee, services, etc.); (iii) health and education fee. The third category is 
expenditure for repairing and purchasing fix assets, durable goods, and house, land. The final 
category of expenditure includes: (i) other spending that is considered as expenditure: legal and 
administrative fees and taxes; contribution/support to funds/donations; wedding, funeral, 
entertainments; and others; (ii) other spending that is not considered as expenditure: debt 
repayment, incomplete big investment, and other uncategorized types.  
Then saving is summation of residual income (difference between total income and total 
expenditure)  and other spending for saving purpose, including: (i) lending, contributing to 
revolving credit groups, buying shares and bonds; (ii) buying gold, silver, gemstone, foreign 
exchange; (iii) depositing in savings accounts; (iv) buying life and life security insurance. 
Overall, the data shows that the total income significantly increased in 2008 compared to 2006. 
The increase is highest  for “out households”, followed by “continuing households” , and lowest 
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for “ in households”. Increases in income are attributable to all three income categories, except 
for the second category of “continuing households” and “ in households”. The total expenditure 
of these groups of households also increased , and highest increase is for “out households”. 
Increases in the third and fourth categories of spending of group “out households” are 
remarkable greater than these other two groups of household. Hence, with highest income and 
expenditure in 2008, this group “in households” had lowest saving, and the group “in 
households” obtained the greatest saving. Especially, saving in all groups of household 
decreased in 2008 compared to 2006. The data also shows that loans obtained in “in 
households in” is greatest in 2008; and an increase in loans obtained in 2008 compared to 2006 
is highest in “continuing households”, but is negative in “out households”. Thus, an access to 
credit may be linked to the motivation to increase investment in cultivation.  
2.4.4. Price index 
The price data are not in the VHLSS but come from another source of the Vietnam General 
Statistic Office. Due to the absence of real price, we have to use a price index instead of 
measuring the level of prices.  
Retail price index at national and regional level 
Deriving from the test of Deaton (1990), Table 2.5 shows summary statistics for the retail price 
indices from three crop groups during the two surveys for May 2006 to November 2008 that 
the analysis uses (details in the followed section). Retail price indices are normalized to be 100 
at January 2005. These indices reflect level of increase in nominal prices, and note that they are 
not real prices. The coefficients variation show the extent of variability in relation to the mean 
of the sample. Rice price indices appear to have greatest volatility 0.29, following by other 
staples at 0.22 and vegetables at 0.19. The coefficients of autocorrelation are tested at lags of 
one and six months to reflect the seasonal variation. The first-order autocorrelation are high for 
all groups, at 0.99 for other staples, and 0.98 for rice and vegetables. The autocorrelation still 
remains high for six months lags, especially other staples. 
Price index at household level 
I use the monthly retail price index to measure the degree of price shocks at household level. 
There are two limitations in the use of these price indices. First, the relevant price for producers 
is the farm-gate price index since this would capture more precisely the effect on the 
production decision of farmers. Because only the farm-gate price index for rice is available, I 
have to employ the retail price index. Nonetheless, the degree of fluctuation in the margin 
between retail and farm gate price indices is fairly small, as shown in Figure 2.3 for rice. Second, 
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the retail price indices are disaggregated  by three groups of crops. The retail price indices are 
available at national level for all three groups, but at regional level only for rice and other 
staples.10 Since the average revenue of vegetables  accounts for a small fraction of crops and 
fluctuates less, it may be acceptable to combine this national index with the regional indices of 
these two groups.  
In order to construct the index of price shocks at household level, this index/variable has to 
capture the price change with the weight of each crop in the basket corresponding to the  
household’s production. The price index at household level therefore is adjusted by the share of  
three type of crops in used sample. The retail price indices in each year (2006 and 2008) are 
identified in regional level, denoted by j, except vegetables at national level, and the crop 
groups (γ 1=rice, γ 2=other staples, γ 3=vegetable). The retail price index is then transformed to 
household level (i ) by multiplying the difference of retail price index between 2006 and 2008 
with shares of crops of a household (g). Shares of crops are measured by two indicators: share 
of total output value and share of sole/ bartered value.11  This is shown as:  
                               
 
   
            
2.5. Empirical approach 
In this section, the theoretical framework developed in section 2 will be translated into an 
econometric model which can be estimates using the VHLSS data. Household behaviour 
(investment, saving, expenditure) is expected to be influenced by the level of food price shocks 
alone, and conditional on financial constraints.  
Investment, saving and expenditure 
Initially, the model is estimated in first differences using the panel data for 2006 and 2008. 
Differencing eliminates time-invariant fix effects at household level. These unobserved factors 
could be correlated with the price weights to share of crops and lead to bias in estimating the 
effects of the price spike on investment or expenditure decisions.  
                                                     
10
 The difference in distribution of national and regional price indices is shown in Figure 2.7. 
11
 According to the survey, these crops were collected with different information. Rice crop has details of output 
value on: total value, lost, sold or bartered, retained as breeds, used as food, used as food for cattle or poultry, 
used as gift, lending or input of business, payment, etc., left for future consumption. However, other staples and 
vegetables have details on: total value, sold/bartered, retained for consumption.  
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where        is expenditure on agricultural assets in 2007-2008 period, and      is 
uncorrelated to       due to the assumption                , then the first-difference 
estimator is unbiased and consistent.  
Moreover, the time-varying factors at regional level are also aware of potential effect. The 
model includes a dummy variable     captures the regional-specific effects on investment of 
each region j. Inclusion of this dummy variable can account for the different characteristics of 
regions vary in terms of natural endowments, crop structure, food consumption behaviour, etc.  
For example, the highland and mountainous regions are suitable for industrial crops than rice 
and staple crops as in delta regions (Table 2.2). This lack of homogeneity might induce the 
households in different regions adjust to price shocks in different ways.   
The effect of price index volatility on investment is estimated by the first-difference model:  
                                
The impact of price shocks on investment is estimated by the coefficient   . If increased price 
shocks raise investment, the coefficient will be positive,      Otherwise, the price shocks may 
decrease investment,    ;  or leave it uninfluenced. The standard error is clustered at area 
(urban and rural) and provincial level.12  
The same procedure is applied for saving and expenditure. Since the expenditure may vary 
depending on items, the model tests for total expenditure and separately food expenditure. 
Replacing the investment dependent variable in equations (18) and (19) by the difference of 
saving and expenditure during 2006 and 2008, the estimation function are:  
                                         
                                             
                                                     
12
 The first-difference regression assumes that the residuals are independent. The sample contains households 
covering all 8 regions, 64 provinces of both  urban and rural areas in Vietnam. Heterogeneity across regions is 
controlled by dummy variables. Hence, it is possible that the impact of price shock may not independent within 
each province, and  this could cause the residuals that are dependent within province and within urban or rural 
areas also. The cluster option  indicates that the households are clustered within area-province and correlated 
within area-province but may not correlated across area- province. The correlations within area- province are 
checked graphically and statistically, and  reveal that correlation coefficient values (between  price shock and  
investment) are fairly diversified.  
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Imperfect credit market 
According to theoretical analysis, given a positive income shock, wealthier producers will invest 
more due to their greater availability of financial sources, whereas the less wealthy producers 
will save or spend more. An alternative possibility is that poor producer takes advantage of 
their higher marginal return on capital relative to that of rich producers. If poor producers gain 
in terms of income from the price shocks, they will invest more in production. Therefore, the 
decision of the producer depends on which effect dominates. The model examines the effect of 
price shocks on investment, saving, and expenditure conditional on initial wealth conditions. 
Initial wealth is captured by both disposable income and loan obtained. We use the total 
income and loan obtained over the last 12 months in 2008 representing for the initial wealth. 
The wealth variable (  ) enters the model both linearly and through an interaction term. 
Applying this to equation (14) we get:   
                                                        
In addition, when land serves as collateral, small producers may find themselves credit 
constrained and reduce their investment. Although the theoretical model does not allow us to  
distinguish the effects of credit constraints or increasing return to scale, the model examines 
the total effect of price shocks on investment conditional on land size. Similarly to the initial 
wealth, the land size in 2006 variable (  ) enters linearly and as an interaction term with the 
price index. 
                                                     
2.6. Estimation results 
2.6.1.The effects on investment, saving and consumption in general 
This section uses the theoretical and empirical models to test the hypothesis that households 
increased investment, or alternatively that households increased saving and consumption. As 
shown in the theoretical analysis, households gain income from positive price shocks and this 
leads to adjustment of their spending allocation. By taking advantage of the higher prices, 
households can boost investment in order to increase farm profit. In that analysis we assumed 
that households were risk-neutral. They prefer to increase investment in the absence of credit 
constraints to undertake the required amount of investment in relation to  high future 
expected price. Instead, households may leave investment unchanged and increase saving or 
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consumption if credit constraints impedes their ability to expand the cultivation. Households 
also can adjust their expenditure baskets depending on price of different goods. The model 
therefore also distinguishes the impact on total expenditure and food expenditure.   
Table 2.8 reports the first-difference estimation of equations (19, 20 and 21) to evaluate the 
effects of overall the price spike. Panel A shows  result of price index measured by share of  
total output revenue, and Panel B shows result of price index measured by share of sole output 
revenue. The impacts on the investment, saving and food expenditure  are positive, with an 
exception of total expenditure. The effects of both price indices are quite similar. The first 
column shows statistically significant positive effect of price shocks on investment at less than 
the 1 percent level. This implies that households which experienced  higher level of price shocks 
expanded production by increasing fixed assets investment. The effect of the price shocks on 
saving is positive, but not statistically significant. Hence, there is no evidence that households 
are influenced by precautionary motives to save in order to smooth consumption. In addition, 
estimation reveals that the price shocks have a negative effect on  total expenditure and a 
positive effect on food expenditure, but again the effects are not statistically significant.  
2.6.2. The effects in relation to market imperfections 
This section considers the effects of the price shocks on decisions in relation to investment, 
savings and consumption decisions incorporating with financial conditions (income, loan and 
land) levels as a measure of financial constraint. There are two options to measure those initial 
financial variables in terms of timing, in 2006 or in 2008. Each wave of survey collected the 
information over  the past 12 months. For instance, household income in the 2006 VHLSS 
survey was the income that households obtained during previous 12 months until the day they 
were interviewed in 2006. We use financial conditions in 2006 as a proxy for initial financial 
variables. This is in line with the period of price shocks used between the two waves of survey.  
The followed results are estimated from the equations (22, 23).  
 Income 
In the theoretical model, less wealthy households may decrease investment or leave it 
unchanged and increase savings and consumption due to borrowing constraints. They also may 
increase investment due to the higher marginal return to capital. Financial wealth is firstly 
measured by income per capita in 2006. Table 2.9 shows the estimates of price shocks 
conditional on income per capita in 2006 as initial financial situation. The interaction term 
between income and price shocks has significant positive parameters on investment and saving, 
and significant negative parameter on total expenditure. This parameter is negative on food 
expenditure but not statistically significant. This shows that the effect of price shocks has a 
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positive effect on investment conditional on available income in 2006. To compare the 
magnitude of the effect, we need to compute the marginal effect.  From the estimated model 
in Panel A,  the marginal impact of price shocks during 2006-08 on investment is: 
   
    
 
              , where the mean of total income per capita in 2006 is 8.65, hence the 
marginal effect for mean income is 0.78. This effect is interpreted as, at mean of income, 
investment increases 78 percent point for every one unit increase in price index. Analogously, 
the marginal effect of the price shock index measured by share of sole revenue  is: 
   
    
 
              , and the effect is 0.94. As in the general case, this finding shows that  the 
more market-oriented households are likely to response more to positive price shocks.   
Access to loans   
Table 2.10 shows the  estimated results of price shock impact conditional on value of loan 
obtained. The parameters of the interaction term between the loan variable and price shocks 
are statistically significant positive for only investment. Based on the parameters of the direct 
effect in Panel A, the interaction term and mean of loan obtained at 3.286, 
   
   
       
       , we can compute the effect to be equal to 0.868. Similarly, the effect of the price 
index measured by sales value in Panel B is 0.979 and higher than the price index of total value 
in Panel A . This implies that households those which had access to higher loan are likely to 
increase investment, and households with more market-oriented productions respond more. 
Thus, as in the case of income, households with higher loans have more incentive to increase 
investment, but not saving. The effect of loans has a lower magnitude of parameter. This could 
be explained as value of loan accounts for only a fraction of total income. The household may 
use alternative financial sources, for example, from remittances, social welfare, etc. which 
could constitute a larger share in total income of household than loan obtained (as shown in 
descriptive statistic, Table 2.7).   
Farmland 
As referred above, the survey only provides information on land used to grow crops in the 
previous 12 months. This could be lower or higher than the actual area landholdings. To match 
with the income and loan variables above, the analysis test for land used in 2006. As in the 
empirical framework, the farmland is a factor of production and can become a financial source 
when it serves as collateral for obtaining credit. The larger the producer is, the higher possibility 
he has access to a greater value of credit. Thus, the theoretical model predicts that the smaller 
producers have less incentive to increase investment due to the borrowing constraint when 
facing positive income shocks. Instead, they will increase saving and consumption.  
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Table 2.11 shows that the results of the impact of price shock when interacted with farm land. 
The land used in linear variable and interaction variable have statistically significant effect on 
investment only with the price index of total value in Panel A. Interaction term of land size and 
price shock negatively affects on investment. With the mean of land size in 2006 is 2.2, the 
marginal effect of the price shock on food spending conditional on mean of land size,  
   
    
                 , is 0.326.  Therefore, the larger farmer tends to decrease 
investment in response to higher price shocks. 
Tobit model to deal with zero investment 
The results report significant and consistent effect of price shock on investment and also in 
relation with financial conditions. We now further focus on investment equation by other 
empirical test. We observe in this sample that there are around 11 percent of households who 
did not spend on fix assets.  Therefore, the Tobit model is employed to control the effect of 
households with zero investment against the case of households with positive investment.   
Table 2.12 shows  estimated effects of price shock on investment. All tests still take into 
consideration of regional dummy variables and area-province clusters. In both Panel A and B, 
price shocks have positive effects on investment, and interaction terms with income and loan 
have positive effect on investment, except for the case of land with negative effect. The results 
are all similar to those of first-difference tests in terms of magnitude and sign.  
The effects in 3D space charts  
In order to visualize the estimation results with interaction term, I illustrate the effects on 
investment of income, loan obtained, and land in hyper-plane graphs. Based on the statistically 
significant results, the effect on dependent variables are computed from estimated parameters 
of independent variables. A three dimensional surface chart is created on three-axis space 
which represents for these three variables in each regression function. Scale of each axis falls 
into the distribution  (min and max values) of  independent variable that axis represents. 
Colours on the surface chart are associated with changes of the value or the effect  on 
dependent variable and specified in the data band. The lighter the colour indicates the higher 
value of effect.  The lines between data bands and lines within data bands  corresponds to 
gridlines on the chart walls and chart floor.  
Figure 2.6A shows the effect of investment on fix asset investment conditional on income. As 
we can see, the surface of the chart in the region of lowest income moves to downward in 
investment axis along increasing price index. Whereas, the surface of the chart in the region of 
higher income constantly converts to upward trend and appears to be steepest at highest 
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income. We can alternatively navigate that, at the lowest price index, the area of the chart goes 
down along higher income, which shows a decreasing trend of investment. In contrast, at the 
highest price index, the area of surface goes up along higher income, and hence shows the 
revert effect of investment.  Figure 2.6B depicts the effect on investment of the price shocks 
conditional on loan obtained. In this case, the chart shows that change in effect on investment 
of higher price index is less significant between lowest and highest loan. This also is referred as 
the lower parameter of interaction terms of loan than that of income. In contrast, Figure 2.6C 
illustrates the negative effects of the price shocks on investment conditional on land size, 
respectively.  
2.7. Conclusion  
This study has investigated the short-term impact of the food price crisis on productive 
investment, saving and expenditure decisions in Vietnam by using panel data covering 2006 and 
2008 and in conjunction with regional food price indices. The empirical results show a positive 
impact of higher food prices on only fix asset investment over the crisis period. The impact of 
the price shocks are positive on saving and negative on total expenditure, but both are not 
statistically significant. Moreover, when the price shocks are incorporated with financial 
condition, the findings reveal that the effects of household income, loan obtained and land size 
matter. Higher-income households tended to invest more in response to higher level of the 
price shocks and those with higher loan obtained also tended to invest more. Whereas the 
higher-income households and larger-landholding households respectively were likely to 
decrease total expenditure and food expenditure. Higher-income households also saved more 
to respond with higher level of the price shocks. This implies that low-income households tend 
to be more constrained as the result of imperfect financial markets and hence are unable to 
increase productive investment as much as they might have wished.  
Based on this empirical evidence, the study shows the important role of capital in investment 
decision in production with higher expected profit. The poor farm households are under-
capitalized and subject to be more vulnerable. The positive food price shocks not only caused 
the negative impact of the poor (since they are likely to be net food consumers) but also 
broaden the gap with the rich farmers. The implication therefore suggests that mitigating the 
credit constraint can both reduce poverty and increase the investment in productive assets. 
Hence the efficiency in input-allocation can lead to higher profit and smoother consumption. 
This binding can be relaxed through mechanisms or policies that provide and assist external 
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financial sources for farmers. Consequently, the investment could further accelerate the long-
term benefit and push upward agricultural production. 13  
 
  
                                                     
13
 The preview of data in Table 2.13 reports the significant increase in income by an increase in production 
investment during global crisis in short-term. 
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Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Structure of Vietnam economy  in 2007 
   Share of total (%) Export 
intensity* 
Import 
intensity**    GDP Employment Exports Imports 
Total GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Agriculture 22.1 53.9 7.6 2 21.3 8.4 
 Crops 13.4 36.6 4.6 1.4 23.3 10.3 
 Livestock 2.7 8.5 0.4 0 7.4 1.6 
 Forestry/Fishing 5.9 8.8 2.6 0.6 23.4 8.2 
Industry 41.7 19.9 76.1 85.4 38.5 48.7 
 Mining  10.9 0.9 19 0.6 82.9 14.9 
 Manufacturing 20.1 13.3 57.1 84.9 40.7 57.8 
  Agro-processing 5.8 4.1 12.5 4.3 33.5 20.3 
  Textiles/clothing 3.7 2.2 25.8 15.3 68.6 62.2 
  Wood/paper 1.4 0.8 2.9 3 34.9 44.2 
  Fuel/chemicals 2.8 2.3 3.2 22.5 21.8 74.7 
  Metals/machinery 4.4 3 11.9 38.5 36.8 70.4 
  Other 2.8 1.4 1.4 2.7 8.1 17.6 
 Others 10.7 5.7 0 0 0 0 
Services 36.2 26.1 16.3 12.6 22 20.5 
Source: Calculation of Thurlow et al. (2010) using the 2007 social accounting matrix Arndt et al. 
(2009) 
Note: (*) Export intensity is the share of exports in gross domestic output. (**) Import intensity 
is the share of imports in total demand of input.  
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Table 2.2: Share of crop production in 2006  
 
Rice Other 
staples 
Vegetables Total 
sample* 
Total sample / 
Total survey 
Red River Delta 83.13 6.69 10.18 100 85.54 
North East 65.40 20.04 14.57 100 77.95 
North West 56.14 30.53 13.33 100 82.55 
North Central Coast 72.41 15.95 11.64 100 73.97 
South Central Coast 75.36 15.36 9.28 100 81.25 
Central Highlands 48.38 33.12 18.50 100 63.40 
North East South 58.52 29.18 12.30 100 73.16 
Mekong River Delta 83.52 1.88 14.60 100 84.89 
Total 72.52 14.87 12.61 100 79.85 
Source: Calculation from the 2006 VHLSS. 
Note: (*)Total sample refers to crops used in the paper, which are excluded perennial, industry, 
fruits from  total crops collected in the survey.  
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Table 2.3: Basic information of farm households 
Panel A: Sample from VHLSS 2006 
  
   
Quantiles   
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
Land (acres) 2,531 2.09 3.55 0 0.65 1.26 2.17 72.03 
Crop expenditure (total) 2,285 4,339 9,553 2 1,271 2,256 3,820 190,264 
Crop expenditure (per area)   2,285 2,154 2,794 82 1,400 1,961 2,443 93,474 
Crop income (total) 2,303 5,583 8,065 -29,462 1,953 3,866 6,190 182,852 
Crop income (per area)   2,303 3,740 11,523 -85,684 2,150 2,860 3,699 492,241 
Crop income (per capita)  2,303 1,262 1,706 -9,821 499 896 1,462 36,570 
Household size 2,303 4.52 1.66 1 4 4 5 15 
Age of hh head 2,303 47.77 13.01 19 38 46 56 89 
Education of hh head 2,303 2.69 0.83 1 2 3 3 5 
Source: Calculation from the 2006 VHLSS. 
Note: All the values are deflated to price in January 2006  
 
Panel B: Sample from VHLSS 2008 
    
Quantiles 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
Investment * 2,053 461 4147 1 26 55 118 142041 
Land (acres) 2,303 2.32 5.08 0.00 0.72 1.28 2.24 158.08 
Crop expenditure (total) 2,282 5,418 16,751 1 1,336 2,458 4,384 533,775 
Crop expenditure per land 2,282 2,498 5,837 23 1,514 2,156 2,807 188,799 
Crop income (total) 2,303 6,930 17,118 -47,607 2,228 4,268 7,236 606,523 
Crop income per land  2,303 4,048 7,636 -160,618 2,387 3,306 4,266 194,793 
Crop income (per capita)  2,303 1,652 4,846 -9,521 560 1,047 1,756 202,174 
Household size 2,303 4.39 1.71 1 3 4 5 14 
Source: Calculation from the 2008 VHLSS. 
Note: All values are deflated to price in January 2006. (*) Asset investment is decomposed into 
groups of items purchased in the table below. 
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Table 2.4: Investment on fixed assets, 2007-08 (VND 1,000) 
  
   
Quantiles 
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
Agricultural tools* 2036 87 156 1 24 47 95 3,591 
Minor repair assets** 314 124 310 2 22 49 100 3,344 
Rice milling machine 9 4,570 2,528 865 2,847 3,472 6,636 8,329 
Harvesting machine 13 6,189 12,702 266 530 641 8,742 46,418 
Pesticide sprayer 7 6,820 15,034 230 1,062 1,235 1,878 40,896 
Tractor 4 35,379 56,194 883 3,609 10,710 67,148 119,211 
Tractor plough 22 12,737 14,998 1,272 4,695 8,671 15,432 72,055 
Cart 20 962 508 412 596 897 1,097 2,481 
Pump 42 2,828 4,542 177 733 1,461 3,194 26,780 
Power generator 3 3,312 2,642 581 581 3,498 5,856 5,856 
Total 2060 463 4,141 1 26 55 119 142,041 
Source: Calculation from the 2008 VHLSS. 
Note: All values are deflated to price at January 2006. (*)Agricultural tools include small and 
non-durable tools such as: sickles, shears, shovels, jackknifes, etc. (*) and (**) are expenditure 
of production which spent during last 12 months. The other items are fixed assets which were 
bought during 2007-2008 and have value over 500,000 VND at time purchased.  
 
 
Table 2.5: Variation of monthly commodity price indices, 2006-08  
 
Coefficient of variation  
Autocorrelation 
 1 month 6 months 
Rice 0.29 0.98 0.71 
Other staples 0.22 0.99 0.93 
Vegetables 0.12 0.98 0.76 
Source: Calculation from data of GSO  
Note: Period during the two rounds of survey, from May 2006 to November 2008 
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Table 2.6: Variable description 
1 Price volatility The sum of change in price indices of 3 crops (rice, other staples and 
vegetables) during the period between the two surveys 2006-2008 and 
weighted by  revenue shares of each crops. 
2 Investment Log of total expenditure on fixed assets during 2007-2008 (table 4) 
3 Saving Log difference of saving amount (total income minus total expenditure) 
between 2006 and 2008. 
4 Living expenditure Log difference of food, nonfood and other annual consumption 
between 2006 and 2008. 
5 Fix/Durable expenditure Log difference of spending on repaired and purchased fix assets, 
durable goods, and house/land  between 2006 and 2008. 
6 Other expenditure Log difference of debt repayment, lending, buying gold, or silver, 
deposit, buying insurance, big investment, other kind of fee, tax, 
donation, etc. between 2006 and 2008 
7 Total income Log disposal income in 2006 and 2008  
8 Income 1 Log income from wages, farm and non-farm, and business in 2006 and 
2008 
9 Income 2 Log income from remittances, social allowance, pension, insurance, 
subsidies, interest of saving account, bonds, etc. in 2006 and 2008 
10 Income 3 Log income from selling means, leasing equipment, withdrawing 
account, borrowing, advanced payment, etc. in 2006 and 2008 
11 Loan Log of loan obtained in 2006 and 2008 
12 Land 2006 and Land 2008 Size of land used for cultivating crops (acres) in 2006 and 2008. 
Note: Variables (except 1 and 12) are adjusted in per capita and deflated in January 2006. 
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Table 2.7: Financial sources of households in 2006 and 2008 (VND 1,000) 
      2006     2008   
      
Continuing 
HHa 
Out HHb  In HHc  Continuing 
HH 
Out HH  In HH 
Total income 7,305 9,528 11,115   8,386 12,406 11,141 
 
Income 1  4,850  6,007  5,848   5,499  7,008  6,578 
 
Income 2  1,094  2,014  2,847   965  2,305  1,811 
 
Income 3  1,360  1,506  2,419   1,921  3,093  2,752 
Total expenditure 6,217 8,050 9,067   7,818 12,442 9,648 
 
Food  2,103  2,546  2,629   2,450  2,884  2,975 
 
Non-food  1,829  2,720  2,813   2,257  2,864  3,110 
 
Fix/durable  1,284  1,185  1,736   1,700  3,158  1,408 
 
Other spending  1,472  2,196  2,688   2,094  4,226  3,066 
Saving= Inc. - Exp. 1,579   2,308   2,466     1,093   1,284   2,281   
 
                                          
Loan  990   1,782   1,731     2,138   1,224   2,364   
 
                                          
Obs.  2,303 225 168 
 
2,303 225 168 
% of obs.  85.28 8.51 6.21  85.28 8.51 6.21 
Source: Calculation from the 2006 and 2008 VHLSS. 
Note: a, b, c  respectively refer to households continued to cultivate crops during the period of 
2006-08, households stopped cultivating in 2008, and households started cultivating in 2008. 
The values are per capita and deflated in January 2006.  
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Table 2.8: Estimated effect of price shocks, 2006-08 
Panel A: Price index measured by share of output revenue 
 
Investment Saving Total exp. Food exp. 
Price Index 0.903*** 0.368 -0.008 0.043 
 
(0.224) (0.309) (0.065) (0.035) 
Intercept 2.051*** -1.809*** 0.194 0.081 
 
(0.419) (0.570) (0.120) (0.064) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area-Province clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,303 2,303 2,303 2,303 
R-squared 0.040 0.008 0.004 0.024 
     Panel B: Price index measured by share of sole revenue 
 
Investment Saving Total exp. Food exp. 
Price Index 1.014*** 0.083 -0.033 0.033 
 
(0.114) (0.227) (0.043) (0.024) 
Intercept 1.752*** -1.299*** 0.242*** 0.095** 
 
(0.240) (0.449) (0.087) (0.046) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area-Province clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,303 2,303 2,303 2,303 
R-squared 0.079 0.008 0.005 0.024 
Note: ***, **, *  denote the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and clustered at the area (rural/urban) and provincial level. The seven regional 
dummies are included but not reported.  
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Table 2.9: Estimated effect of price shocks and income by first-difference model 
Panel A: Price index measured by share of output revenue 
 
Investment Saving Total exp. Food exp. 
Price Index (PI) -4.185** -2.177 0.266 -0.312 
 
(1.696) (3.753) (0.814) (0.392) 
Total income * PI 0.574*** 0.277 -0.037 0.038 
 
(0.196) (0.431) (0.094) (0.045) 
Total income  -1.060*** -1.019 -0.228 -0.194** 
 
(0.358) (0.774) (0.172) (0.081) 
Intercept 11.443*** 7.274 2.244 1.811** 
 
(3.127) (6.765) (1.484) (0.713) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area-Province clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,303 2,303 2,303 2,303 
R-squared 0.045 0.014 0.078 0.064 
     Panel B: Price index measured by share of sales revenue 
 
Investment Saving Total exp. Food exp. 
Price Index (PI) -1.620* -0.803 0.072 -0.206 
 
(0.960) (2.125) (0.632) (0.237) 
Total income * PI 0.296*** 0.089 -0.018 0.024 
 
(0.107) (0.240) (0.073) (0.027) 
Total income  -0.514** -0.696 -0.267* -0.171*** 
 
(0.207) (0.432) (0.142) (0.052) 
Intercept 6.345*** 4.952 2.642** 1.629*** 
 
(1.876) (3.853) (1.226) (0.460) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area-Province clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,303 2,303 2,303 2,303 
R-squared 0.082 0.013 0.081 0.064 
Note: ***, **, *  denote the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and clustered at the area (rural/urban) and provincial level. The seven regional 
dummies are included but not reported.  
  
60 
 
Table 2.10: Estimated effect of price shocks and loan by first-difference model 
Panel A: Price index measured by share of output revenue   
 
Investment Saving Total exp. Food exp. 
Price Index (PI) 0.503** 0.227 0.002 0.048 
 
(0.250) (0.380) (0.076) (0.044) 
Loan * PI 0.111*** 0.054 -0.006 -0.001 
 
(0.040) (0.074) (0.011) (0.007) 
Loan -0.198*** -0.021 -0.007 0.005 
 
(0.074) (0.140) (0.020) (0.012) 
Intercept 2.773*** -1.800** 0.235 0.060 
 
(0.474) (0.716) (0.144) (0.079) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area-Province clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,303 2,303 2,303 2,303 
R-squared 0.046 0.013 0.014 0.025 
     Panel B: Price index measured by share of sales revenue 
 
Investment Saving Total exp. Food exp. 
Price Index (PI) 0.785*** -0.185 -0.008 0.043 
 
(0.138) (0.304) (0.059) (0.031) 
Loan * PI 0.059*** 0.074 -0.007 -0.002 
 
(0.020) (0.051) (0.009) (0.004) 
Loan -0.109*** -0.065 -0.004 0.008 
 
(0.040) (0.108) (0.018) (0.008) 
Intercept 2.182*** -1.029* 0.254** 0.064 
 
(0.292) (0.612) (0.122) (0.059) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area-Province clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,303 2,303 2,303 2,303 
R-squared 0.083 0.013 0.015 0.025 
Note: ***, **, *  denote the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and clustered at the area (rural/urban) and provincial level. The seven regional 
dummies are included but not reported.  
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Table 2.11: Estimated effect of price shocks and land by first-difference model 
Panel A: Price index measured by share of output revenue 
 
Investment Saving Total exp. Food exp. 
Price index (PI) 0.801*** 0.207 -0.005 0.070* 
 
(0.210) (0.357) (0.077) (0.041) 
Land * PI -0.216** 0.046 0.004 -0.019 
 
(0.080) (0.152) (0.022) (0.015) 
Land  0.570*** -0.032 -0.011 0.033 
 
(0.168) (0.310) (0.045) (0.028) 
Intercept 1.886*** -1.637** 0.196 0.039 
 
(0.392) (0.665) (0.141) (0.073) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area-Province clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,303 2,303 2,303 2,303 
R-squared 0.107 0.010 0.005 0.027 
     Panel B: Price index measured by share of sales revenue 
 
Investment Saving Total exp. Food exp. 
Price index (PI) 0.837*** -0.007 -0.028 0.050** 
 
(0.113) (0.241) (0.049) (0.025) 
Land * PI -0.027 -0.003 -0.002 -0.024 
 
(0.070) (0.160) (0.021) (0.018) 
Land  0.183 0.069 0.001 0.043 
 
(0.142) (0.328) (0.043) (0.035) 
Intercept 1.806*** -1.265*** 0.239** 0.074 
 
(0.227) (0.474) (0.096) (0.047) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area-Province clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,303 2,303 2,303 2,303 
R-squared 0.130 0.010 0.005 0.028 
Note: ***, **, *  denote the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and clustered at the area (rural/urban) and provincial level. The seven regional 
dummies are included but not reported.  
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Table 2.12: Estimated effect of price shocks by Tobit model  
Panel A: Price index measured by share of output revenue 
 
Investment 
Price index 1.074*** -4.726** 0.610** 0.985*** 
 
(0.271) (2.006) (0.293) (0.258) 
Income*PI 
 
0.654*** 
  
  
(0.233) 
  Income 
 
-1.224*** 
  
  
(0.430) 
  Loan*PI 
  
0.130*** 
 
   
(0.047) 
 Loan 
  
-0.235*** 
 
   
(0.087) 
 Land * PI 
   
-0.243*** 
    
(0.090) 
Land 
   
0.631*** 
    
(0.187) 
Intercept 1.963** 12.786*** -0.593 1.329** 
  (0.637) (3.738) (0.514) (0.575) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area-Province clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N (censored) 2,303 (250) 2,303 (250) 2,303 (250) 2,303 (250) 
Log pseudolikelihood -4670 -4664 -4595 -4595 
Note: ***, **, *  denote the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and clustered at the area (rural/urban) and provincial level. The seven regional 
dummies are included but not reported.  
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Panel B: Price index measured by share of sole revenue 
 
Investment 
Price index 1.207*** -2.338* 0.922*** 1.025*** 
 
(0.160) (1.317) (0.178) (0.156) 
Income*PI 
 
0.399*** 
  
  
(0.150) 
  Income 
 
-0.720** 
  
  
(0.294) 
  Loan*PI 
  
0.075*** 
 
   
(0.027) 
 Loan 
  
-0.142*** 
   
(0.054) 
 Land * PI 
   
-0.243*** 
    
(0.090) 
Land 
   
0.631*** 
    
(0.187) 
Intercept 1.748*** 8.137** 2.289*** 1.329** 
  (0.431) (2.634) (0.469) (0.575) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area-Province clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,303 (250) 2,303 (250) 2,303 (250) 2,303 (250) 
Log pseudolikelihood -4618 -4614 -4613 -4595 
Note: ***, **, *  denote the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Standard errors are in 
parentheses and clustered at the area (rural/urban) and provincial level. The seven regional 
dummies are included but not reported.  
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Table 2.13: Preview of survey data 
Panel A: Log of increase in crop income across quantiles of investment 
Quantiles of investment Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Increase in crop income -0.237 -0.065 0.152 0.204 0.316 
 
Panel B: Log of investment across quantiles of price volatility 
Quantiles of price volatility Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Investment 3.247 3.825 3.933 3.814 3.573 
Note: *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5 %, * significant at the 10 %. Standard 
errors are in parentheses and clustered at the provincial level. The dummy variables are 
included in the test but not reported.  
 
Table 2.14: Distribution of households' access to credit market in formal and informal 
markets 
Panel A: Indonesia 
    Poorest Poor Less poor 
Formal 
    
 
% access 13 17 34 
 
Amount (US$) 3 26 154 
Informal 
    
 
% access 78 81 58 
 Amount (US$) 11 13 19 
Source: Data is from survey in two districts of Central Sulawesi Province, Indonesia where the 
poverty rate is relatively high (46.1 % in 2004) compared to other districts (Nuryartono, 2006).   
Note: Data is in poor group of the survey.  
 
Panel B: Vietnam  
    Low Medium High 
Formal 
    
 
% access 29 35 43 
 
Amount (US$) 329 509 1,509 
Informal 
    
 
% access 19 20 19 
 Amount (US$) 210 368 973 
Source: Calculation from the 2006 VHLSS.  
Note: Data of the survey covers the whole country.   
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Figures 
 
Figure 2.1: International FAO food price indices during 2005-2009  
 
Source: FAO’s database.  
Note: The FAO food price index is a measure of the monthly change in international prices of a 
basket of food commodities. It consists of the average of five commodity group price indices, 
and weighted with the average export shares of each of the groups. Similarly, each of the 
followed five group (Meat, Dairy, Cereals, Oils and Fats, Sugar) commodities is computed from 
average prices of a basket of that specific group and also weighted by world average export 
trade shares.  These price indices are normalized at 100 percent in January 2005.  
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Figure 2.2: Growth rates by sectors in Vietnam, 2000-2009 
 
Source: Statistical yearbook of Vietnam 2009, GSO. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Price indices of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, 2005-2009  
 
Source: (*) Calculation from data of Ministry of Finance, (**) calculation from data of GSO. 
Note: (i) Ordinary rice retail and paddy farm-gate price indices  are from Vietnam. 
(ii) The prices are monthly available, except for farm gate price of paddy (unhusked rice), so all 
prices are converted to quarterly prices for comparable purpose. Prices are normalized at 100 
percent in January 2005.  
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Figure 2.4: Monthly retail price indices of main crops in Vietnam, 2005-2009 
 
Source: Calculation from data of GSO.  
Note: The price indices are normalized at 100 percent in January 2005.  
 
Figure 2.5: Retail price indices of ordinary rice across regions in Vietnam,  2005-2009 
 
Source: Calculation from data of GSO 
Note: The price indices are normalized at 100 percent in January 2005.  
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Figure 2.6A: Effect on investment of price shocks conditional on income  
 
Note: The graph based on estimates of column 1, Panel A, Table 2.9. The scales of Income and 
Price Index fall into their distribution, [6.7; 12] and [1.3; 2.3], respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
1.3 
1.45 
1.6 
1.75 
1.9 
2.05 
2.2 
0 
0,5 
1 
1,5 
2 
2,5 
3 
3,5 
4 
4,5 
5 
Price Index 
Fi
x 
as
se
ts
 in
ve
st
m
e
n
t 
(l
n
) 
Income (ln) 
4,5-5 
4-4,5 
3,5-4 
3-3,5 
2,5-3 
2-2,5 
1,5-2 
1-1,5 
0,5-1 
0-0,5 
69 
 
Figure 2.6B: Effect on investment of price shocks conditional on loan obtained 
 
Note: The graph replies on estimate of column 1, Panel A, Table 2.10. The scales of Loan and 
Price Index fall into their distribution, [0; 10.7] and [1.3; 2.3], respectively.  
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Figure 2.6C: Effect on investment of price shocks conditional on farmland 
 
Note: The graph bases on estimates of column 1, Panel A, Table 2.11. The scales of Farmland 
and Price Index fall into their distribution, [0; 10] and [1.3; 2.3], respectively.  
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of price volatility index, 2006-08 
  
 
 
 
Note: The analysis uses the regional price index (vegetables price still are at national level) that 
looks more symmetric and more fluctuated than national price index. However, at the lowest 
level of regional index (on the left), the distribution appears unusual higher. Those two groups 
include households grew only vegetables that lead those household keep staying at the stable 
price index. N=2,303 
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Figure 2.8: Investment in agricultural assets, 2006-08 
 
Note: Log of total expenditure. N=2,060 
 
 
Figure 2.9: The difference in log income from crop between 2006 and 2008  
 
Note: N=2,303 
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Appendix 14  
 
Now suppose the household is unable to borrow. The consequence is that investment must be 
financed by current saving. Equations (1) and (2) become 
    1 1 1 1 1c q i k p f k     (1’) 
    2 2 2 2 1 1c p f k p f k i     (2’) 
Gross investment must be non-negative: 1 1 0i k   . The household’s maximization problem is 
     
1 1 2
maxi u c u c   (3’) 
There is now a single first order condition which is precisely that given by equation (4): 
      1 2 2 2 1 1' ' ' 0qu c E u c p f k i k        (4) 
The left hand side of inequality (4) is the utility cost of foregone period 1 consumption. The 
right hand side is the discounted utility benefit of the additional period 2 consumption. If the 
right hand side exceeds the left hand side, the household would like to reduce investment but 
this is impossible if gross investment is zero. 
To make the investment level explicit, we need to expand  2'f k around k1. Doing this 
            2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1' ' ' " 1 'f k f k i f k f k i i f k       
where 
 
 
1 1
1
"
'
k f k
f k
   , the curvature of the production function. Substitution into equation (4) 
gives 
                                                     
14
 This part was helped by Prof. Christopher Gilbert.  
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 
   
1
1 1
1 2 2
'1
max 1 ,
' '
qu c
i k
f k E u c p
  
    
        
  (5’) 
To proceed further, consider a steady state in which at the normal price level to be p* in which 
*
1k k , 
* 0i   (no net investment) and  * *'q p f k , i.e. the marginal cost of investment is 
equal to its discounted marginal revenue product. Let  * * * *1c p f k k    be the period 1 
consumption level at this price. Then 
      
       
   
 
* * *
1 1 1
* * * *
1 1
* *
1 1 *
*
' '
' "
1 '
u c u c p p f k qi
u c p p f k qi u c
p p f k qi
u c
c
   
    
  
  
  
 
where 
 
 
* *
*
"
'
c u c
u c
    , the household’s coefficient of relative risk aversion.  
Similarly,   
      
       
   
 
* * *
2 2 1
* * * *
2 1
* *
2 1 *
*
' '
' "
1 '
u c u c p p f k i
u c p p f k i u c
p p f k i
u c
c
   
  
  
  
  
  
Writing, as previously,   * *2 1 21p p p p    , we can evaluate  
 
 
   
 
     
 
* * *
1 2 1 *
2 *
* * *
1 2 1 *
*
' 1 '
1
1 '
p p p f k i
u c u c
c
p p p i f k
u c
c
        
 
 
        
 
 
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where 
 
 
* *
*
'k f k
f k
   . If the production function is Cobb-Douglas,  f k Ak  , then   and 
1  . This allows evaluation of  2 2'E u c p   . Ignoring quadratic terms in  
*
1p p   and ε2 
      
   
 
* *
1* * *
2 2 1 1 *
' 1 1 '
p p f k
E u c p p p p i u c
c
 
        
  
  
Returning to equation (5’) 
 
 
     
   
   
 
* *
* 1
1* *
1
* * ** *
* *1 11 2 2
1* * *
*
1
* * *
1
'
' ' '
1
1
'
c p p
i f k
qu c q p p
c p p p pf k E u c p p f k
c i f k
p p p
p p q
p p f k

 
        
 
 
 
  (6’) 
Using the fact that 
 * *
1
'
q
p f k


, it follows that the period 1 investment level satisfies 
 
*
1
1 1*
max ,
p p
i k
p
  
  
 
   
For positive price shock, and provided the shock is at least to some extent persistent (λ > 0) the 
inequality reduces to  
 
*
1
1 *
p p
i
p
 


  (7’) 
so investment responds positively to the shock even if households cannot borrow.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Agricultural technology adoption and natural disasters  
 
 
3.1. Introduction   
The recent food crisis still has given rise to broader concerns that need to be solved in the 
future. Given scare resources (land, water, nutrients and energy) but increasing population and 
demand of food, one of the key responses to which attention should be paid is agricultural 
productivity growth (M.  Ivanic & Martin, 2010). Looking back over the last century, technology 
changes have played a fundamental role in generating rapid growth in agriculture (Cochrane, 
1993; Schultz, 1964). In particular as the result of the Green Revolution, which occurred from 
the 1940s and spread rapidly throughout Asia over the period 1965-1990, production and 
productivity in agriculture have increased remarkably through the expansion of research and 
technological transfer initiatives. For developing Asia countries, the movement has led to 
unprecedented development in agriculture that has contributed to a substantial reduction in 
poverty and to rapid economic growth (Hazell, 2009). Across Asian countries, cereal yields grew 
significantly. For instance, over the period 1965-1982, the annual growth rate of yield was 4.1 
percent for wheat, 3.5 percent for maize and 2.5 percent for rice; correspondingly the annual 
growth rates of production were about 5.4 percent, 4.6 percent and 3.3 percent (Rosegrant & 
Hazell, 2000).  
Technological innovations can be classified into two groups: those that are embodied in capital 
goods or products and those which are disembodied (Sunding & Zilberman, 1999). Examples for 
embodied innovations are: mechanical innovations (adoption in tractors and combines), 
biological innovations (new seed varieties), and chemical innovations (new fertilizers and 
pesticides); while examples of disembodied innovations could be: agronomic innovations (new 
farm management practices) and informational innovations. Many disembodied innovations 
take the form of practical knowledge and can be shared by users. Since the difficulty in 
measuring the benefit from that disembodied innovations, investment and research activities 
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are less expanded. The Green Revolution was mainly driven by a package of modern inputs 
including: improved seeds, irrigation, fertilizers and pesticides, which are embodied 
innovations.  
A large body of literature has developed the theoretical framework in relation to technological 
adoption. This theory focuses on the behavior of individual farmers who decide whether or not 
and the degree of adoption. The parameters associated with adoption models include adoption 
costs, input prices, cost of alternatives, product prices, wealth, risk aversion, etc. In conjunction 
with these conceptual frameworks, a number of empirical studies have evolved to investigate 
the adoption decision and process of adoption. The results can support or contradict 
theoretical studies depending on specific sample. The main factors affecting adoption that have 
been widely tested are farm size, risk and uncertainty, human capital, labor availability, credit 
constraint, tenure, supply constraint, aggregate adoption over time (Gershon, Just, & 
Zilberman, 1985).  
This paper focuses on risk and uncertainty factors, particularly the objective risk of natural 
disasters; rather than more subjective factors such as the unexpected performance of 
technology adoption itself. Following Schultz (1964), we suppose that the farmers are rational 
profit maximizers, so they make the decision of whether to adopt and the level of adoption 
depending on their anticipation of profit. In developing countries where almost farmers are 
vulnerable to shocks, the technology adoption might easily have a negative impact as the 
consequence of weather fluctuations. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) find that a one 
standard deviation decrease of weather risk could increase profits by up to 35 percent in the 
lowest quintile of a sample in India. Esther Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2008) observe from an 
experiment in Kenya that farmers switch back and forth between using and not using fertilizer 
from season to season. These studies show that the returns of technology adoption are not 
always profitable once we take risky events into account. This study therefore aims to evaluate 
the returns of technology adoption taking into consideration of natural shocks.  
There has been concern about confounding issue when assessing the effects of technology 
changes on outcomes. The possibility of bias appears since differences in outcomes between 
adopters and non-adopters could be affected by other factors as well as by technology 
adoption. In an experimental context, randomization reduces selection bias whereas in 
observational studies, the assignment of technology adoption is not randomized. This study 
overcomes that methodological problem in evaluating the effect of technological changes by 
implementing a non-parametric method, namely propensity score matching (PSM).  This 
technique, which has been widely applied to estimate the impact of a program, policy, or 
treatment, was first proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).     
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This study explores the empirical impact of chemical fertilizer adoption in paddy cultivation 
using data from a survey conducted in rural Vietnam. As a developing country in Asia, Vietnam 
is the second-largest rice exporter (after Thailand). Vietnam is also exposed to frequent natural 
disasters which strike farmers hard, especially poor farmers. In this context, the sample could 
be expected to exhibit importantly disparate impacts across different conditions of natural 
disasters. The paper uses the terms user, adopter, participant or treated unit, interchangeably.  
The paper structure is organized in seven parts. The following section 2 introduces the current 
context of Vietnam. Section 3 explains the methodological framework and its application. 
Section 4 summarizes general information of the survey and descriptive statistics of the data. 
Section 5 presents results of PSM approach versus OLS and IV approach. The concluding 
remarks are discussed in section 6.    
3.2. Background of the case study and the objectives  
3.2.1. Rice cultivation and chemical fertilizer adoption in Vietnam 
Vietnam is an agriculturally based economy. The agricultural sector involved 52 percent of total 
labor force of the economy and accounted for 28 percent of total GPD in 2009 (GSO). In the 
agriculture sector, rice is the most important crop. The area for growing rice is cultivated in 7.4 
million hectares and accounted for 74 percent of total area for crops in 2009. Although the 
share of protein supply of average Vietnamese decreased from 63 percent in 1990 to 38 
percent in 2010, it remains the second-highest source behind vegetables (FAOSTAT). The 
reason is that increasing income results in less consumption of rice.    
Following the institutional transition of in 1986, the central planning economy became a 
market-oriented economy with liberalization affecting all sectors.  The reforms created 
favorable conditions for rice industry such as a contract-based system, longer land lease period, 
a free market in land use and privatization of input and output markets. After nearly two 
decades, from being a major rice importer, the country became one of the major rice producer 
and exporter. In 2010, compared to the top rice exporter Thailand with 8.9 million tonnes, 
Vietnam remained in the second position achieving 6.8 million tonnes (FAOSTAT).  
The development of the rice industry is displayed in Figure 3.1. Production slowly increased 
from 1961 to before the reforms, from around 9 million tonnes to 15 million tonnes in 1986. 
Since that time, output has risen sharply and reached nearly 40 million tonnes in 2010. Over the 
period from 1988 to 2010, the annual growth rate achieved 4.3 percent. This trend also 
appeared in yield and cultivated area for rice.  Yield increased from 2.9 t/ha in 1998 to 5.3 t/ha 
in 2010. Those values for paddy cultivated area were 5.7 million hectares and 7.4 million 
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hectares. The expansion of the area mainly was derived by the conversion from single to double 
or even triple cropping per year with the use of shorter rice varieties. The growth rates of 
production, yield and cultivated area have been risen sustainably but at lower rates during the 
1990s.  
As in many other countries, one of key driven factors of increasing production and yield is 
technological adoption. The principle innovations are modern varieties, greater fertilizer 
adoption, greater crop intensity increase and irrigation improvement. On the other hand, the 
farmers in Vietnam are characterized by small scale land holdings in relation to a large 
population. The population in 2011 was over 87 million, nearly three times more than 50 years 
previously. Hence, under the constraints of resource scarcity, enhancing productivity of rice is 
the crucial issue. Among the above-mentioned technical changes, fertilization and nutrient 
management have contributed most in increasing productivity.  
In spite of a long tradition of using organic fertilizers, chemical fertilizers are more efficient and 
used more widely. According to the Vietnam household living standard survey (VHLSS) in 2010, 
which sampled through the entire country, an average of 60 percent (by weight) of chemical 
fertilizers used by households is devoted to paddy/rice out of all crops. Within the paddy crop, 
the households spend an average of 36 percent of total expenditure on chemical fertilizers, and 
only 8 percent for organic fertilizers. Vietnam is also a major exporter of chemical fertilizers. 
Nonetheless, the availability of fertilizers from local production is far insufficient to meet the 
demand of farmers and crops depend heavily on foreign suppliers.  
Figure 3.2 shows the ratio between imported and consumed fertilizers by the main kinds of 
nutrient in Vietnam from 2002 to 2010. The important chemical fertilizers for crops include 
these kinds of nutrients:  nitrogen, phosphate, and potash. The import data are based on the 
trading database (FAOSTAT). Consumption is on an apparent basic and is obtained as the 
difference between total imported and local produced values subtracting export values. It is 
clear that 100 percent of consumed potassium fertilizers are imported. For nitrogen fertilizers 
this decreases from 96 percent in 2002 to 58 percent in 2010. Although both quantities of 
imported and consumed nitrogen declined (from raw data), the extend of decline in import is 
greater than in consumption. The share of phosphate fertilizers fluctuates around 60 percent 
during this period. Nonetheless, the quantity imported of potash is lower than nitrogen and 
phosphate fertilizers; for instance, 298 thousands tonnes, 631 thousand tonnes and 310 
thousands tonnes in 2010, respectively. Thus, the rice producers are significantly dependent on 
the international market of fertilizers.  
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3.2.2. Agro-ecological conditions and natural disasters 
The country is divided into economic eight regions (Figure 3.4). These correspond to different 
agro-ecological conditions. The distribution of paddy cultivation area is distinct for each region. 
Also, the decision and the degree of adoption vary across regions since the different 
characteristics of environment (soil, weather) and other cultivating practices. Figure 3.3 displays 
the paddy cultivation features across six regions from data of Vietnam General Statistic Office 
(GSO). Using a slightly different classification of eight economic regions, the crops and 
conditions in North East and Northern West regions, and in North Central Coast and South 
Central Coast regions are somewhat similar, then they are merged into combined Northern 
Mountains and Central Coast regions, respectively. The characteristics in each region are 
illustrated by the maps in term of soils, slopes, temperature, rainfall, and flooding distribution 
throughout of country (Figure 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9). They are briefly summarized as the follows: 
(1) Red River Delta: Because of its rich nutrient fluvial soils, the ancient Viet people 
settled here and cultivated wet rice over 3000 years ago. The urbanization and industrialization 
have turned it to be the most densely populated region at 949 person/km2 comparing to 265 
person/km2 on average of the country in 2011 (GSO), and smallest landholding farmers. The 
region obtains the highest yield of the country at 5.9 tonnes/ha. The advantageous conditions 
arising out of an improved irrigation system has allowed farmers to intensify production to 
obtain crops to twice or three times per year. The region is the second largest “rice bowl” of the 
country and contributes 17 percent of total production.   
(2) Northern Mountains: This mountainous and hilly area makes up 9 percent of total 
paddy land in the country. The region is inhabited predominantly by ethnic minorities. Shifting 
cultivation is based on slash-and-burn and long fallow. The degraded soil and dry are 
unfavorable conditions for rice growing. The yield is 4.6 tonnes/ha, the second lowest among 
others. Production accounts for 7.7 percent in the total output of the country.   
(3) Central Coast: The region features denuded, moderately-eroded hills and mountains 
and sandy land. The cultivated areas mostly concentrated in the small delta along the coastline. 
Some locations are extremely dry in the dry season. The yield however is, lower than only two 
largest delta regions, around 5 tonnes/ha. The share of paddy land is 16 percent and of 
production is 15 percent, out of total. 
(4) Central Highlands: The conditions in this region is unfavorable for rice. Instead, with 
the mild temperature and humidity, many industrial crops are intensively cultivated such as 
coffee, rubber, coffee, tea, etc. The ratio of paddy cultivation is only nearly 3 percent and 
contributes 2.6 percent for total production of the country.  
81 
 
(5) Southeast: Similar to Central Highlands region, the physical and weather conditions 
are more suitable for industrial crops, corn, and high-value vegetables than for rice (Young, 
Wailes, Cramer, & Nguyen, 2002). The economic return is also higher than from a rice crop. The 
paddy sown area takes up 3.9 percent and the production is 3.3 percent. The yield of this region 
is lowest in the country, only 4.5 tonnes/ha.  
(6) Mekong River Delta: Located in a low elevation area, the highest flow of Mekong 
river combine with high rainfall in the wet season causing annual flood while the lowest flow 
months coincides with dry season that often leads to water shortage when the agricultural 
demand is highest (Nebitt, Johnston, & Solieng, 2004). About 40 percent in this region is acid 
sulfate soils and seasonal saline soils (Young et al., 2002). The environmental conditions are not 
good as in the Red River Delta and this results in a lower yield at around 5.5 tonnes/ha. 
Nonetheless, the proportion of cultivated area is about 53 percent and of production is 54 
percent out of total which is greatly higher than other regions. Thus, this region is the largest-
rice producing region in the country.   
Located in the tropical monsoon area of South East Asia, Vietnam is one of the most hazard-
prone areas in the region. Based on the long-term climatic risk index, Vietnam is placed in the 
sixth position of countries that was most affected by the weather events during the period  
1991-2010 (Harmeling, 2011). The indicators of that index include the death toll, deaths per 
inhabitant, total value loss, total value loss per unit GPD, and number of events. The most 
frequent and most devastating weather events to Vietnam are typhoons/cyclones and floods. 
The storm season occurs from May to December and hits the north part of the country from 
May through June, then moves down to the South from July to December. Since most of the 
population reside along the coastline and in the low-lying delta region, disasters damage to 
their livelihoods heavily.  
According to the Ministry of Agriculture’s Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control, 
around 80 to 90 percent of the population is affected by the typhoons. The damage threatens 
both people living along the coastline and living in the upland areas who are exposed to 
subsequent flashfloods resulting from the typhoons’ heavy rains (The World Bank, 2009). 
Moreover, Vietnam has 2,360 rivers which are steep and short. Heavy rainfall in their basins 
produces intense and short duration floods. According to  the report, an average of six to eight 
typhoons or tropical storms strike Vietnam each year with more frequent occurrences in the 
northern and central coastal region earlier in the season.   
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3.2.3. Literature reviews and objectives of the study 
In the recent literature, there are many studies about the impact of natural disasters and 
climate change on Vietnam. Almost of all studies adopt a macroeconomic perspective, with 
only a small number focusing on microeconomic context. One reason may be limited data 
available  at the household level. Among the microeconomic studies, Thomas et al. (2010) 
measure the natural disasters and hazards at disaggregated geographical levels from primary 
meteorological weather station data, storm tracks and satellite observations. These weather 
indicators are then matched with the panel data of VHLSS in 2002, 2004, and 2006 in the 
corresponding geographical areas. The study find that riverine floods cause welfare losses up to 
23 percent and storm reducing welfare by up to 52 percent in cities with a population over 
500,000. Households are better able to cope with the effects of droughts, largely by irrigation. 
Another paper of Yu, Zhu, Breisinger, and Nguyen (2012) also constructs rainfall and 
temperature data recorded in 25 weather stations across the country which are used as the 
indicators of climate change and natural shocks. This data set is combined with VHLSS for 2004 
and 2006 to examine the effects on agriculture and rural poor people, and their adaptation 
behavior in terms of adjustment to input usage. The results show that rice production is 
affected by climate change. The finding additionally suggests that expanding irrigation and 
agricultural intensification are the key components in maintaining productivity level and dealing 
with climate change.  
In these circumstances, the farmers in Vietnam are faced with serious challenges. First, rate of 
productivity growth in the rice industry has slowed over the most recent decade. Second, the 
substantial losses and damage caused by disasters impact frequently and severely on farmers. 
For those reasons, technology adoption in agriculture is an important means to overcome such 
problems. The paper therefore intends to add additional empirical evidence about the impact 
of using technology given natural risk conditions. Utilizing across section data collected in 2010 
in rural areas of Vietnam and the natural disaster losses reported by households, the study 
attempts to address fours main questions:  
 (1) Which are the characteristics that make households use chemical fertilizers? 
(2) Whether and to what extent do the chemical fertilizer users obtain more beneficial 
outcomes than non-users in terms of rice productivity and household welfare? 
(3) How do these results vary depending whether or not the households are exposed in 
natural disaster shocks?  
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(4) Are there differences in these results according to the econometric methodology 
employed (matching, OLS and IV)?  
3.3. Methodology 
3.3.1. The two-stage models 
This section investigates determinants  affecting on decision of using chemical fertilizer. The 
effects of relevant factors on technology adoption have been widely documented and studied. 
This study uses the limited dependent-variable models to test the household behavior on 
chemical fertilizer adoption. The most familiar type is Tobit model which has been applied in a 
wide range of consumer demand studies using micro-data.  However, the Tobit model bases on 
the restrictive assumption, we therefore  alternatively employ Heckman’s two-stage sample 
selection to understand better the behavior of farm household on decision of adoption. The 
two-stage method includes the first stage deals with decision of adoption and the second stage 
deals with the extent of adoption.  
Tobit model 
The Tobit model is a traditional approach to deal with data with many zeros, which estimates 
the relationship between non-negative dependent variable and an independent variable (Tobin, 
1958). The marginal effect of an independent variable is treated conditional on limited fraction 
of dependent variable which takes positive values as in this case.  
The model is defined as:    
   
                                
                 
                                                 
   
       
   
            
                
where   
  is a latent unobserved endogenous variable which presents the optimal working 
hours;     is the corresponding observed variable which measures actual hours worked;      and 
    are vectors of independent variables and their parameters, respectively;    is a 
homoskedastic and normally distributed error term. The condition (2) implies that the observed 
the amount of fertilizer adoption is positive continuous if the positive fertilizer used is desired, 
and zero otherwise. Due to the non-negative values of fertilizer used, dependent variable    is 
censored at zero. This means that the observed zero on the dependent variable can be either 
“true” zero (i.e. individual deliberate choice) or censored zero (i.e. data collection methods, 
certain circumstances). Using maximum likelihood method, the likelihood function of standard 
Tobit is:   
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Where “0” denotes the zero observations (fertilizer used    is zero) in the sample and “+” 
indicates the positive observations (fertilizer used    is positive);      and      denotes 
standard normal cumulative distribution function and standard normal probability density 
function, respectively.  
Heckit model 
There is an argument pointing out an inadequacy of the Tobit model in solving that problem. In 
the Tobit model, the choice of being censored (adoption) and expected value conditional on un-
censored (level of adoption) are determined by the same factors. The model considers 
dependent variable to be censored at zero but ignores the source of zeros, in which could be 
caused by deliberate household’s decision or certain circumstances (e.g. financial conditions, 
characteristics of demographic (Newman et al, 2003; Martinez-Espineira, 2006).  
Heckman (1979) proposes the two-stage estimation procedure to test the sample with zero 
observation (non-adopter). Heckman pointed out that estimation on selected subsample results 
in selection bias. The first stage is Probit estimation and the second stage is censoring 
estimation on selected subsample. In other words, the first stage estimates the probability of 
observed positive outcome or adoption decision. The second stage estimates the level of 
adoption conditional on observed positive values. The model assumes that these two stages are 
affected by different sets of independent variables, which is different from Tobit model. 
Another extended point in the Heckit model is that all zero observations are assumed to be 
derived from respondent’s deliberate choices. 
The first step estimates the adoption decision and the second step estimates for level of 
adoption. According to Heckman (1979) and Flood and Gråsjö (1998), the Tobit model is 
modified as:  
The adoption decision:   
   
                                                
                                              
         
   
            
                
The level of adoption decision:   
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In this model,      and      are vectors of explanatory variables in two stages of decision. Hence, 
the model assumes that the decisions of adoption and level of adoption are affected by 
separated sets of factors. As in Tobit model,    and    are corresponding vectors of 
parameters;    
  is a latent variable that denotes binary censoring;    is the observed value 
representing the adoption decision. The observed fertilizer used equals to unobserved latent 
value when a positive fertilizer used is reported; otherwise it takes the value zero. The error 
terms      and      are assumed to be independently distributed. This assumption implies that 
there is no relationship between the two stages of decision.  
However, Heckman (1979) assumes that the two error terms are correlated and the first stage 
dominates the second one. Thus the error terms follow the bivariate normal distribution:  
 
  
  
      
 
 
    
        
        
               
Where    is correlation coefficient of the error terms. The domination assumption means that if 
the household reports positive fertilizer used, this is the intentional purpose of the household. 
In other words, the adoption is a deliberate choice. Then the model is estimated by Probit for 
the decision of adoption and standard OLS for the positive fertilizer used. The log-likelihood 
function for this approach is:  
             
     
 
 
          
       
 
           
     
  
 
 
   
         
 
 
        
If the error terms are independent, ρ=0, the equation (9) is simplified as:  
             
     
 
 
                   
 
 
   
         
 
 
                
 
3.3.2. Problem of impact evaluation 
The definitions of impact evaluations have been described in varying ways. The World Bank 
(2008) states “impact evaluations compare the outcomes of a program against a counterfactual 
that shows what would have happened to beneficiaries without the program. Unlike other 
forms of evaluation, they permit the attribution of observed changes in outcomes to the 
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program being evaluated by following experimental and quasi-experimental designs”. The 
OECD (2002) states that impact evaluation analyze “positive and negative, primary and 
secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, 
intended or unintended”. These definitions have been widely used and somewhat modified, in 
a large number of researches, studies and reports.   
The basic ideas of those definitions are almost the same, although they are described in 
different ways. In what follows, the main idea from those different descriptions is rephrased. In 
general, impact evaluation aims to assess the probabilities of outcomes which are directly 
affected by an intervention (or treatment). The treatments could be laws, regulations, 
educational programs, financial subsidies, medical drugs, technologies, etc. The participants 
could be individuals, households, firms, districts, countries, etc.  Impact evaluation looks for 
directly at cause and effect questions.  
In short, the issue can be understood in the following manner: the participants are exposed to a 
treatment or different levels of a treatment. The treatment effect can be measured by 
comparing the outcome of the same participant when exposed and not exposed to the 
treatment. Nonetheless, no agent can participate in more than one treatment at the same 
time. Thus, only outcomes of the participants exposed to the treatment are observed. 
Outcomes of treated agents in the absence of treatment cannot be observed. Since the 
counterfactual is unobservable, the impact must be evaluated through a reference to a 
comparison or control group. Therefore, the main challenge of counterfactual method is to find 
a similar group of nonparticipants that is comparable with the group of participants.  
By seeking an appropriate comparison group, the counterfactual approach attempts to cure 
potential problems that arise from impact evaluations. These include confounding factor, 
selection bias, and heterogeneity (Khandker, Koolwal, & Samad, 2010; Ravallion, 2008; White, 
2006). 
(1)  Confounding issue refers to omitted factors or unobserved factors that are 
correlated with both exposure to the treatment and the potential treatment effect. These 
factors could result in the spurious attribution of effects to the treatment. This is analogous to 
omitted variable bias.   
(2) Selection bias is a special case of confounding, in which omitted factors influence the 
non-randomly selection of participants from the population. For example, those farm 
households that decide to adopt a new technology (mechanization) are more likely to have 
better complementary conditions (large cultivated land, irrigated land). Again these factors 
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simultaneously affect the probability of adoption and the productivity of crops. The 
endogeneity of treatment may cause simultaneity bias.  
(3) Heterogeneous effects occur when the participants have diverse characteristics. For 
example, the households in different geographically areas may exhibit different socio-economic 
characteristics. Thus, each specific socio-economic type could affect on potential outcome.  
There are several approaches controlling these problems. Each method imposes different 
assumptions and constructs the suitable framework to evaluate the impact of treatment 
(Khandker et al., 2010). The widely used approaches are briefly described as following:  
(1) The randomized evaluation method allocates randomly treatments across subjects. 
The counterfactual information is captured through randomized trials or experiments which 
ensures similarity between the control and treatment group.  
(2) The propensity score matching method generates statistical similar groups by 
estimating the probability of participating in the treatment conditional on the observed 
characteristics which are independent of the treatment. These estimated probabilities are used 
to match the treated and non-treated groups.  
(3) The double-difference (difference in differences, DD) method compares the 
outcomes before and after treatment of the treated and non-treated groups. The DD method 
clears out the bias from time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. This method is only available 
for panel data.  
(4) The instrumental variable (IV) method identifies variables which correlate with the 
treatment decision but do not correlate with unobserved characteristics of outcomes. These 
variables can be used as instruments for the endogenous treatment variable. When used with 
panel data it can control for time-varying selection bias.  
(5) Regression discontinuity methods exploit the near randomness of treatment 
selection around the cutoff for treated and non-treated groups. This method allows both 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity but throws away a large proportion of the sample 
information.  
Randomized experiments are not normally in empirical studies in economics since they are 
costly and give rise to ethical issues. Faced with cross-sectional non-experimental data, this 
study adopts the propensity matching method to tackle problem of impact evaluation. The 
paper applies propensity score methods for the cases of both binary treatment and continuous 
treatment. The analysis further compares the result of this non-parametric approach with that 
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from ordinary least squares and instrumental variable approaches. The following sections 
introduce the theoretical aspects of these methods.  
3.3.3. Propensity score matching (PSM) with binary treatment 
3.3.3.1. The basic framework 
The counterfactual framework was initially proposed by Rubin (1974) and Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983). Let   be a binary treatment indicator, where     indicates the actual 
participation in a treatment, and     otherwise. In principle, each agent in the population 
might have either outcomes depending on whether or not he was treated. Suppose the 
outcomes of an agent received a treatment (    ) is    , and outcome without treatment 
(   ) is    . The treatment effect is        . Because each agent whether was or was not 
treated either     or      is observed. The impact evaluation of the treatment therefore faces 
missing data problem.  
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the average treatment effect on the population is 
the difference in the outcomes with and without treatment:  
                                
where ATE is the expected effect of treatment on a random agent drawn from population. 
Heckman (1997) argues that a treatment might target a certain group of population that relates 
to treatment purposes. In this sense, the interesting treatment effect is that of the agents who 
actually received the treatment. This is referred as the average treatment effect on the treated:  
                                         
Hence, ATT is the average difference in the outcomes with and without treatment of agents 
received the treatment. Which treatment effect is more relevant will depend on the specific 
circumstances and available data (Heckman, LaLonde, & Smith, 1999).  
As mentioned, an agent either was or was not treated. In equation (12), the counterfactual 
mean of an agent who received the treatment,        , cannot be observed. We therefore 
have to use substitute agents to estimate this counterfactual. In case of the randomized 
experiment, the treatment is independent with outcomes, the unobserved counterfactual, 
       , could be replaced by the outcome of an untreated agent,        . In this way, the 
ATT is rewritten as:  
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In non-randomized contexts, the factors affecting treatment assignment also affect outcomes, 
or the treatment decision may be affected by the expected outcomes, or both. In these cases,  
confounding and selection bias problems arise as pointed out in previous section. Therefore, 
the treatment is likely to be correlated with the potential outcomes, and the unobserved 
counterfactual is not equal to the expected outcome of untreated agent.  The second term in 
equation (4),                        , reflects the bias of estimates, so-called 
selection bias. To overcome this problem and estimate a true ATT, appropriate methods must 
be devised to clear out the selection bias, B = 0. The validity of these methods depends on 
whether the assumptions they make are valid.  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose the 
propensity score matching method should ensures a reasonable substitute for unobserved 
counterfactual. The idea of matching approach is to find a control group of nonparticipants who 
have similar observed characteristics to those in the group of participants. Participants are 
matched with observationally nonparticipants conditional on their characteristics, and the 
average difference of the outcomes between the two groups is the average treatment effect. 
Datasets may include a very large number of characteristics so finding a close match in a 
general sense will be difficult. What the authors showed that the treatment probability is a 
sufficient statistic for matching in the context of measuring treatment effects. This reduces a 
multidimensional matching problem to a unidimensional problem. Corresponding to the 
problems, the authors introduce assumptions to identify a valid treatment. The two necessary 
conditions are unconfoundedness and common support.  
Assumption of unconfoundedness 
This assumption, first mentioned by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), is also known as ignorability 
of treatment, or selection on observables (Heckman & Robb, 1985), and conditional 
independence (Lechner, 1999). This states that the potential outcomes Y are independent on 
the treatment decision T, given observable characteristics X which are not affected by that 
treatment.  
                               
where   denotes independence. Given the controls X, the probability of treatment is 
independent of outcomes. Essentially, we have sufficiently many controls to account for 
treatment. The condition implies that the pre-treatment characteristics affecting the treatment 
decision and outcomes are simultaneously observed.  
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Unconfoundedness is strong assumption, and it is determined by the characteristics of the 
treatment or program. If there are unobserved factors that correlate with treatment 
assignment and potential outcome, the conditional dependence assumption is violated. 
Otherwise, if the assumption holds, the matching method is similar to that with a randomly 
assigned treatment in experimental process. This assumption is un-testable, so the theoretical 
and empirical literature provide guidance to select the pretreatment variables.   
Assumption of common support or overlap  
This condition states that each agent has a positive probability of being participant or non-
participant given the certain covariates (Heckman et al., 1999), as the following expression:  
                               
This assumption ensures the overlap in the distribution of covariates. To achieve the efficiency, 
the sample should be large enough to generate sufficient set of predictors that matches in 
common region and leads to valid estimation of casual inference. If a nonparticipant lies out of 
the range in support region, it needs to be dropped out to guarantee the similarity with the 
treated group. If these two assumptions hold, the treatment assignment is referred to strong 
ignorability (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983).  
When the treatment is identified under such assumptions, the valid ATT can be estimated 
conditional on covariates X. If X is a high dimensional vector, this may cause the large-scale 
problem for estimation. Therefore, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the balancing score 
method which is applicable for large sample. The propensity score is defined as the conditional 
probability of receiving a treatment given observed characteristics or observed covariates X :    
                               
The authors prove that the matching method conditioning on p(X) is efficient as conditioning on 
X if the sample satisfies the key assumptions. This is because the biases from observable factors 
are swept out by conditioning on the propensity score. The balancing propensity score allows 
investigator to identify those agents with similar characteristics in the relevant sense. In other 
words, agents with similar propensity score should have similar distribution of covariates X, 
regardless treatment decision.15 Then the expected difference of the observed outcomes is:  
                                                     
15
 This statement is presented and proven more specifically in Theorem 2 by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Initially, 
suppose balancing score      is a function of covariates X. The most trivial balancing score is       . The 
balancing score      that we need to identify is the “finest” propensity score     . The Theorem states that:      
is a balancing score,         , if and only if      is finer than      in the sense that               for some 
function f  (proof is shown in the paper). Theorem implies that “if subclasses or matched treated-control pairs are 
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Since the strong ignorable treatment decision holds, the agents with the same propensity score 
p(X) but different treatment status can act as counterfactual for each other. The average 
treatment effect is estimated from the ATE conditional on p(X) and ATT conditional on p(X) 
through a two-step sampling process.16 It is noted that ATE conditional on p(X) and ATT 
conditional on p(X) become identical since this process sweeps out selection bias (in equation 
(4)). By averaging ATT across distribution of p(X) in the entire population, we have the effect on 
the population:  
                                                                             
where          is expectation over the distribution of p(X) in the entire population. The average 
treatment effects in the equation (19) and in the equation (11) are equal. The implementation 
of the propensity matching method will be presented in the next section.  
3.3.3.2. Implementation  
In this case of binary treatment, the average treatment effect is estimated in three steps.  
Step 1. We first estimate the propensity score by modeling the participation in treatment. In 
this case of binary treatment, the propensity score is the probability of participantion versus 
nonparticipation given the observed characteristics. This can be carried out by logit or probit 
models which give the similar results:    
                                                                                                                                                                           
homogenous in both      and certain components chosen of  , it is still reasonable to expect balance on the 
other components of   within these refined subclasses or matched pairs”. An important advantage of this 
Theorem is that such procedure of classifying and matching is not only for      but for other function of   as well, 
e.g. estimates of average treatment effect in  subpopulation defined by components of rural and urban areas.  
16
 Following the previous footnote, this step is also proven more specifically in Theorem 3 by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983). The Theorem states that it is treatment assignment is strongly ignorable given covariates  , then it is 
strongly ignorable given any balancing score     . We therefore can estimate treatment effects given balancing 
scores and ignorable treatment assignment. Suppose a specific value of the vector of covariates   is randomly 
sampled from the entire population of agents. That is both treated and control agents together. Then a treated 
agent and a control agent both are found having this value for the vector of covariates. In this two-step sampling 
process, the expected difference in outcomes is                              , where    is expectation 
with respect to the distribution of   in the entire population of agents. If treatment assignment is strongly 
ignorable, that expected difference in outcomes equals to                                 . Now 
suppose a value of a balancing score      is sampled from the entire population of agents, and then a treated 
agent and a control agent are sampled from all agents having this value of     . In this sense, the equation (18) 
follows the Theorem 3, and similarly gives the equation (19). For simplicity, I keep using only       which is equal 
to      if it satisfies the required assumptions.  
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where     is normal Cumulative Distribution Function of the standard normal distribution that 
contains all the covariates. The PSM will be bias if the pre-treatment characteristics which 
determine the participation decision are not included in the function. The reasons could be 
poor-quality data or a lack of understanding the feature of the treatment. In the other hand, 
over-specification (too many X variables) might result in higher standard errors for the 
propensity score. Thus, The investigator needs to balance parsimony against bias reduction.  
Step 2. This step defines the region of common support where the distribution of propensity 
score for treatment and control groups overlap. Nonparticipants who fall outside the range of 
common support are dropped. If the dropped nonparticipations are systematically different 
from the retained ones in control group, selection bias might appear. A balancing test can be 
used to examine whether the average propensity score and the mean of X are the same for 
each quintile of propensity score distribution. Although the balancing test implies the 
comparable propensity distribution in treated and control groups, they might not similar if 
misspecification occurs.  
Step 3. The last step is to match participants and nonparticipants by the estimated propensity 
score. The mean difference of outcome in these two matched groups is the impact of the 
treatment. There are several matching algorithm methods based on weighting for each 
matched participant and nonparticipant set, including:  
(1) Near-neighbor matching. This method is one of most widely used which assign each 
treated unit to the non-treated unit with the closest propensity score. The number of selected 
neighbor unit could be more than one, and also bases on the sample size and propensity 
distribution. With the option of matching with replacement, one non-participant can be 
matched for different participants. In contrast, matching without replacement allows an 
untreated unit can be used only once.  
(2) Caliper or radius matching. This procedure imposes a certain maximum range for 
propensity score. It eliminates the problem that some nearest neighbours may nevertheless be 
quite distant. The poorly-matched agent pairs are cleared out and quality of matching 
improves. Nonetheless, if too many agent pairs are  dropped this might lead to increase 
variance of estimates.  
(3) Stratification or interval matching. This method divides the common support of the 
propensity score into different strata or intervals. Then taking the mean difference of the 
outcome between treated and control observations within each stratum, we obtain the impact 
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of treatment. The weighted average of those strata impact yields the overall treatment impact 
by taking the ratio of participant in each stratum as the weights 
(4) Kernel and local linear matching.  This approach is a nonparametric matching 
procedure that use an appropriate weighted average of all agents in the control group to 
generate the counterfactual outcome. This matching has an advantage of lower variance 
because more information is used. In return, the problem of poor-matched might appear. Thus, 
the proper imposition of commons support region is necessary for better quality of matching.  
In short, all approaches have itself advantage and disadvantage. The choice of estimator 
depends on data structure, and characteristics of covariates and treatment. All the methods 
however should give similar results asymptotically since the similar since they become closer to 
compare exact matches with growing sample size (Jeffrey, 2000). Hence, checking the results 
across matching approaches serves to indicate the robustness of the impact evaluation. In case 
the different approaches yield diverse results, the specification need to be further examined.  
3.3.3.3. Balancing test for common support condition 
The fundamental idea of matching method depends on the quality of balanced propensity score 
between treated and control groups which are identified by the common support region. 
Violation of the common support condition can lead to substantial selection bias for causal 
inference. If many control observations are different from treated observations, the 
subsequent comparison of outcome is inappropriate. Therefore, it is important to test for 
validity of the overlap region to ensure the comparability between treated and control groups.  
There are several methods to check the validity of propensity score adjustment. This study 
applies the suggestion of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) that evaluates the distance between 
marginal distribution of covariates. This indicator is referred as “standardized difference in 
mean” or “standardized bias” (SB). The SB is measured by the ratio of the difference of means 
in treated and control groups divided by the square root of variances in these two groups 
averaged across treated and nontreated agents. The SB is computed for each covariate or 
observable pre-treatment characteristic before and after matching procedure, in the 
followingmanner :  
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where     and    are variances of observable characteristic X  in treated and control groups. 
The subscription M denotes for sample after matching selection in common support region. 
Although there is no specific SB value for validity of balancing property, the empirical studies 
considered the figures of under 5 percent as acceptable.  
Another approach is to check for the balancing property by the t test for each covariate used to 
estimate propensity score. The test is applied for covariates before and after matching. If the t-
statistics show that the two groups of participants and non-participants are significantly 
different before matching and indifferent after matching, then the matching method helps to 
improve the balance for the sample.   
If the results reveal considerable lack of balance, the matching method needs to be altered or 
the pre-treatment characteristics should be re-checked. Smith and Todd (2005) state that the 
observable characteristics of matching method should influence both participation decision and 
outcomes, but should not affected by the treatment, although there is little guide available on 
how to select the conditional variables. There is a trade-off effect between the plausibility of 
unconfoundedness condition and the variance of the estimates. When using the full 
specification, bias will arise from adoption of a wide bandwidth for the common support region. 
On the other hand, when using a minimal specification, the plausibility of unconfoundedness 
condition could be violated. Hence, the suitable pre-treatment variables and balancing test 
should be iterated until achieving the convinced balance. This results in considerable latitude 
for the investigator to select the results which best suit his theoretical predilections. 
3.3.4. Generalized propensity score matching with continuous treatment 
3.3.4.1. The basic framework 
To evaluate the impact when the treatment is a continuous variable, we use an approach that 
extends the basic framework of the binary treatment case. The propensity score in this case is 
called generalized propensity score (GPS). As the binary treatment case, adjusting observed 
covariates by GPS could avoid the selection bias associated with these covariates. This analysis 
follows the approach developed by Hirano and Imbens (2005).  
Analogously, we start with a random sample drawn from the population. For each agent, there 
is a set of potential outcomes Y(t), where t belongs to an interval         and refers to as the 
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unit-level treatment. The interested effect is estimated through the average dose-response 
function,             . Given in certain observed covariates X, and treatment value received, 
         , the potential outcomes of agent observed is shown as Y = Y(T).  
Assumption of weak unconfoundedness 
The GPS also requires the unconfoundedness assumption:  
                                         
This condition however is relaxed from the one of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) in the binary 
treatment case. The authors mentioned this as weak unconfoundedness, because it does not 
require joint conditional independence of all potential outcomes, but only each value of the 
treatment. Hirano and Imbens (2005) define the GPS as: 
                           
where                  , that is the conditional density of the treatment given the observed 
covariates. The property of balancing score is similar to the case of standard propensity score 
above. Thus, with a similar GPS, the decision of receiving treatment level, T = t, is independent 
of the observed covariates.  
GSP can remove selection bias in two steps. Under the weak independence assumption, the 
decision of treatment is random and uncorrelated with the potential outcome within each 
strata identified by GPS, r(t, X). We have:  
                                                            
From each treatment value of an agent, we also have:   
                                                                        
Substituting the function (25) to (26), we obtain the expected outcome conditional on given 
GPS interval r(t, X):  
                                          
This is the first step in which conditional expectation of the outcome is estimated by a function 
of two scalar variables that are treatment level t and GPS interval r(t, X). In the second step, the 
average dose-response function is estimated by averaging the conditional expectation function 
over GPS across each level of treatment.  
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This emphasizes that the estimation of dose-response function (18) averages over the GPS at 
interested treatment level,         , rather than averaging over GPS,         . In this 
way, the regression function        does not have a casual interpretation. However, the dose-
response function corresponding to        presents the average treatment effect at each level 
of treatment and can be used to compare the effect at different levels of treatment. Hence, the 
function        has a casual interpretation.    
3.3.4.2. Implementation  
In this case, the effect of treatment also can be undertaken in three steps.  
Step 1. As in the binary treatment case, the first step is to estimate the score        from the 
conditional distribution of the treatment given observed characteristics. The distribution is 
assumed to have a normal distribution:  
             
     
                    
The parameters of the distribution are estimated by maximum likelihood, and then used to 
calculate the GPS:  
    
 
     
     
 
   
         
    
                     
Step 2. In the second step computes the conditional expectation function of outcome  , given 
   and  . The polynomial approximations of order three or less is used. This study applies the 
quadratic function:  
                        
           
                          
These parameters are estimated by ordinary least square using the calculated GPS    in the 
previous step. As emphasized, there is no direct interpretation for the estimated parameters in 
this equation.  
Step 3. Finally, the last step consists of averaging estimated regression function over the score 
function evaluated at the desired level of the treatment.  
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In particular, we estimate the average potential outcome for each level of the treatment that 
we are interested in, in order to get the estimate of the entire dose-response function. This 
analysis uses the bootstrap method to obtain standard errors which take into account estimate 
of the GPS and the parameters .  
3.3.4.3. Balancing test 
Similar to the case of the binary treatment, a balancing test can be used to assess the 
comparability of the covariates as adjusted by matching GPS. While the approach of binary case 
involved comparison of covariate means between treated and control observables before and 
after matching, the procedure for continuous treatment is more complicated.  
Followed the approach proposed by Hirano and Imbens (2005), the test examines the balance 
on both estimated GPS and treatment level. First, the set of continuous treatment values is 
divided into K treatment intervals (k=1, 2, …K). Within each treatment interval, the GPS are 
computed at representative points (e.g., the mean, median, or another percentile) of treatment 
variable for each observation. Second, each interval k continuously is divided into m blocks by 
the quintiles of GPS. Note that those blocks are categorized conditional on the distribution of 
GPS within each k treatment interval, and denoted as   
   
   
   
     
   
. Third, within each 
block   
                we calculate the mean difference of each covariate X between 
observations that belong to treatment interval k and observations that are in the same block 
GPS interval    , but belong to another treatment interval k. This step is carried out for all block 
intervals.  
Finally, using weight average given by the number of observations in each block GPS interval, 
we combine all m differences in means of those blocks. Then the test statistics (the Student’s t 
statistics) are the functions of this weight average to examine the balancing property. The value 
of test statistics (the highest value of Student’s t statistics) is compared with reference to the 
critical value to check the level that balancing property is supported by the data. The less the 
extent that these differences in means are statistically different from zero, the better balancing 
level those covariates are. As the binary case, if the results suggest imbalance in the propensity 
scores in the sample, we should re-check the specifications, the division of treatment intervals 
and GPS intervals.  
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3.3.5. Instrumental variables method 
3.3.5.1. Basic framework of IV method 
To evaluate treatment effect of a single cross-sectional data, the instrumental variables (IV) 
estimator is frequently applied. IV estimation could be an alternative solution when 
unconfoundedness is suspected to have failed. The IV gives consistent estimates by viewing 
treatment assignment as endogenous. Based on discussions of Blundell and Dias (2002), 
Wooldridge (2002), Wooldridge (2005) and (Heckman, Urzua, & Vytlacil, 2006), this section 
compares the IV and matching approaches.  
It is said that the IV methods can be very effective for estimating average treatment effect if a 
good instrument for treatment is available (Wooldridge, 2002).  Otherwise,  “the cure can be 
worse than the disease” (Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995).  
The problem is rewritten in parametric regression method as the following.  
                            
                              
where subscriptions (0, 1) still denote for variables of agent without and with treatment, and 
error terms,    and   , have zero mean. The function g(X) is a set of covariates, g(X) =     . 
The average treatment effect conditional on covariates X is:  
                                              
When the observed outcome Y is expressed in linear form:  
                                              
                                                      
 If the error terms of    and    are not affected by treatment assignment, i.e. meaning that the 
treatment effect is homogeneous across agents, the equation (37) becomes: 
                              
If unconfoundedness holds, the treatment T is independent of error term   conditional on 
covariates X. Then we can estimate the treatment effect,   , as the parameter of binary 
treatment variable T  by the OLS regression (28). In particular, the ATE is,               , 
constant.  
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Therefore, there are two conditions of homogeneity and unconfoundedness for unbiased and 
consistent OLS estimator. We now explain the IV method to fix on failure of these two 
assumptions. Firstly, in the case of failure of the unconfoundedness condition, the treatment is 
correlated with error term, and leads to inconsistent estimation by OLS. We need to find one 
excluded instrumental variable which helps to isolate the correlation between endogenous 
treatment variable T and error term . For simplicity, I suppose a single instrumental variable. 
The instrumental variable, which is absent from outcome equation, must satisfy two 
assumptions:   
(1) Exogeneity assumption: Given a set of covariates X, the instrumental variable Z must 
be uncorrelated with the error terms. This is called as exclusion restriction.  
                           
(2) Relevance assumption: The instrumental variable must be correlated with the 
endogenous treatment variable. 
                             
These two assumptions imply that the instrument variable Z affects the participation decision 
but does not have any relationship with factors affecting the outcomes.  In other words, IV does 
not have impact on outcome through the unobservable factor, but it affects the outcome 
through the treatment variable T. Now the treatment effect under the standard instrumental 
variable estimator is defined as the ratio of the covariances (Durbin, 1954). The treatment 
effect uses only a fraction of the variation in T that is correlated with Z:  
    
        
        
             
The IV absorbs the correlation between treatment T and error term ɛ. The parameter of 
treatment variable is estimated consistently through the IV procedure when the two 
assumptions of relevance and exogeneity hold. If the number of IVs is greater than the number 
of endogenous variables, we call the estimation method 2SLS 
Secondly, bias and inconsistency may also arise if the impact of treatment is heterogeneous. 
The heterogeneity could be caused by observable or unobservable variables. The effect of 
treatment varies across agents for specific treatment status. This is shown as the error terms 
are different,      . So in equation (37) the error term presents the relationship with 
treatment variable, which is:             .  To avoid the heterogeneity from self-selection 
bias, Blundell and Dias (2002) impose another assumption which isolates the different 
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characteristics from the participation decision. In particular, the agents do not use the 
information on the idiosyncratic factors of the treatment effect when deciding about 
participation. The idiosyncratic factors indicate their different characteristics that assist for 
greater gains from treatment if they participate. If the assumption holds, the agent participates 
the treatment without the prior information (but the researcher has all of that in covariates X) 
and the decision is based on the treatment effect of a specific group conditional on covariates X 
(without that prior information).  
                                                         
where          , and we put an subscript i to indicate the error term of a certain agent in 
the population. Then we can identify the average treatment effect   , and ATE is identical with 
ATT,                   .  
However, in fact, the treatment decisions are most likely to be non-random. Agents always 
participate in a treatment because of the expected gains from treatment which might rely on 
the advantage of their own characteristics. Agents will therefore be aware of the gains arising 
out of idiosyncratic factors. An example in Blundell and Dias (2002) is the distance to the 
treatment place used as an instrument. The variable is unlikely to be related with outcomes 
such as earnings or employment opportunities. This is considered as idiosyncratic factor of the 
treatment. However, agents are likely to participate if they reside closer to treatment place, 
since they incur lower travel cost, even if they expect lower gains from treatment. This 
selection process causes a correlation between the idiosyncratic gain from treatment     and 
instrumental variable Z. Then the correlation is presented as:  
                                             
Then the error term under heterogeneity of treatment effect now is rewritten:  
                                     
where T is identified by Z, and Z depends on the gain of       . In this sense, we cannot 
estimate the average treatment effect with only two basic assumptions of  IV (exogeneity and 
relevance assumptions). In other words, the standard instrument variables do not identify any 
meaningful treatment effect (Blundell & Dias, 2002; Heckman et al., 2006). The problem 
normally relates to the features of the regions that identify the set of covariates X. Then 
changes in Z affect the participation decision but are uncorrelated with the expected gains from 
treatment. Thus, to deal with heterogeneous population, IV might be not as effective as 
matching method. The PSM method, using different techniques, can eliminate observations 
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which are highly unbalanced in terms of their characteristics. This may substantially diminish 
sample heterogeneity.  
3.3.5.2. Implementation 
The 2SLS method is processes in two stages.  
(1) The first stage is to regress treatment T on the instrumental variables Z and 
covariates X and get the fitted values   . This is part of treatment T that is uncorrelated with the 
error term  . The residual may instead be correlated with error term  , this is why the 
treatment T is potentially endogenous.  
  (2) The second stage is to regress Y on    and covariates X to obtain    .  
As the theoretical framework, if the composite residual has zero mean and is uncorrelated with 
fitted values    and exogenous variables X, the regression provides unbiased and consistent OLS 
estimates. But if the residual mean is different from zero, the effect of treatment is 
heterogeneous.  Therefore, we have to check for validity of those three assumptions in IV 
approach: endogeneity, relevance, and homogeneity.  
3.3.5.3. Tests for validity  
Test for endogeneity  
The 2SLS estimator will be more efficient than OLS if the suspected explanatory variable is 
endogenous. Otherwise, the estimates of 2SLS could produce large standard errors. It is 
necessary to have a test for endogeneity of the treatment variable. In the equation (28), we 
suspect a single endogenous variable is treatment T. So if the treatment T is proved to be 
uncorrelated with the error term, we should estimate the equation (28) by OLS. Based on  the 
Hausman (1978) proposed a test that compares OLS and 2SLS estimates and checks whether 
the differences are statistically significant. The test is done in two steps:  
(1) Similar to the above implementation, we first regress the treatment T on Z and other 
exogenous covariates X to obtain error term,          . The residual captures unobserved 
variables influencing treatment, but not captured by treatment and other exogenous covariates 
X.  
(2) Then we regress outcome Y on covariates X and error term   . Using the t-test, if the 
coefficient on the residual    is statistically different from zero, the unobserved variables jointly 
influencing on treatment and outcome Y are significant. The null hypothesis that error terms    
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and   are uncorrelated is rejected. In other words, the treatment T is endogenous and 2SLS is 
more efficient than OLS.    
Test for weak instruments 
A major concern in relation to the IV method is to find good instrumental variables. An IV is 
considered weak when it fails to satisfy the two conditions, relevance and exogeneity or 
exclusion restriction.  
The relevance condition requires that the  IV be significantly correlated with the endogenous 
treatment variable. This helps to decrease the standard error of the IV estimate and the impact 
of endogenous treatment T could be predicted more accurately. In the first stage regression of 
2SLS, if the coefficients on the excluded instrumental variables Z are statistically different from 
zero, the relevance condition hold. Since the model has a single endogenous variable, we 
simply use t statistic if there is one IV, and F statistic if there are more than one IV. The null 
hypothesis for the case of multiple IV is that all coefficients on excluded IVs are jointly equal to 
zero. If the null hypothesis is rejected, there is at least one excluded IV satisfied.  
The exclusion restriction indicates that IV must be uncorrelated with the error term   of the 
outcome equation. This cannot be tested because the error term   is unobserved. However, if 
the model has more than one excluded IV, it could be examined whether at least one of them 
uncorrelated with the structural error. The test refers as overidentification test. The number of 
overidentifying restrictions is the number of extra excluded IVs. If each endogenous variable 
has one excluded IV, there is no overidentifying restriction that needs to be tested. If there are 
more than one IV for the single endogenous variable, we can test for overidentifying 
restrictions. The test is proceeded in two steps:  
(1) Obtain the 2SLS residual   by estimation of 2SLS structural equation.  
(2) Regress residual   on all exogenous variables Z and X to obtain R-squared,   . Use 
the null hypothesis that all IVs are uncorrelated with the residuals,       
 , where q is the 
number of excluded IVs minus the number of endogenous variables, or the number of 
overidentifying restrictions. If the calculated Chi-square statistic is greater the critical value at 
specific significant level, the null hypothesis is rejected. This indicates that at least one excluded 
IV is correlated with error term or not endogenous.  
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3.4. Data and model specification 
The paper uses the cross-sectional data from Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey 
(VARHS) conducted in June, July, and August of 2010. This survey with two previous rounds, in 
2006 and 2008, were carried out in collaboration between University of Copenhagen in 
Denmark and the Institute for Labor Studies and Social Affairs in Vietnam. The surveys aim to 
investigate changes in household welfare in rural areas of 12 provinces, out of total 64 
provinces.  In particular, they are: Lao Cai, Dien Bien, Lai Chau, Phu Tho, Ha Tay, Nghe An, 
Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Lam Dong, and Long An. The surveys collected 
data in detail about agricultural production, employment, income and partial food expenditure, 
credit, risk and shock; along with basic information of household members and demographic. 
The 2010 VARSH was implemented in 3,208 households. Due to missing data and relevant 
information, the sample used in this analysis contains 2,280 observations or farm households 
who cultivated paddy.  
3.4.1. Natural conditions and shocks 
Figure 3.4 shows the location of the 12 provinces which provide data. These are spread 
throughout the country. They belong to seven economic regions, out of total eight regions in 
Vietnam. Hence, the agricultural land of households is characterized by diverse types of land as 
well as weather conditions, which substantially affect crop yield and therefore fertilizer 
adoption. The provinces in North East and North West regions, namely Lao Cai, Dien Bien and 
Lai Chau, are mountainous with sloping land and poor soils. The other three provinces Dak Lak, 
Dak Nong and Lam Dong are also located in hilly area. Instead Ha Tay and Phu Tho in Red River 
Delta region, and Long An in Mekong River Delta region are located in the two plains which 
form the two largest rice producing regions of the country.   
The survey collected information on land where problems were experienced in planting. Table 
3.2 shows the percentage of land area by six problematic types that include: erosion, dry land, 
low-lying land, sedimentation, landslide, stony soils or clay, and uncategorized type of 
problematic land. The first column is the ratio with respect to total land area. Dry land exhibits 
the highest ratio , at around 29 percent. The other types of problem accounts for much lower 
proportions, from 3 to more than 5 percent. Land without problems is approximately 42 
percent of the total. However, farmers typically grow more than one crop. Especially if farmers 
manage forest or pasture land which are normally much larger than the area used for crops, 
they might underestimate the ratios of problematic land. Although the information on land 
with problem is available only for total land, not for paddy land, we can compare these two 
areas. The second column is the ratio between total unfertile land and paddy land that 
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households hold. Dry land is nearly equal to land without problem, about 92 percent and 97 
percent; followed by eroded land, low-lying land, and land subject to landslides, with ratios of 
21 percent, 17 percent and 14 percent respectively.  
Regarding the uncertain risk from weather fluctuations, the maps in Figure 3.8 show that the 
average annual temperature increases but fluctuates less as we move from the North to the 
South. Correspondingly, the three provinces in Northern mountain region have 
disadvantageous temperature conditions. Instead, the coastal provinces in the middle and the 
South Center of Vietnam, which contain Quang Nam and Khanh Hoa, face higher rainfall level 
and also a greater possibility of suffering coastal flooding. The other two River Delta regions are 
in the plains area with its intensive river system that is the main source of water and which 
periodically enriches the  land. On the other hand, these conditions turn to be harmful when 
riverine and coastal floods arise. Such phenomena are most frequent  in Ha Tay in the North 
and Long An in the South. 
This analysis uses the information on natural disaster reported by households that their plots 
(land) suffered in the period starting from July 2008 with the exact month and year for each 
incident. In order to make natural disasters consistent with the outcomes, the sample uses only 
shocks that households suffered in the previous twelve months. The natural disasters are 
classified into seven types. Based on the similar consequences, those types are further 
aggregated into three groups. The objective of this is to generate a large enough sample size to 
investigate the impact in each group of disaster. The first group includes floods, storms or 
typhoons, and landslides; the second group is drought and the last group includes pests or plant 
diseases, insects and animals problems. The household could be hit by more than one disaster, 
so Table 3.2 reports the numbers that households suffered one disaster exclusively and with 
other types simultaneously. The raw data indicates that the farmers are exposed in highly 
possibility of natural shocks. The sample reveals that more than 30 percent of all households hit 
by at least one natural disaster event in the previous twelve months. The proportion of 
households that experienced floods, storms and landslides is around 12 percent, while the 
proportion experiencing drought is about 8 percent, and that for plant/insects diseases is nearly 
14 percent. Considering those disaster events that happened exclusively to farmers, the 
numbers decreases around 1 or 2 percent for each group of disasters.  
3.4.2. Outcomes by treatment status 
Table 3.4 relates to chemical fertilizer adoption. Fertilizer adoption is measured by the total 
expenditure spent on fertilizers purchased for rice production. The purchases cover urea, NPK, 
phosphate, etc; but exclude organic fertilizers. The units are thousand VND per square meter. 
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The data show that the majority of respondents adopt chemical fertilizers for their paddy 
cultivation. Out of total 2,280 observations, only 267 farmers cultivate rice without using 
chemical fertilizers  accounting for around 12 percent of the total. The distribution of users is 
slightly right skewed with mean 0.37 and median 0.33 units.  
Base on the distribution of fertilizer users, we track the data on outcomes by three categories 
of fertilizer-using status: non-users, below average users and above average users. The data is 
observed through four categories of natural shock status: without disasters, flood/ storm/ 
landslide disasters, drought disasters, and plant disease/ insect disasters. Since different natural 
disasters may cause different levels of harm, the analysis investigates the impact of each shock 
type separately.  
The outcomes variables measuring crop productivity are rice yield and rice revenue. Rice 
revenue is the total value of rice produced per unit land area, which includes both value for sale 
and the value retained for household use. The outcomes capturing household welfare are 
monthly per capita income from agricultural activities and monthly per capita  income. It is 
acknowledged  that these indicators may  fail to adequately capture the effect of treatment. 
First, although rice production is the main crop of farmers in Vietnam, agricultural income also 
arises from crops and livestock. The income from rice production solely is a closer proxy for 
evaluating impact. However, the survey aggregates some items of expenditure of rice 
production in common with other crops which makes it impossible to compute the income 
(revenue minus expenditure) from rice separately. So we have to use revenue indicator instead 
of income indicator. Second, the same problem for total income variable for those households 
for which rice growing accounts for only a small fraction of total household income. The survey 
also reports information on food expenditure which might be a better indicator for household 
welfare changes. However, this variable relates to expenditure information for only the 
previous four weeks while household food expenditure may fluctuate substantially over the 
year.   
Table 3.5 presents summary statistics and statistical tests on the difference in means for the 
continuous variables between groups of  non-users and users, and between groups of below 
average and above average users. About 50 percent of households belong to the below average 
group and 37 percent of households are in above average  group. In the whole sample, the 
outcomes of those four indicators show significant positive differences between users and non-
users, and among users, at less than 1 percent level.  
Moreover, we observe the diversity in the outcomes across categories of disasters. For 
example, the households suffered flood/ storm/ landslide shocks exhibit a negative difference 
in rice revenue between users and non-users, and in agricultural income within user group. In 
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group of households which did not experience disaster shocks, the outcomes show little 
difference across fertilizer usage status, except for total income among users. The outcome 
variables for non-users appear lower than for users resulting in higher values of difference 
between users and non-users than between groups of users. Farmers experienced drought 
show the positive incomes differences but insignificant. Therefore, the descriptive data 
suggests differing impacts of chemical fertilizer adoption on outcomes conditional on the level 
of adoption and type of disaster shock.  
3.4.3. Observable characteristics by treatment status 
Table 3.6 reports descriptive statistics on the variables that will be used to estimate the 
propensity scores. All variables are tested to examine whether the mean of Observable 
characteristics  differ significantly across groups. Overall, the differences are more significant 
between users and non-users than among the user groups, both in terms of observable 
characteristics and the magnitude of the differences. The features of household structure are 
significantly different in both comparison groups, except for the number of members at the 
ages from 16 to 25, the number of members at the ages from 26 to 60 between users and non-
users, and gender headship among users. The non-users reports fewer members working for 
wages or salary, fewer workers hired outside for paddy cultivation, but more workers in 
household agricultural or business activities. The workers in household business and hired 
workers within the group of users are broadly equal. Moreover, the non-users are more likely 
to report being constrained by credit access and much lower assistant receipted 17. The 
demographic (ethnic minority) characteristics and distance to the center of commune are also 
associated with the status of fertilizer use.  
Related to land characteristics, the t-test results show insignificant differences across groups for 
both paddy land and the proportion of land without problem out of total land area (which 
relatively measures the quality of land). The plots of fertilizer users are more dependent on 
public irrigation system than non-users. The likely reason is that almost non-users reside in 
Northern West mountain area (Table 3.18) where the public irrigation is underdeveloped. The 
other farmers in coastal and plain regions are favored by extensive public irrigation for their 
crops. According to the data of this sample, the proportions of irrigated area in total land for 
paddy cultivation take up 27 percent, 75 percent and 87 percent in non-users, below average 
                                                     
17
 Money or goods from persons who are not members of your household such as relatives living elsewhere friends 
or neighbours (private transfers); or from public institutions, e.g. insurance money or social assistance (public 
transfers.  
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users and above average users, respectively. This variable exhibits a severe in propensity score 
matching, so it will not be used in the model and reported in the table.  
The farmers also were asked to report the main type of seed cultivated. There are three 
categories of seeds used: hybrid seed, ordinary improved varieties, and old local varieties (with 
about 1 percent of uncategorized seed).18 Each type of seeds has different advantages and 
disadvantages that are appropriate for different agro-ecological, socio-economic areas. For 
example, based on the empirical result from a survey covering nine provinces in Vietnam 
(Hossain, Tran, & Janaiah, 2003), hybrid rice is adopted less in Central Highland and in the south 
than in the north. Compared to inbred varieties (either ordinary improved or old local 
varieties), the study finds that the hybrid seeds generate higher return but also involves in 
higher costs. Recently, about 86 percent of the farmers expressed their willingness to continue 
hybrid rice cultivation due to of higher profitability. Only 14 percent of that sample indicated 
that they would discontinue hybrid cultivation in the next seasons because of lower yield, lower 
price and lower profitability. Therefore, the type of seed used may differ across provinces. In 
this sample, the non-users are most likely to adopt ordinary varieties, and use less hybrid seeds. 
In the group of users, higher chemical fertilizer use is associated with a higher ratio of hybrid 
seed adoption and lower improved seed adoption. Use of the old local seed appear does not 
differ across fertilizer users and non-users. The descriptive statistics reveals that the adoption 
of hybrid seed is expanding in Vietnam, as noted in Hossain et al. (2003) .  
3.4.4. Instrumental variables 
According to the two key requirements for an IV, we need to find an appropriate set of 
variables (or a single variable) that are correlated with decision on treatment participation and 
correlated with outcome only through the treatment participation. The geographical indicator 
could be considered for the choice of IV as it is much likely to affect fertilizer adoption. 
However, different regions also characterized by different agro-ecological conditions that 
contribute to a higher productivity by types of soil, temperature, rather than only fertilizer; and 
socio-economic conditions that contribute to a higher income. Such correlations will cause 
correlation between the candidate IV and error term. For instance, in this case study, the 
majority of non-adopter live in mountainous regions. Since the agro-ecological conditions don 
                                                     
18
 According to the manual of VARSH 2010, those types of seed are described as: (i) Hybrid seeds are produced by 
artificially cross-pollinated plants. It is necessary to buy new hybrid seeds every season. (ii) Ordinary improved 
varieties cover modern, improved seeds for which it is possible to store harvested rice and use it as seeds in the 
next season. Hence, with this type of seeds it is not necessary to buy new seeds every season. Hence, with this 
type of seeds it is not necessary to buy new seeds every season. (iii) Old local varieties are the seeds that have not 
been improved by modern methods. These are varieties that have typically been grown in the area for many years.  
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not favor paddy cultivation, production and productivity cannot be as high as other regions, 
even if comparable amounts of chemical fertilizer are adopted.  
We propose the two variables as instruments: the availability of information about fertilizer 
received by household and the availability of crop insurance. Information on the first one of 
these is acquired from a question that asks whether the household received any information on 
and assistance in fertilizer utilization provided by extension workers who visited the household 
in the previous 12 months. These visits might have taken place at the request of the household. 
Although requested visits form 15 percent of total visits. The household is assumed to be more 
likely to adopt fertilizer when it has more information. So if we find a correlation between 
information assistance and outcomes, this can only arise through adoption. Table 3.6 shows 
that the share of household that received information in group of non-users was 69 percent, 
while that ratio in group of users was 91 percent. The gap between non-users and users is 32 
percent and differs from zero at 10 percent level of significance. The gap between two groups 
of users is 3 percent.  
The second IV derives from the question which asks how much households would receive if the 
insurance against lost and damage crops were available. This availability of insurance appears 
to have a positive impact on fertilizer adoption, especially for households who frequently 
suffered from disasters. The binary treatment model applies the dummy IV of crop insurance, 
and the continuous treatment applies the continuous one. Crop insurance may affect other 
kinds of technology adoption, such as irrigation, varieties, soil management, etc., and this may 
complicate interpretation of the results. Also, crop insurance contributes directly to household 
welfare if there is loss or damage in its production. We will check this through test for IV 
validity.  The descriptive data in Table 3.6 show that the share of household with crop insurance 
in the group of non-users, below average users, and above average  are 10 percent, 39 percent, 
and 47 percent, respectively. The difference of non-users versus users, and below average 
users, and above average  are statistically significant at 1 percent level. Similarly, the 
differences in term of value of crop insurance also are significant at 1percent. The following 
section exhibits result and analysis in detail.  
3.5. Application and results 
First, we investigate the determinants which affect the decisions of farm-household on 
chemical fertilizer adoption. The first stage of Heckman model evaluates whether or not 
farmers  used fertilizers, and the second stage evaluates intensity of adoption.  We test for both 
cases, with and without consideration of natural disasters. The explanatory variables are the 
expected factors that have been tested in empirical studies and shown in Table 3.6.  
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Second, we continue to explore the effect of adoption on outcomes by matching methods. The 
variables used in the model are pre-treatment characteristics as in Heckman tests. On the basic 
of the significance tests discussed in section 5, some variables appear to differ substantially  
between the groups of users and non-users. This is likely to generate unbalanced propensity 
scores. To ensure that the propensity scores relate to adoption  decisions and outcomes, we 
experiment with different specifications  with the objective of achieving satisfactory balancing 
test outcomes.  In line with other empirical studies, the model can be augmented with 
interaction terms and higher order terms. Therefore, in order to achieve a better balance in the 
propensity score, highly significant variables are used interaction terms and higher order terms, 
including: education of head, ethnicity, paddy land area, ratio of unproblematic land, and three 
kinds of seed varieties. In particular, the education of head is interacted with ethnicity; the 
paddy land area is interacted with the share of unproblematic land, and with seed varieties. The 
square of the education of the household head is also included into in the model. In addition, 
the values of loan and assistance receipt are transformed into log term to reduce the skewness. 
On the basic of this specification, the application of matching method and results are discussed 
below in the two cases of binary and continuous treatment.  
Third, for comparability with matching method, we also report results of using OLS and IV 
methods. The regressions take both binary treatment and continuous treatment as the 
intervention variable corresponding to all categories of outcomes and types of disaster as in the 
matching method. All the pre-treatment variables, which are used for measuring the propensity 
scores, become the explanatory variables in the regressions.   
3.5.1. Heckman tests 
We test for four models in which the determinants in the second stage of decision are selected 
differently. The first model test for the same explanatory variables in both stages of decision 
making, and the other models chooses only the most relevant and significant explanatory 
variables in the second stage. Table 3.7 shows results of the whole sample and Table 3.8 shows 
results with taking consideration of natural disasters as dummy explanatory variables.  
The impacts of most of the statistically significant variables appear with expected sign. 
Education of household head, numbers of household labours in agriculture, outside labours and 
assistance receipt have positive impacts on adoption decision, whereas numbers of member 
from 10 to 25 years old, minority ethnic households, male headship, numbers of household 
labours in business, distance to committee, and land independent on public irrigation have 
negative effects on adoption decision. The effects between two stages of decision-making are 
fairly different. In model 2, we keep the same explanatory variables in the second stage, 
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household members from 10 to 25 years old, education, ethnicity, male headship, outside 
labours, assistant receipt become statistically insignificant; while labours for salary, loan 
obtained and land independent on irrigation have positive effects on level of adoption. In the 
model 2, 3 and 4, we keep the significant variables in the second period. Then education appear 
to be positively significant. Moreover, households who suffered disasters are more likely to 
adopt fertilizers. Effects of different type of natural shocks vary in both stages. Flood/ storm 
disasters have positive effects in both stages, while disease/ insect shocks positively affect in 
the first stage, and drought positively affect in the second stage.  
The Maximum Likelihood Ratio Test refers to the similarity of the decision making mechanisms 
of adoption and level of adoption, in term of the existence of significant correlation  between 
the error term of the two stages. According to the results of LR test, the error terms of the two 
stages are found to be zero correlation, except model 4, based on the 10 percent significance 
level of the chi-squared distribution. These findings fail to reject the hypothesis that the 
decision of whether or not to adopt fertilizer does not affect the decision of adoption intensity.   
The model 1 shows the lowest correlation between the two stages as it includes all the same 
covariances in the second stages. The directions and level of significance of determinants are 
fairly different between adoption and level of adoption equations. When we drop the 
insignificant variables in the level of adoption equation, the correlation of increases. This refers 
that there is selection bias and Heckit model is appropriate choice. Moreover, the natural 
disasters show statistically significant effects in both stages. The flood and storm have 
significant and positive effect in both stages, but disease and insects have positive effect in the 
first stage and drought has positive effect in the second stage.  
As theoretical framework, the Heckit model is identified if the same independent variables in 
the first stage appear in the second stage. The identification occurs from distributional 
assumptions about residuals and not because of variation in the independent variables. This 
means that non-linear relationship in the first stage causes identification. So identification is 
one of the problem to select the independent variables in the second equation, and we may 
have inaccurate estimates in level of adoption. We need to find the independent variables that 
effect adoption decision but not level of adoption.  In general, we can either exclude variables 
in the first equation, or add variables in the second equation, although this might not be 
correctly theoretically motivated. Therefore, identification issue is one of limitations for this 
approach.  
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3.5.2. Matching methods 
Binary treatment 
In this case, we estimate the mean difference of outcomes between group of farmers who use 
chemical fertilizers and group of farmers who do not use chemical fertilizers. To reveal the 
different effects of natural disaster shocks, the matching method is employed in turn for the 
whole sample, for the group of farmers who do not experience disasters, and for the group of 
farmers suffered from natural disasters. In the sample, the number of non-adopters is 276 
households, and the number of non-adopters experienced a specific disaster is less than 10 
percent, which is too small to be checked by matching method. Thus, we do not distinguish 
between households which experienced different types of disasters but instead consider just 
households suffered from at least one sort of disaster. We use the Stata package developed by 
Leuven and Sianesi (2003).  
The logistic model is employed to predict the probability of adopting chemical fertilizers with a 
set of households and crop characteristics. This step could equally be employed using probit 
model giving the similar results. Table 3.9 shows the results of estimated propensity scores 
from logit regression. The first column is estimate of the whole sample, the second is for 
subsample of households who did not suffer disasters, and the third is for households suffered 
at least one kind of disaster during the previous twelve months.  The role of propensity scores is 
just as a means to balance the observed distribution of covariates between users and non-
users. Although the estimated parameters of the logit model are not the objective of this step, 
they show a numbers of characteristics that significantly affect on the decision of adoption and 
are similar as in the Heckman tests. These impacts are statistically insignificant for the 
subsample of households who suffered disasters. The results are quite similar for the whole 
sample and subsample of households without disasters with only a slightly differences in 
magnitude. These estimated parameters are less statistically significant for the subsample of 
households with disasters.  
Using the estimated propensity score in the above model of the whole sample and the 
subsample, we generate the new samples of matched observations between users and non-
users by four alternative matching algorithm techniques. The common support condition is 
imposed in all matching techniques. To implement this condition, the users whose propensity 
scores are higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity score of non-user 
are dropped from the matched sample. Then the means of the two groups, users and non-
users, remaining in the common support region are compared to obtain the difference. This 
difference measures the effect of treatment, here chemical fertilizer adoption.  
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Table 3.10 presents the average effect of adoption on rice productivity (yield, revenue) and 
household welfare (agricultural income and total income) for different categories of households 
in Panel A, B, C. The first column is the result of sample before matching. The remaining four 
columns shows the result from the four matching techniques. The treatment assignment 
displays the numbers of observations which are left in common support region and used to 
evaluate the difference of means. In the nearest neighbor (NN) method with replacement in the 
second column, the user is matched with closest non-user in term of propensity score. Since the 
number of non-users is lower than of users, each non-user is replicated several times to match 
with users. The second method, we continue to use nearest neighbor method combining with 
non-replacement condition (NNN). This method performs that only one non-user is matched to 
one user in each pair. The third technique, we employ the caliper matching that imposes the 
certain distance for any match (CN). In this method, the observations which lie outside of 
caliper are dropped. These estimates apply caliper 0.01, which means that all matches not 
equal to within 0.01 standard deviations of each covariate are dropped. The last method is 
kernel-based matching (KBM) by which a pair of matched observations is identified by kernel-
weighted average condition. The KBM method requires selection of the kernel function and 
bandwidth (or smoothing parameter). The selection of bandwidth is more important (Pagan & 
Ullah, 1999). There is a tradeoff between variance and bias which is caused by selection of 
bandwidth. Higher bandwidth leads to a smoother density function and hence lower variance. 
On contrary, higher bandwidth causes greater bias estimate. The model employs Epanechnikov 
kernel and 0.06 bandwidth, as the default in this Stata package.   
The detailed propensity scores before and after matching are reported in Table 3.11, 3.12, and 
3.13 for those three categories of households. In these tables, we also show the t-test, between 
users and non-users, before matching and after matching. The bias reduction refers to how 
much the difference in propensity score between the two groups decreases after matching. The 
results demonstrate that almost of the observable characteristics achieve more balanced 
propensity scores after matching. This is indicated by a higher p-value of the t-test. Moreover, 
we also report the propensity score distribution in kernel density estimation. The figure below 
each panel illustrates the kernel distribution of sample before matching and after matching. We 
can observe that the distribution of propensity scores is more balanced after matching, and the 
difference is clearer when the standardized bias is smaller. However, this is not always the case, 
for instance in the case households suffered disasters in KBM technique (Panel D, Table 3.15), 
and the mean of standardized bias is lowest, compared to other matching techniques. But the 
kernel distribution of propensity score in KMB appears less balanced than that in NNN and CN. 
Therefore, tests of the balancing property should be checked together with t-test and bias 
reduction in each pre-treatment variable,  together visual examination of the kernel 
distribution of propensity scores.  
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In Panel A, Table 3.10, the results show that the rice yield obtained by the group of fertilizer 
adopters is significant higher than that obtained by the group of non-adopters. Specifically, the 
NN method estimates the effect of adoption is 0.056 (kg/m2) higher than without adoption. 
Similarly, the effect in NNN, CN, and KBM techniques are 0.103 (kg/m2), 0.093 (kg/m2), and 
0.067 (kg/m2).  This is the average difference of rice yield between the similar pairs of 
household that adopted chemical fertilizers and those that did not adopt. Compared to the 
result of the sample before matching, the impacts appear lower after matching. The 
overestimate of before matching result may be contributed by other factors that also are 
favorable of higher yield, such as soil quality, irrigation, credit, etc. The balancing tests show the 
evidence of reduced bias level after matching. In detail, bias before matching is 27.95 percent, 
while the lowest bias after matching is 5.25 percent in the KN method. This standardized bias is 
almost equivalent to the level of validity which is commonly sought of less than 5 percent. The 
NN, NNN and KBM give a higher bias level, at around 8 percent. Hence, the result from CN 
method provides the “best quality” after matching.  
The effect of fertilizer adoption on rice revenue is significantly positive before matching. In the 
CN technique, the impact is around 0.3 (thou. VND/m2). The effect is slightly smaller in the 
KBM, greater in the NNN, whereas the effect is not significant in the NN. The relatively 
significant levels of these matching techniques are reflected correspondingly by the 
standardized bias test. The comparable results of chemical fertilizer adoption on rice revenue 
are shown similar as yield, in term of matching methods. Compared with the effect before 
matching, the magnitude after matching is halved which is in line with the effect on yields.   
Concerning household welfare, the effects of fertilizer adoption on income from agriculture are 
significantly positive and equal to around 0.27 on the basic of the CN method. Since income is 
measured logarithmically, this can be interpreted as implying that the average income from 
agriculture in the group of adopters is 27 percent point higher than the group of non-adopters. 
The impact after matching of agricultural income is slightly greater than before matching which 
is 23 percent point. However, the effect of adoption on total income is lower than on 
agricultural income, and approximately 17 percent point. The estimates prior to matching are 
much higher, at 50 percent. The difference could be understood as the total income of 
household includes other sources of income rather than income from rice production. This is 
reasonable if the effect before matching is overestimated. The real implication is that adoption 
is much more likely for richer households, biasing the unmatched estimates.  
Panel B shows the estimates for the households which did not suffer disasters. The balancing 
tests for NNN and CN matching methods display the lowest standardized bias with around 5.6 
percent and 5.8 percent, respectively. The effects of fertilizer adoption are all significantly 
positive in these two techniques whereas the effects in NN and KBM are found to be less 
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statistically significant and are associated with the higher standardized bias of around 9 
percent. The estimates prior to matching also are higher than estimates after matching, except 
for agricultural income. Compared to the whole sample, the adoption effects in the group of 
households without disasters is found to be higher on yield and revenue, but lower on incomes. 
So these results may reflect that the positive effect between chemical fertilizer users and non-
users is higher on the productivity if farmers did not suffer from natural disaster loss or 
damage.  
Panel C reports the estimates for households that suffered disasters. The magnitude of the 
effects is smaller than in these two above groups of households, and also less statistically 
significant reflecting the much lower number of observations. The balancing test show a high 
standardized bias value in all matching technique. The lowest standardized bias is 11 percent in 
KBM, and the highest is 23 percent in NN matching. The most important reason is likely to be 
the small number of non-users, only 55 households. This factor makes it more difficult to find a 
similar fertilizer-using household and so increases the bias.   
Continuous treatment 
This case is different from the binary case in two main respects. First, the average potential 
effect is evaluated in terms of the extent chemical fertilizer used. In this context, the estimates 
relate only to fertilizer users. Second, the sub-sample of fertilizer users is sufficiently large 
enough to allow us to evaluate separately the impact on groups of households suffered a 
particular type of disaster. We investigate how the dose-response of fertilizer use affects on 
outcomes distinguishing between different groups of households. The groups of fertilizer users 
are further separated into five categories containing respectively the whole sample, households 
which did not suffer any disasters, households which suffered flood or storm or landslide 
disasters, households which suffered drought, and households which suffered plant disease or 
insect disasters.  
The application of continuous treatment follows the implementation described in the previous 
section by using the Stata package of Bia and Mattei (2008). The generalized propensity score 
can be estimated by OLS, in which the values of chemical fertilizer used are regressed on pre-
treatment characteristics. The model specifications are the same as in the binary case. Since the 
regression results show that that data depart from  normality irrespective of whether the data 
are measured in levels or in logs, we use the Box-Cox transformation for chemical fertilizer used 
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to improve the normality of variables. 19 The Box-Cox regression finds the maximum likelihood 
estimates of the Box-Cox transform. The estimate of GPS is reported in Table 3.15. Then the 
distributions across all categories of households satisfy the assumption of normality at 5 
percent or 10 percent level of significance. As the binary case, the estimates of regression in 
this step only accounts for computing GPS, and does not have impact on interpretation of the 
treatment effect.  
In addition, the treatment range or the amount of fertilizer used is divided into two intervals by 
the sample mean. To test the balancing property (BP), the estimated GPS is divided into four 
blocks in the group of households without suffering disasters, and three blocks in each group of 
households suffered from disasters. The number of GPS block in the sub-sample of households 
without disaster shocks is greater than the other groups due to a larger sample size. The GPS 
blocks correspond to the distribution of GPS percentiles. Explicitly, all of four GPS blocks 
conditional on median of the two treatment intervals are categorized by 25th, 50th, 75th and 
100th centile of GPS distribution. Similarly, three GPS blocks in the group of household suffered 
disaster shocks are 25th, 75th and 100th centile of GPS distribution. Within each block GPS, the 
mean difference is compared between two intervals of the treatment: above and below 
average  in terms  of fertilizer adoption. There are four mean differences in the sub-sample of 
households who did not suffered disasters and three mean differences in each group of 
households who suffered from disasters. To compute the mean t-statistics, the corresponded 
four and three blocks are weighted by the number of observations. Table 3.16 reports the 
values and distributions of the GPS evaluated at the representative point of each treatment 
intervals.  
The last rows of Table 3.16 and Table 3.17 show the t-statistic test of balancing property. 
According to the guidance of Bia and Mattei (2008), the “order of magnitude” interpretations  
of the test is classified into 5 levels: from supported evidence to decisive evidence against 
balancing property.20 The results show that the t test for the whole sample is 1 percent; the 
group of households suffered flood/storm/landslides is significant at 10 percent level and of 
other groups is significant at 5 percent level. This implies that the means of covariates used for 
estimates are indifferent at 5 and 10 percent level of significance across groups of low and high 
                                                     
19
 The Box-Cox transformation is defined as (Box & Cox, 1964):     
   
  
   
 
       
              
  
20
 (i) If t test is significant at less than 1 percent: Decisive evidence against BP. (ii) If t test is significant from 1 
percent to less than 5 percent: Strong to very strong evidence against BP. (iii) If t test is significant from 5 percent 
to less than 10 percent: Moderate evidence against BP. (iv) If t test is significant from 10 percent to less than 20 
percent: Very slight evidence against BP. (v) If t test is significant at greater 20 percent: Evidence supports BP. 
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adoption, given the estimated GPS. Comparing these figures with the Bia and Mattei (2008), the 
evidence  against the balancing property may be considered as only slight or moderate.  
In Table 3.17, the expected outcome indicators are calculated using a flexible function of the 
treatment variable to estimate GPS according to equation (31). The parameters in polynomial 
function are estimated by OLS using observed quantity of chemical fertilizer applied and the 
estimated GPS. Hirano and Imbens (2005) note that the parameters do not allow direct causal 
inference. They only test whether all parameters involving the GPS are equal to zero. This can 
be interpreted as a test whether the covariates generate any bias. Table 3.14 shows the 
estimated result across four groups. The significant parameters of GPS indicate that they are 
relevant and matter in reducing bias of response function. The linear estimated GPS, The 
quadratic estimated GPS and whereas the interaction term between GPS and treatment  
appear highly significant in the whole sample and in the group of households without shocks. 
These variables have less statistically significant effects in the groups of households who 
suffered from disasters.   
Finally, using these parameters, we further estimate the mean difference of outcome at each 
treatment level. Then the entire dose-response equation is mean-weighted using then 
estimated parameters and estimated GPS at each specific treatment level as expressed in 
equation (32). The bootstrap procedure (100 replications) is applied to compute the standard 
errors and confidence intervals. Table 3.14 reports the estimated effect of fertilizer adoption on 
outcomes. The impact evaluation is specified in average of dose-response function and at 
certain level of treatment. The treatment level is the degree of chemical fertilizer used which 
belongs to a set of evenly spaced values t0, t1, ..., t10. The levels of treatment at t0 and t10 are 
the min and max values of chemical fertilizer used. The second column is the average dose-
response computed at each level of treatment or at each level of chemical fertilizer adoption. 
The marginal casual effect in the third column reflects the variation of treatment on the 
variation of outcome. This also is referred as the derivative of dose-response function. We 
employ the treatment gap of 0.1 to estimate the marginal potential outcome. In particular, the 
marginal effect of treatment can be interpreted as how outcome changes if treatment 
increases by 0.1 units.   
The estimated treatment effects are graphed in Figure 3.5 together with the corresponding 95 
percent confidence intervals for both dose-response function and marginal casual effect 
function. On average, the level of chemical fertilizer adoption is highest in households suffered 
plant diseases, followed by households suffered flood,  households without disasters and 
household suffered drought; which equals to 0.396, 0.393, 0.359 and 0.352, respectively. The 
degree of fertilizer adoption does not correspond monotonically with rice yield. The households 
suffered plant diseases/insects turn out to have the lowest rice yield while the highest yield is 
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from households who suffered flood, then households without disaster and households 
suffered drought. This order of effect on rice revenue is similar, except the magnitude of impact 
in households without natural shocks is a bit lower than in households with drought. Thus, the 
effect of chemical fertilizer impact most on household that experienced plant diseases or insect 
problems.  
In order to investigate the effect of different levels of fertilizer adoption, we check marginal 
effect over the wide-range of treatment. In all groups of households, the marginal effect 
increases productivity at low level of fertilizer adoption, but decreases at higher intensity of 
adoption. However, the confidence intervals are very wide at high levels of application. It is not 
clear that the downturn is statistically significant. Observed at similar levels of treatment, the 
rice yield in group of households which did not experience disasters is relatively higher than 
households suffered disasters. Overall, the treatment effect functions appear to be consistent 
with a declining marginal impact and in some cases zero marginal impact at higher levels of 
application.  
About household welfare, we observe the effect of adoption on agricultural income and total 
income. The average dose-response on household welfare has a quite opposite order 
comparing to the effect on productivity. The households suffered flood have lowest average 
agricultural income and total income. The households suffered plant diseases have the highest 
agricultural income, and households suffered drought have the highest total income. 
Furthermore, the results by treatment levels show the change in the effect more clearly. The 
higher level of fertilizer used has a negative relationship to agricultural income for households 
without disasters, except for the treatment level t0 and t1. This marginal casual effect could be 
explained by the idea of returns to scale. The farmers in Vietnam are constrained by small farm 
size that lead to a lower degree of   increased output when input increases. The empirical 
evidence also supports this trend in which there is negative relationship of mechanical adoption 
with credit constraint and farm size (Alviar, 1972; Greene, 1973; Pingali, Bigot, & Binswanger, 
1987; Weil, 1970).  
On the other hand, the intensity of fertilizer used has a positive impact on agricultural income 
for households suffered plant diseases or insects, except at the lowest treatment level t0. The 
negative marginal impact of fertilizer adoption also are occurred at only t3 and t4 level of 
households suffered drought, and t0, t4, t5, and t6 of households suffered flood. For total 
income, the marginal effect appears negative with lower adoption level in households without 
disasters, but with higher adoption level in households suffered flood while the negative 
relationship of marginal effect is shown in the middle level of treatment in households suffered 
flood and plant diseases. Differently from the effects discussed in the previous section, 
agricultural income and total income might fail to capture the effect of fertilizers since the 
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household welfare could come from other agricultural sources and other kinds of income, 
rather than only from rice cultivation.  
3.5.3. Instrumental variables  
Table 3.18 reports the estimates from using OLS and IV methods for the case of binary 
treatment and for three categories of sample as in matching method: the whole sample the 
group which was free from disaster, and the group which suffered at least one disaster. Overall, 
the effect of chemical fertilizer adoption on outcomes is positive and statistically significant at 
less than 1 percent. However, the effects in IV estimates are two or three times as high as those 
in OLS estimates. As in matching method, the magnitude of treatment effect on yield and 
revenue is highest in group of households without disasters, followed by group of all sample, 
and group of households with disaster.  
We also report checks the on the validity of these two methods. Panel B of Table 3.18 shows 
the result for the 2SLS estimates. The IVs, fertilizer information and crop insurance, appear 
individually to correlate with fertilizer adoption at 1 percent level of significance in all three 
categories of household. The weak IV test is designed for two key conditions of IV method. 
First, the F test reveals that these two IVs are jointly different from zero, and hence satisfies the 
relevance condition of IV. Second, the null hypothesis in the Sagan test states that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation, i.e. that at least one excluded 
instrument is uncorrelated with the structural error. The test statistic has the chi-squared 
distribution. Rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. The result shows that only 
in the group of household with disaster, and all groups in revenue outcome, satisfy the 
overidentifying condition.  
The Hausman statistic is computed as a test of endogeneity by comparing the IV estimates and 
OLS estimates. The null hypothesis states that an OLS estimator of the same equation would 
yield consistent estimates. A rejection of the null indicates that endogenous regressors' effects 
on the estimates are meaningful, and IV techniques are required. The result shows that all 
regressions in 2SLS strongly reject the null hypothesis implying that  the IV method is preferred 
to OLS. Thus, the evidence favors IV estimates than OLS estimates.  
We now turn to the case of continuous treatment. Table 3.19 reports OLS and IV estimates 
across five groups of households depending on their disaster status. As in the binary case, the 
effect of chemical fertilizer adoption is higher in IV estimates than in OLS estimates. The effects 
of treatment on yield and revenue are higher in the group of households without disaster is 
higher than in the whole sample. These effects are lower in the groups of households suffered 
from disaster, or statistically insignificant. The effects of treatment on agricultural income and 
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total income are positive, but inconsistent across the groups of households. Again all the 
regressions satisfies two first assumption of IV and thus the tests also favor IV estimates over 
OLS estimates.  
3.5.4. Heterogeneity effects  
Results obtained from both methods are almost similar in terms of direction (positive or 
negative). Nonetheless, in the case of binary treatment, the effects of chemical fertilizer 
adoption shows a greater impact in IV method than in PSM method. In the case of continuous 
treatment, although matching method estimates over different intervals and  IV method 
estimates on average of the sample, we find somewhat non-linear relationship in matching 
method in comparison with statistically significant positive impact in IV method. As pointed out 
in the framework analysis, we suspect the flaw of IV method arise from heterogeneity. More 
specifically, households are likely to use or use more fertilizer with partial or full knowledge of 
gain in  expected outcomes as they live in areas with advantage agro-ecological conditions for 
cultivation. The higher estimated effects of adoption on outcomes from IV method could be 
additionally gained by such advantages. In contrast, households may not use or use less 
fertilizer as the awareness of their less favorable and risky (e.g. natural disasters) conditions. 
The adoption decision therefore is made with the knowledge of gain or loss to adoption after 
controlling observable characteristics, and IV cannot identify treatment effects. Moreover, in 
this situation, households attain relevant information of fertilizer and buy insurance for crop 
loss/ damage usually induced by the awareness of their expected gain or loss outcomes. 
Instrumental variables hence violate the basic assumption although the tests for validity show 
supporting results. On the other hand, we notice that it could also violate the 
unconfoundedness assumption. However, the matching method helps to diminish this 
heterogeneity problem by estimating comparable outcomes over households with similar 
observable characteristics, and even dropping the highly different households.  
We further investigate in a subsample of households characterized by specific  features that 
may cause heterogeneity. The descriptive statistic in Table 3.20 shows that more than 80 
percent of non-adopters reside in two mountainous provinces where the agro-ecological 
conditions are unfavorable for crops. To carry out a quick test, we examine the  effects of 
adoption looking only at these two provinces. In Table 3.21, the effects of adoption from PSM 
method are found considerably smaller and less statistically significant in this subsample than in 
the whole sample. The decline of treatment effect seems to be an extraction of the additional 
impact from adoptions in the regions with more favorable agro-ecological conditions. Thus in 
the analysis with four kinds of matching techniques, the nearest-neighbor non-replacement 
matching and caliper matching are found to have lower degree of bias. These techniques 
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impose a higher level of similarity and hence eliminate poorly matched observations which are 
likely lead to such overestimation.  
3.6. Conclusion 
In the circumstance of the recent food crisis, the challenge of meeting rising global demand for 
food needs to be paid more attention. One of the key responses is to increase productivity 
under resource scarcity (water, land, nutrients, and energy) by adopting technology and using 
input efficiently. This is a case study of Vietnam where rice is the most important crop for 
farmers and has contributed significantly to poverty reduction over the past two decades 
following the transition to a liberalized economy. Accounting for more than 30 percent of total 
expenditure on inputs, chemical fertilizer adoption is an essential factor that affects crop yields. 
Moreover, Vietnam is one of the most frequently and worst affected area for natural disasters, 
which negatively affect farmers. Hence, the main objective of the study has been to investigate 
the determinants and to assess the  impact of technology adoption and the degree of adoption 
on paddy cultivation in rural Vietnam under different conditions of natural disaster incidence. 
Additionally, the analysis attempts to implement the propensity matching method in 
comparison with IV method for impact evaluation, and points out the advantage of matching 
over IV for this case.  
The effects of technology adoption on the productivity and household welfare are not 
straightforward. The main difficulty is that those agents who are most likely to benefit from 
adopting a treatment (here fertilizer application) will also be the most likely adopters. The 
estimated effects of adoption are therefore likely to exceed those that would apply to a 
randomly selected adopter. Due to these concerns over selection bias, the analysis in this thesis 
has applied the propensity matching method to deal with this problem. The idea of this 
approach aims to imitate a randomized experiment by comparing the outcomes of units that 
applied technology versus to those that did not. The analysis implements two approaches of 
matching method to evaluate the impact of fertilizer adoption. First, the matching method for 
binary treatment examines the effect of chemical fertilizer adoption on outcomes between 
users and non-users. Second, the matching method for continuous treatment explores the 
effect of the degree of chemical fertilizer adoption among users. The tests are applied for all 
groups of households under different situation of natural shocks.  
First, the findings show that determinants affecting decision of adoption differ from those 
affecting decision of adoption intensity. Second, the results exhibit that the adoption of 
chemical fertilizers has a significant positive impact on both productivity and household 
welfare. The level of impact is higher for households without suffering natural shocks on 
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cultivation. Although the impacts are unsurprised, this shows overestimated impacts between 
before matching versus after matching. The effects are complex when take into consideration 
of natural disasters. The impacts of level of fertilizer adoption are non-linear across groups of 
households. In term of productivity, the rice yield and revenue are lower for households that 
experienced natural disasters. These effects show that yields increase  until reaching a turning 
point of certain level of fertilizer adoption, and then start to decrease. However, the turning 
points are different for households that suffered particular forms of natural disaster. The group 
of households that experienced drought has lowest value of turning point, and the highest 
point appears in group of households that did not suffer disasters.  
The movement of effect on household welfare differs between agricultural income and total 
income. The effect of increased application shows a positive marginal impact for agricultural 
income for households that suffered disasters, but for a negative impact form household 
without disasters. The finding indicates that higher intensity of fertilizer adoption significantly 
improves the income from agricultural source when households face disasters to their paddy 
crop  whereas the effect on total income increase for lower intensity of adoption and decrease 
for higher intensity of adoption in the groups of households suffered disasters. 
From a  methodological perspective, the IV method is usually employed for dealing with 
endogenous and selection bias issues. Instead of that, we apply the non-parametric propensity 
score matching. This has a couple of advantages. First, in the context of the sample employed in 
this thesis, technology adoption depends in large measure  on regional conditions. The IV 
method appears infeasible to estimate under the significant heterogeneity. The matching 
method overcomes this issue by generating counterfactual and estimating among the 
observations with similar characteristics, which remarkably decreases the heterogeneity.  
Second, another advantage of PSM method is that, by applying different matching techniques, 
we can drop highly dissimilar observations. Thus, the estimates partly clear out the 
observations whose otherwise different characteristics might  confuse  outcomes. It is possible 
that the IV method overestimates treatment effects for  this reason. Third, in case of 
continuous treatment, the approach investigates in detail of the impact through different level 
of treatment, where we can diagnose a non-linear relationship.    
Overall, the study finds substantial effect of fertilizer adoption of paddy cultivation on 
productivity and welfare. On the one hand, the results show levels of effect are associated with 
the intensity of adoption across natural disaster conditions. This evidence suggests that the 
farmers could increase returns by not only deciding on whether to adopt, but also deciding to 
the extent of adoption. The findings also indirectly relate to the  poor who are constrained by 
lack of  credit access and who are vulnerable to shocks.  
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Around 90 percent of non-adopters are in the two provinces where the poverty rate is among 
the highest in the country. It is likely that they lack of capital to invest input for crop. Moreover, 
these low-income farmers also lack resources to cope with shocks. If farmers reside in the area 
that is frequently hit by disasters, they might to be unwilling to invest on risky technology 
adoption. Consequently, they are stuck in low productivity, low return, low risk activities, and 
trapping in poverty (Dercon & Christiaensen, 2011; Zimmerman & Carter, 2003).  
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Tables 
 
Table 3.1: The major hazard events in Vietnam, 1999-2008 
Year Event No. of 
people 
death 
No. of 
people 
injured 
No. of 
people 
missing 
Economic 
loss (bil. 
VND) 
Area affected 
2008 Storm Kammuri 133 91 34 1,939.73 9 North and Central provinces 
2007 Storm Lekima 88 180 8 3,215.51 17 North and Central provinces 
2006 Storm Xangsane 72 532 4 10,401.62 15 Central and Southern 
provinces 
2005 Storm No. 7 68 28 
 
3,509.15 12 North and Central provinces 
2004 Storm No. 2 23 22 
 
298.199 5 Central provinces 
2003 Rains and floods 65 33 
 
432.471 9 Central provinces 
2002 Floods 171 
  
456.831 Mekong River Delta 
2001 Floods 393 
  
1,535.91 Mekong River Delta 
2000 Flash floods 28 27 2 43.917 5 Northern provinces 
1999 Floods 595 275 29 3,773.80 10 Central provinces 
Source: The World Bank (2009) extracted from CCFSC’s website.  
 
 
Table 3.2: Land with problem of households (%) 
Types of problem Ratio over total land Ratio over paddy land 
Erosion 4.75 21.13 
Dry land 29.03 92.01 
Low-lying land 5.54 17.33 
Sedimentation 2.42 2.42 
Landslide 3.52 13.97 
Stony soils/ clay 3.07 9.74 
Others 0.78 3.26 
No problem 41.88 97.26 
Source: Calculation from the 2010 VARHS (N=2,280). 
Note: The information of land problem is only available for crops land, forestry land, grass land, 
and garden; and excludes residential land, land for aquaculture, and uncategorized land, which 
take up around 9 percent of the total land area.  
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Table 3.3: Household’s land plots suffered natural disasters in 2010  
  
Disaster  Flood/Storm/ 
Landslide 
 Drought  Plant diseases/ 
Insects 
   
All Exclusive 
 
All Exclusive 
 
All Exclusive 
No. HH 696 
 
274 217 
 
189 151 
 
314 251 
Percent 30.53 
 
12.02 11.89 
 
8.29 6.62 
 
13.77 11.01 
Total obs. 2,280 
         
Source: Calculation from the 2010 VARHS.  
Note: Around 1 percent of uncategorized disaster is excluded out of those groups.  
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Chemical fertilizer adoption (1,000 VND/m2). 
Total sample (N=2,280) Non-user (N=267) User (N=2,013) 
  
Mean S.D. Min Med. Max 
Chemical fertilizer use 0 0.37 0.17 0.001 0.33 2.25 
Source: Calculation from the 2010 VARHS. 
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Table 3.5: Outcomes by treatment status 
    Non-user   User   Difference (%) 
      
 
Under 
mean 
Over 
mean 
 User Vs. 
Non-user 
Under Vs. 
Over mean  
No. of observations (N=2,280) 267 
 
1132 881 
   Percent 11.71  49.65 38.64    
Rice yield (kg/m2) 
       
 
Total sample 0.276 
 
0.397 0.477 
 
57*** 20*** 
 
Without disaster 0.274 
 
0.408 0.486 
 
61*** 19*** 
 
Flood/Storm/Landslide 0.410 
 
0.400 0.470 
 
6 17*** 
 
Drought 0.228 
 
0.401 0.439 
 
82*** 10 
 
Plant disease/Insects 0.251 
 
0.332 0.461 
 
54*** 39*** 
Rice revenue (thou. VND/m2)             
 
Total sample 1.559 
 
2.052 2.342 
 
40*** 14*** 
 
Without disaster 1.572 
 
2.132 2.391 
 
43*** 12*** 
 
Flood/Storm/Landslide 2.378 
 
1.937 2.288 
 
-11 18*** 
 
Drought 0.907 
 
2.064 2.268 
 
136*** 10 
 Plant disease/Insects 1.380  1.736 2.195  40*** 26*** 
Agricultural income (thou. 
VND/capita) 
       
 
Total sample 280 
 
376 458 
 
132*** 82*** 
 
Without disaster 275 
 
381 424 
 
125*** 43** 
 
Flood/Storm/Landslide 170 
 
372 337 
 
185* -35 
 
Drought 368 
 
451 530 
 
114 79 
 Plant disease/Insects 321  285 767  165 482*** 
Total income (thou. VND/capita) 
       
 
Total sample 772 
 
1176 1484 
 
70*** 26*** 
 
Without disaster 783 
 
1237 1503 
 
73*** 22 
 
Flood/Storm/Landslide 562 
 
971 988 
 
74* 2 
 
Drought 772 
 
1292 1451 
 
75 12 
 Plant disease/Insects 761  857 1916  71* 124*** 
Source: Calculation from the 2010 VARHS. 
Note: (i) Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *, **, ***. Standard deviations are 
displayed in parentheses. 
(ii) 2 observations of fertilizer user and 3 observations of rice yield are excluded out of the 
sample since their values are over ten times higher than means.  
(iii) The average values of fertilizer users are not reported here for simplicity.  
(iv) Incomes are reported at current prices. 
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Table 3.6: Summary of observable characteristics of the sample.  
    Non-user User 
 
Difference (%) 
   
Below 
mean 
Over 
mean 
 
User Vs. 
Non-user 
Below Vs. 
Over 
mean 
 
No. of observations (N=2,280) 267 1,132 881 
   
 
Percent of total sample 11.71 49.65 38.64 
   Household characteristics 
      
 
HH size 5.58 5.00 4.61 
 
-13*** -8*** 
 
No. of members < 10 1.14 0.78 0.61 
 
-38*** -22*** 
 
No. of members 10-15 0.82 0.56 0.50 
 
-35*** -11* 
 
No. of members 16-25 1.23 1.17 1.09 
 
-8 -7 
 
No. of members 26-60 2.09 2.09 1.97 
 
-2 -5*** 
 
Ethnic minority (dummy) 0.95 0.53 0.39 
 
-51*** -25*** 
 
Education of head (0-12 grades) 3.49 5.45 6.24 
 
66*** 14*** 
 
Male headship (dummy) 0.92 0.85 0.85 
 
-8*** -1 
 
Age of head 44.38 49.04 50.29 
 
12*** 3** 
 
No. of labors for wage/salary 0.70 0.95 1.04 
 
42*** 10* 
 
No. of labors in HH agriculture 3.55 3.38 3.09 
 
-8*** -9*** 
 
No. of labors in HH business 0.49 0.41 0.37 
 
-20* -9 
 
Hired labor outside 0.22 0.44 0.46 
 
107*** 6 
 
Loan value (thou. VND) 6,815 8,348 11,281 
 
41* 35*** 
 
Assistance receipt (thou. VND) 245 2,614 2,761 
 
993*** 6 
 
Distance to People's Committee 
(km) 5.99 3.00 2.53 
 
-53*** -16*** 
Land and crop characteristics 
      
 
Land independent on public 
irrigation  0.45 0.25 0.25 
 
-45*** 1 
 
Paddy land (acres) 1.96 1.69 1.92 
 
-9 14 
 
Ratio of land without problem (%) 0.44 0.47 0.46 
 
5 -2 
 
Hybrid seed (dummy) 0.32 0.48 0.53 
 
57*** 10** 
 
Improved seed (dummy) 0.19 0.30 0.26 
 
49*** -15** 
 Old local seed (dummy) 0.47 0.18 0.19  -61*** 10 
Instrumental variables  
     
 
Received  info. of fertilizers 0.69 0.90 0.92
 
-32*** -3*  
 
Crop insurance (dummy) 0.10 0.39 0.47 
 
-305*** -20***  
 
Crop insurance (ln) 0.54 1.76 2.14 
 
-257*** -21***  
Source: Calculation from the 2010 VARHS. 
Note: Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *, **, *** 
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Table 3.7: Heckit model of the whole sample 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  
Adoption Level of 
adoption 
Level of 
adoption 
Level of 
adoption 
Level of 
adoption 
HH size 0.058 0.010       
 
(0.080) (0.011) 
   No. of member <10 -0.098 -0.023* 
   
 
(0.094) (0.014) 
   No. of members 10-15  -0.190** 0.005 
   
 
(0.091) (0.014) 
   No. of members 15-25 -0.171** -0.016 
   
 
(0.082) (0.011) 
   No. of members 25-60 -0.137 -0.028** 
   
 
(0.085) (0.011) 
   Education of head 0.261*** 0.007 0.007*** 0.008*** 
 
 
(0.038) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
 Education of head (squared) -0.011*** 0.000 
   
 
(0.003) (0.000) 
   Edu. of head * Ethnic -0.145*** -0.000 
   
 
(0.018) (0.002) 
   Gender of head (male) -0.253* 0.013 
   
 
(0.147) (0.018) 
   Age of head -0.001 0.000 
   
 
(0.004) (0.001) 
   No. of labors for salary 0.013 0.015*** 0.010* 
 
0.012** 
 
(0.043) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
No. of labors in HH agriculture 0.214*** -0.003* -0.007* 
 
-0.011*** 
 
(0.040) (0.006) (0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
No. of labors in HH business -0.151*** -0.012** -0.016** 
 
-0.014** 
 
(0.047) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
Hired labor outside 0.391*** -0.013 
   
 
(0.092) (0.012) 
   Loan (ln) -0.005 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Assistance receipt (ln) 0.051*** 0.001 
   
 
(0.016) (0.002) 
   Distance to People's 
Committee 
-0.061*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
(0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
-0.182*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.034** 
(0.084) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Paddy land 0.029 0.002 
   
 
(0.088) (0.006) 
   Paddy land * Problematic land -0.026 -0.004 
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(0.025) (0.003) 
   Paddy land * Hybrid seed  0.005 -0.003 
   
 
(0.089) (0.007) 
   Paddy land * Improved seed -0.014 0.000 
   
 
(0.087) (0.006) 
   Paddy land * Old local seed -0.074 -0.002 
   
 
(0.086) (0.006) 
   N  2260  1995 1995 1995 1995 
Log likelihood 
 
-698 -710 -717 -719 
LR test, chi2 (1)  0.35 0.91 1.52 3.42* 
Note: ***, **, *  denote the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
Table 3.8: Heckit model of the whole sample including disaster variables  
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Adoption 
Level of 
adoption 
Level of 
adoption 
Level of 
adoption 
Level of 
adoption 
HH size 0.058 0.011     
 
 
(0.080) (0.011) 
   No. of member <10 -0.091 -0.023* 
   
 
(0.095) (0.014) 
   No. of members 10-15  -0.192** 0.004 
   
 
(0.092) (0.014) 
   No. of members 15-25 -0.167** -0.017 
   
 
(0.082) (0.011) 
   No. of members 25-60 -0.132 -0.028** 
   
 
(0.086) (0.011) 
   Education of head 0.254*** 0.007 0.007*** 0.008*** 
 
 
(0.038) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
 Education of head (squared) -0.010*** 0.000 
   
 
(0.003) (0.000) 
   Edu. of head * Ethnic -0.146*** -0.000 
   
 
(0.019) (0.002) 
   Gender of head -0.247* 0.014 
   
 
(0.149) (0.017) 
   Age of head -0.002 0.000 
   
 
(0.004) (0.001) 
   No. of labors for salary 0.010 0.015** 0.010* 
 
0.012** 
 
(0.043) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
(0.006) 
No. of labors in HH agriculture 0.212*** -0.004 -0.008** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
(0.041) (0.006) (0.004) 
 
(0.004) 
No. of labors in HH business -0.155*** -0.011 -0.015** 
 
-0.014* 
 
(0.048) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
132 
 
Hired labor outside 0.345*** -0.017 
   
 
(0.094) (0.012) 
   Loan (ln) -0.008 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*** 
 
(0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Assistance receipt (ln) 0.052*** 0.001 
   
 
(0.016) (0.002) 
   Distance to People's 
Committee 
-0.065*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
-0.196** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.033** 
(0.085) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Paddy land 0.040 0.002 
   
 
(0.102) (0.006) 
   Paddy land * Problematic land -0.025 -0.003 
   
 
(0.025) (0.003) 
   Paddy land * Hybrid seed  -0.004 -0.003 
   
 
(0.104) (0.007) 
   Paddy land * Improved seed -0.021 0.000 
   
 
(0.103) (0.006) 
   Paddy land * Old local seed -0.082 -0.002 
   
 
(0.102) (0.006) 
   Disaster 1 (Flood/Storm) 0.434*** 0.034** 0.029* 0.032* 0.032* 
 
(0.155) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Disaster 2 (Disease/Insect) 0.650*** 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.185) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Disaster 3 (Drought) -0.008 0.035** 0.040** 0.037** 0.039** 
  (0.115) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
N  2260  1995 1995 1995 1995 
Log likelihood 
 
-683 -694 -701 -703 
LR test, chi2 (1)  1 1.83 2.61 4.82** 
Note: ***, **, *  denote the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 3.9: Estimated propensity score from logit model of the binary treatment  
Dependant var. is chemical fertilizer user All sample Without disasters With disasters 
HH size 0.080 0.154 0.215    
 
(0.145) (0.171) (0.328)    
No. of member <10 -0.141 -0.167 -0.228    
 
(0.171) (0.202) (0.381)    
No. of members 10-15  -0.320* -0.451** -0.065    
 
(0.166) (0.197) (0.376)    
No. of members 15-25 -0.295* -0.416** 0.084    
 
(0.151) (0.178) (0.343)    
No. of members 25-60 -0.226 -0.388** 0.216    
 
(0.158) (0.184) (0.387)    
Education of head 0.528*** 0.572*** 0.161    
 
(0.075) (0.086) (0.195)    
Education of head (squared) -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.001    
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.017)    
Edu. of head * Ethnic -0.325*** -0.341*** -0.172    
 
(0.045) (0.049) (0.112)    
Gender of head -0.462* -0.590* -0.263    
 
(0.280) (0.331) (0.715)    
Age of head -0.001 -0.006 0.020    
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.019)    
No. of labors for salary 0.016 -0.025 0.206    
 
(0.079) (0.091) (0.209)    
No. of labors in HH agriculture 0.409*** 0.503*** -0.164    
 
(0.075) (0.088) (0.203)    
No. of labors in HH business -0.286*** -0.281*** -0.338* 
 
(0.084) (0.102) (0.182)    
Hired labor outside 0.696*** 0.736*** 0.082    
 
(0.174) (0.216) (0.381)    
Loan (ln) -0.012 -0.022 0.024    
 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.041)    
Assistance receipt (ln) 0.106*** 0.089** 0.202*   
 
(0.032) (0.036) (0.097)    
Distance to People's Committee -0.105*** -0.124*** -0.106*** 
 
(0.016) (0.021) (0.034)    
Land independent on public irrigation -0.328** -0.186 -0.929*** 
 
(0.151) (0.179) (0.379)    
Paddy land 0.039 0.051 44.461*** 
 
(0.165) (0.145) (0.237)    
Paddy land * Problematic land -0.044 -0.059 -0.311* 
 
(0.046) (0.056) (0.175)    
Paddy land * Hybrid seed  0.022 -0.003 -44.103    
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(0.169) (0.147) (0.000)    
Paddy land * Improved seed -0.020 0.005 -44.467*** 
 
(0.164) (0.152) (0.234)    
Paddy land * Old local seed -0.133 -0.138 -44.575*** 
 
(0.162) (0.142) (0.232)    
Constant 1.465*** 1.593*** 1.109    
  (0.496) (0.572) (1.297)    
N 2260 1570 474   
Pseudo R2  0.24 0.27 0.25 
Log likelihood  -618 -451 -112 
Note: Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *, **, ***. Standard deviations are 
displayed in parentheses. 
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Table 3.10: Average treatment effect and balancing test for the whole sample.  
Panel A: The whole sample        
    
Before 
matching 
After matching 
  
  
Nearest 
neighbor 
Nearest 
neighbor 
noreplacement 
Caliper 
norepalcement 
Kernel based 
matching 
Yield 0.156*** 0.056** 0.103*** 0.093*** 0.067*** 
  
(0.01) (0.023) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) 
Rice revenue 0.618*** 0.189 0.394*** 0.33*** 0.239** 
  
(0.051) (0.125) (0.069) (0.073) (0.102) 
Agr. Income 0.232*** 0.328** 0.165** 0.273*** 0.175 
  
(0.062) (0.129) (0.068) (0.075) (0.093) 
Total Income 0.501*** 0.16 0.067** 0.169** 0.133 
  
(0.048) (0.123) (0.059) (0.068) (0.089) 
Treatment 
assignment           
 
Untreated 265 265 265 265 265 
 
Treat 1995 1812 265 233 1812 
Balancing test 27.95 8.06 8.36 5.25 8.00 
 
Panel B: Without disasters 
    
Before 
matching 
After matching 
  
  
Nearest 
neighbor 
Nearest neighbor 
noreplacement 
Caliper 
norepalcement 
Kernel based 
matching 
Yield 0.167*** 0.067** 0.111*** 0.112*** 0.073*** 
  
(0.011) (0.027) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) 
Rice revenue 0.67*** 0.194 0.434*** 0.421*** 0.21* 
  
(0.059) (0.145) (0.075) (0.081) (0.114) 
Agr. Income 0.181** -0.09 0.207** 0.241*** 0.081 
  
(0.07) (0.128) (0.075) (0.086) (0.102) 
Total Income 0.505*** 0.051 0.125* 0.141* 0.09 
  
(0.056) (0.128) (0.069) (0.08) (0.102) 
Treatment 
assignment           
 
Untreated 210 210 210 210 210 
 
Treat 1360 1169 210 174 1169 
Balancing test 26.82 8.88 5.64 5.78 9.46 
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Panel C: With disasters 
    
Before 
matching 
After matching 
  
  
Nearest 
neighbor 
Nearest neighbor 
noreplacement 
Caliper 
norepalcement 
Kernel based 
matching 
Yield 0.13*** 0.038 0.097*** 0.103** 0.034 
  
(0.02) (0.072) (0.032) (0.044) (0.042) 
Rice revenue 0.531*** 0.41 0.422** 0.401* 0.23 
  
(0.104) (0.365) (0.166) (0.214) (0.212) 
Agr. Income 0.351** -0.93 0.348** 0.588** 0.463** 
  
(0.133) (0.315) (0.16) (0.218) (0.206) 
Total Income 0.506*** 0.285 0.18 0.503 0.361** 
  
(0.1) (0.247) (0.131) (0.16) (0.166) 
Treatment assignment       
 
  
 
Untreated 55 55 55 55 55 
 
Treat 635 635 55 42 479 
Balancing test 29.59 23.02  14.37 17.38 10.72 
Note: (i) Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *, **, ***. Standard deviations are 
displayed in parentheses. 
(ii) The log transformation of agricultural income and total income eliminates 20 observations 
with negative values that make the sample sizes of productivity and household welfare slightly 
different. 
(iii) Common support region are imposed for all matching methods.  
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Table 3.11: Propensity score distribution before and after matching for the whole sample 
Summary of propensity score before matching  
 
Percentiles 
   1% 4.045691 
   5% 5.107901 
   10% 5.254936 
 
Obs. 23 
25% 6.668897 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 27.9512 
 
Mean 29.29975 
   
Std. Dev. 21.46029 
75% 43.51601 
   90% 59.97123 
 
Variance 460.5442 
95% 68.60117 
 
Skewness 0.427772 
99% 71.3744  Kurtosis 2.054222 
 
 
 
  
138 
 
Panel A: Nearest-neighbor with replacement technique 
Variable Unmatched/ 
Matched  
Mean % Bias % Reduct 
bias 
t-test 
Treated Control   t p>|t| 
HH size Unmatched 4.83 5.57 -36.6 
 
-5.83 0.000 
 
Matched 4.92 5.05 -6.3 82.9 -1.92 0.055 
No. of member <10 Unmatched 0.71 1.14 -40.5 
 
-6.65 0.000 
 
Matched 0.75 0.93 -17.5 56.9 -5.38 0.000 
No. of members 10-15  Unmatched 0.54 0.83 -34.9 
 
-5.76 0.000 
 
Matched 0.57 0.62 -5.8 83.5 -1.86 0.063 
No. of members 15-25 Unmatched 1.14 1.22 -6.7 
 
-1.08 0.280 
 
Matched 1.17 1.00 13.8 -107.3 4.10 0.000 
No. of members 25-60 Unmatched 2.04 2.08 -5.4 
 
-0.85 0.394 
 
Matched 2.05 2.19 -16.9 -211.6 -4.35 0.000 
Education of head Unmatched 5.78 3.48 60.0 
 
9.24 0.000 
 
Matched 5.38 5.56 -4.6 92.3 -1.37 0.171 
Education of head (squared) Unmatched 47.82 27.06 50.0 
 
7.35 0.000 
 
Matched 42.82 47.23 -10.6 78.8 -3.07 0.002 
Edu. of head * Ethnic Unmatched 1.90 3.09 -33.7 
 
-5.48 0.000 
 
Matched 2.10 1.94 4.4 87.1 1.42 0.157 
Gender of head Unmatched 0.85 0.92 -22.4 
 
-3.12 0.002 
 
Matched 0.86 0.89 -10.4 53.4 -2.99 0.003 
Age of head Unmatched 49.59 44.36 40.7 
 
6.16 0.000 
 
Matched 49.03 48.82 1.6 96.1 0.46 0.647 
No. of labors for salary Unmatched 0.98 0.70 28.0 
 
4.04 0.000 
 
Matched 0.98 1.00 -2.5 91.0 -0.74 0.458 
No. of labors in HH agriculture 
Unmatched 3.25 3.53 -17.6  -2.72 0.007 
Matched 3.28 3.40 -7.0 60.2 -2.03 0.042 
No. of labors in HH business 
Unmatched 0.39 0.49 -11.4 
 
-1.84 0.066 
Matched 0.41 0.43 -2.1 81.7 -0.67 0.500 
Hired labor outside Unmatched 0.45 0.22 51.1 
 
7.32 0.000 
 
Matched 0.41 0.35 13.4 73.8 3.80 0.000 
Loan (ln) Unmatched 4.79 5.04 -5.3 
 
-0.80 0.424 
 
Matched 4.86 4.55 6.7 -27.7 1.99 0.047 
Assistance receipt (ln) Unmatched 2.95 0.80 68.6 
 
8.93 0.000 
 
Matched 2.47 2.29 5.8 91.6 1.53 0.126 
Distance to People's 
Committee 
Unmatched 2.80 6.00 -71.4 
 
-14.04 0.000 
Matched 2.93 3.25 -7.0 90.2 -2.59 0.010 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
Unmatched 0.25 0.45 -43.5 
 
-7.05 0.000 
Matched 0.27 0.23 7.4 82.9 2.42 0.016 
Paddy land Unmatched 1.78 1.94 -5.1 
 
-0.65 0.513 
 
Matched 1.79 1.36 13.7 -168.2 4.18 0.000 
Paddy land * Problematic land Unmatched 0.85 0.98 -5.8 
 
-0.79 0.428 
Matched 0.86 0.65 9.2 -57.5 2.86 0.004 
Paddy land * Hybrid seed  Unmatched 0.65 0.58 4.0 
 
0.63 0.526 
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Matched 0.64 0.63 0.6 85.2 0.17 0.867 
Paddy land * Improved seed Unmatched 0.55 0.35 8.9 
 
1.06 0.288 
 
Matched 0.53 0.33 8.8 0.3 2.72 0.007 
Paddy land * Old local seed Unmatched 0.51 0.98 -22.2 
 
-3.11 0.002 
  Matched 0.55 0.36 9.3 58 3.20 0.001 
 
Summary of propensity score after matching  
 
Percentiles 
   1% 0.5981236 
   5% 1.603028 
   10% 2.091901 
 
Obs 23 
25% 4.603348 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 7.003312
 
Mean 8.062615 
   
Std. Dev. 4.687349 
75% 10.62472
   90% 13.82487 
 
Variance 21.97124 
95% 16.89578 
 
Skewness 0.397035 
99% 17.45477 
 
Kurtosis 2.397067 
     Sample Pseudo R2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias 
Raw 0.239 0 29.3 28 
Matched 0.038 0 8.1 7 
 
Kernel distribution of propensity score before (red) and after (blue) matching 
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Panel B: Nearest-neighbor  without replacement technique 
Variable Unmatched/ 
Matched  
Mean % Bias % 
Reduct 
bias 
t-test 
Treated Control 
  t p>|t| 
HH size Unmatched 4.83 5.57 -36.6 
 
-5.83 0.000 
 
Matched 5.66 5.57 4.9 86.7 0.52 0.604 
No. of member <10 Unmatched 0.71 1.14 -40.5 
 
-6.65 0.000 
 
Matched 1.26 1.14 11.0 72.9 1.17 0.243 
No. of members 10-15  Unmatched 0.54 0.83 -34.9 
 
-5.76 0.000 
 
Matched 0.93 0.83 12.1 65.4 1.27 0.205 
No. of members 15-25 Unmatched 1.14 1.22 -6.7 
 
-1.08 0.280 
 
Matched 1.14 1.22 -6.4 4.0 -0.71 0.479 
No. of members 25-60 Unmatched 2.04 2.08 -5.4 
 
-0.85 0.394 
 
Matched 2.08 2.08 -0.9 83.9 -0.11 0.915 
Education of head Unmatched 5.78 3.48 60.0 
 
9.24 0.000 
 
Matched 3.34 3.48 -3.5 94.1 -0.39 0.694 
Education of head (squared) Unmatched 47.82 27.06 50.0 
 
7.35 0.000 
 
Matched 27.71 27.06 1.6 96.9 0.18 0.856 
Edu. of head * Ethnic Unmatched 1.90 3.09 -33.7 
 
-5.48 0.000 
 
Matched 3.28 3.09 5.4 84.1 0.55 0.581 
Gender of head Unmatched 0.85 0.92 -22.4 
 
-3.12 0.002 
 
Matched 0.94 0.92 7.1 68.2 1.03 0.301 
Age of head Unmatched 49.59 44.36 40.7 
 
6.16 0.000 
 
Matched 42.65 44.36 -13.3 67.4 -1.57 0.118 
No. of labors for salary Unmatched 0.98 0.70 28.0 
 
4.04 0.000 
 Matched 0.57 0.70 -13.1 53.2 -1.70 0.090 
No. of labors in HH agriculture Unmatched 3.25 3.53 -17.6  -2.72 0.007 
Matched 3.46 3.53 -4.3 75.6 -0.50 0.618 
No. of labors in HH business Unmatched 0.39 0.49 -11.4 
 
-1.84 0.066 
 
Matched 0.54 0.49 6.1 47.0 0.62 0.539 
Hired labor outside Unmatched 0.45 0.22 51.1 
 
7.32 0.000 
 
Matched 0.12 0.22 -19.8 61.2 -2.79 0.005 
Loan (ln) Unmatched 4.79 5.04 -5.3 
 
-0.80 0.424 
 
Matched 5.09 5.04 1.1 79.2 0.13 0.899 
Assistance receipt (ln) Unmatched 2.95 0.80 68.6 
 
8.93 0.000 
 
Matched 0.36 0.80 -14.0 79.7 -2.67 0.008 
Distance to People's 
Committee 
Unmatched 2.80 6.00 -71.4 
 
-14.04 0.000 
Matched 6.58 6.00 12.8 82.1 1.19 0.235 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
Unmatched 0.25 0.45 -43.5 
 
-7.05 0.000 
Matched 0.49 0.45 7.3 83.3 0.78 0.434 
Paddy land Unmatched 1.78 1.94 -5.1 
 
-0.65 0.513 
 
Matched 1.50 1.94 -13.9 -172 -1.99 0.048 
Paddy land * Problematic land Unmatched 0.85 0.98 -5.8 
 
-0.79 0.428 
 
Matched 0.68 0.98 -13.1 -125 -1.48 0.140 
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Paddy land * Hybrid seed  Unmatched 0.65 0.58 4.0 
 
0.63 0.526 
 
Matched 0.53 0.58 -3.6 11.7 -0.51 0.611 
Paddy land * Improved seed Unmatched 0.55 0.35 8.9 
 
1.06 0.288 
 
Matched 0.20 0.35 -7.2 19.2 -2.31 0.021 
Paddy land * Old local seed Unmatched 0.51 0.98 -22.2 
 
-3.11 0.002 
  Matched 0.77 0.98 -10.0 55.1 -0.98 0.329 
 
Summary of propensity score after matching  
 
Percentiles 
   1% 0.8719161 
   5% 1.094557 
   10% 1.564301 
 
Obs 23 
25% 4.280225 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 7.156632
 
Mean 8.35642 
   
Std. Dev. 5.034791 
75% 13.08763
   90% 13.89257 
 
Variance 25.34912 
95% 13.95326 
 
Skewness 0.310976 
99% 19.83522  Kurtosis 2.305237 
     Sample Pseudo R2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias 
Raw 0.239 0 29.3 28 
Matched 0.056 0.012 8.4 7.2 
 
Kernel distribution of propensity score before (red) and after (blue) matching 
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Panel C: Caliper without replacement technique 
Variable Unmatched/ 
Matched  
Mean % Bias % 
Reduct 
bias 
t-test 
Treated Control   t p>|t| 
HH size Unmatched 4.83 5.57 -36.6 
 
-5.83 0.000 
 
Matched 5.68 5.45 11.1 69.6 1.10 0.273 
No. of member <10 Unmatched 0.71 1.14 -40.5 
 
-6.65 0.000 
 
Matched 1.23 1.11 11.3 72.1 1.12 0.264 
No. of members 10-15  Unmatched 0.54 0.83 -34.9 
 
-5.76 0.000 
 
Matched 0.84 0.77 7.6 78.1 0.78 0.437 
No. of members 15-25 Unmatched 1.14 1.22 -6.7 
 
-1.08 0.280 
 
Matched 1.27 1.20 5.5 16.8 0.57 0.567 
No. of members 25-60 Unmatched 2.04 2.08 -5.4 
 
-0.85 0.394 
 
Matched 2.04 2.06 -2.0 63.4 -0.23 0.822 
Education of head Unmatched 5.78 3.48 60.0 
 
9.24 0.000 
 
Matched 3.56 3.73 -4.6 92.4 -0.49 0.624 
Education of head (squared) Unmatched 47.82 27.06 50.0 
 
7.35 0.000 
 
Matched 27.58 28.84 -3.0 93.9 -0.34 0.732 
Edu. of head * Ethnic Unmatched 1.90 3.09 -33.7 
 
-5.48 0.000 
 
Matched 3.20 3.29 -2.7 92.0 -0.27 0.790 
Gender of head Unmatched 0.85 0.92 -22.4 
 
-3.12 0.002 
 
Matched 0.91 0.91 -1.4 94.0 -0.16 0.870 
Age of head Unmatched 49.59 44.36 40.7 
 
6.16 0.000 
 
Matched 44.39 44.57 -1.4 96.6 -0.15 0.878 
No. of labors for salary Unmatched 0.98 0.70 28.0 
 
4.04 0.000 
 
Matched 0.76 0.75 0.9 97.0 0.09 0.927 
No. of labors in HH agriculture Unmatched 3.25 3.53 -17.6 
 
-2.72 0.007 
Matched 3.62 3.52 6.5 63.1 0.67 0.501 
No. of labors in HH business Unmatched 0.39 0.49 -11.4 
 
-1.84 0.066 
 
Matched 0.45 0.44 0.5 95.7 0.05 0.958 
Hired labor outside Unmatched 0.45 0.22 51.1 
 
7.32 0.000 
 
Matched 0.22 0.24 -4.7 90.8 -0.55 0.583 
Loan (ln) Unmatched 4.79 5.04 -5.3 
 
-0.80 0.424 
 
Matched 4.60 5.07 -10.2 -93.7 -1.10 0.271 
Assistance receipt (ln) Unmatched 2.95 0.80 68.6 
 
8.93 0.000 
 
Matched 0.71 0.90 -6.2 90.9 -0.94 0.349 
Distance to People's 
Committee 
Unmatched 2.80 6.00 -71.4 
 
-14.04 0.000 
Matched 5.53 5.07 10.1 85.9 0.96 0.336 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
Unmatched 0.25 0.45 -43.5 
 
-7.05 0.000 
Matched 0.45 0.43 4.6 89.4 0.47 0.642 
Paddy land Unmatched 1.78 1.94 -5.1 
 
-0.65 0.513 
 
Matched 1.65 1.75 -3.3 35.6 -0.50 0.618 
Paddy land * Problematic land Unmatched 0.85 0.98 -5.8 
 
-0.79 0.428 
 
Matched 0.65 0.84 -8.5 -46.1 -1.16 0.245 
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Paddy land * Hybrid seed  Unmatched 0.65 0.58 4.0 
 
0.63 0.526 
 
Matched 0.67 0.58 5.9 -45.1 0.63 0.526 
Paddy land * Improved seed Unmatched 0.55 0.35 8.9 
 
1.06 0.288 
 
Matched 0.30 0.35 -2.2 75.6 -0.43 0.670 
Paddy land * Old local seed Unmatched 0.51 0.98 -22.2 
 
-3.11 0.002 
  Matched 0.65 0.79 -6.7 70 -0.87 0.382 
 
Summary of propensity score after matching  
  Percentiles 
   1% 0.4929801 
   5% 0.8505756 
   10% 1.353588 
 
Obs 23 
25% 2.160817 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 4.699869
 
Mean 5.250992 
   
Std. Dev. 3.362003 
75% 7.639369
   90% 10.17851 
 
Variance 11.30307 
95% 11.11758 
 
Skewness 0.3661733 
99% 11.27832  Kurtosis 2.018311 
     Sample Pseudo R2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias 
Raw 0.239 0 29.3 28 
Matched 0.012 0.999 5.3 4.7 
 
Kernel distribution of propensity score before (red) and after (blue) matching 
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Panel D: Kernel-based matching technique 
Variable Unmatched/ 
Matched  
Mean % Bias % 
Reduct 
bias 
t-test 
Treated Control   t p>|t| 
HH size Unmatched 4.83 5.57 -36.6 
 
-5.83 0.000 
 
Matched 4.92 5.24 -15.7 57.2 -4.74 0.000 
No. of member <10 Unmatched 0.71 1.14 -40.5 
 
-6.65 0.000 
 
Matched 0.75 0.89 -13.4 66.8 -4.31 0.000 
No. of members 10-15  Unmatched 0.54 0.83 -34.9 
 
-5.76 0.000 
 
Matched 0.57 0.60 -2.9 91.6 -0.97 0.331 
No. of members 15-25 Unmatched 1.14 1.22 -6.7 
 
-1.08 0.280 
 
Matched 1.17 1.25 -6.6 0.3 -1.89 0.059 
No. of members 25-60 Unmatched 2.04 2.08 -5.4 
 
-0.85 0.394 
 
Matched 2.05 2.15 -11.2 -106.1 -3.10 0.002 
Education of head Unmatched 5.78 3.48 60.0 
 
9.24 0.000 
 
Matched 5.38 5.08 7.8 86.9 2.41 0.016 
Education of head (squared) Unmatched 47.82 27.06 50.0 
 
7.35 0.000 
 
Matched 42.82 40.08 6.6 86.8 2.04 0.042 
Edu. of head * Ethnic Unmatched 1.90 3.09 -33.7 
 
-5.48 0.000 
 
Matched 2.10 2.36 -7.4 77.9 -2.36 0.019 
Gender of head Unmatched 0.85 0.92 -22.4 
 
-3.12 0.002 
 
Matched 0.86 0.88 -8.9 60.3 -2.53 0.011 
Age of head Unmatched 49.59 44.36 40.7 
 
6.16 0.000 
 
Matched 49.03 49.79 -5.9 85.5 -1.70 0.090 
No. of labors for salary Unmatched 0.98 0.70 28.0 
 
4.04 0.000 
 
Matched 0.98 0.91 6.4 77.2 1.86 0.063 
No. of labors in HH agriculture Unmatched 3.25 3.53 -17.6 
 
-2.72 0.007 
 
Matched 3.28 3.65 -23.2 -32.1 -6.45 0.000 
No. of labors in HH business Unmatched 0.39 0.49 -11.4 
 
-1.84 0.066 
 
Matched 0.41 0.42 -0.7 94.0 -0.23 0.821 
Hired labor outside Unmatched 0.45 0.22 51.1 
 
7.32 0.000 
 
Matched 0.41 0.32 19.4 62.1 5.55 0.000 
Loan (ln) Unmatched 4.79 5.04 -5.3 
 
-0.80 0.424 
 
Matched 4.86 4.15 15.4 -193.4 4.61 0.000 
Assistance receipt (ln) Unmatched 2.95 0.80 68.6 
 
8.93 0.000 
 
Matched 2.47 2.34 4.2 93.9 1.11 0.267 
Distance to People's Committee Unmatched 2.80 6.00 -71.4 
 
-14.04 0.000 
Matched 2.93 3.11 -4.0 94.4 -1.56 0.118 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
Unmatched 0.25 0.45 -43.5 
 
-7.05 0.000 
Matched 0.27 0.29 -3.9 91 -1.23 0.221 
Paddy land Unmatched 1.78 1.94 -5.1 
 
-0.65 0.513 
 
Matched 1.79 1.60 6.1 -19.9 1.83 0.067 
Paddy land * Problematic land Unmatched 0.85 0.98 -5.8 
 
-0.79 0.428 
 
Matched 0.86 0.80 2.7 53.8 0.81 0.416 
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Paddy land * Hybrid seed  Unmatched 0.65 0.58 4.0 
 
0.63 0.526 
 
Matched 0.64 0.68 -2.6 36.6 -0.67 0.502 
Paddy land * Improved seed Unmatched 0.55 0.35 8.9 
 
1.06 0.288 
 
Matched 0.53 0.37 7.2 18.2 2.22 0.027 
Paddy land * Old local seed Unmatched 0.51 0.98 -22.2 
 
-3.11 0.002 
  Matched 0.55 0.52 1.5 93.1 0.52 0.606 
 
 Summary of propensity score after matching  
  Percentiles 
   1% 0.6920556 
   5% 1.54248 
   10% 2.566739 
 
Obs 23 
25% 3.899611 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 6.620948
 
Mean 7.995325 
   
Std. Dev. 5.862708 
75% 11.17304
   90% 15.65516 
 
Variance 34.37134 
95% 19.3929 
 
Skewness 1.094392 
99% 23.2113  Kurtosis 3.443817 
     Sample Pseudo R2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias 
Raw 0.239 0 29.3 28 
Matched 0.03 0 8 6.6 
 
Kernel distribution of propensity score before (red) and after (blue) matching 
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Table 3.12: Propensity score distribution before and after matching of households without 
disasters 
Summary of propensity score before matching 
  Percentiles 
   1% 0.6761877 
   5% 1.023039 
   10% 2.20081 
 
Obs 23 
25% 10.98242 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 26.81522 
 
Mean 30.33446 
   
Std. Dev. 22.17862 
75% 46.95355 
   90% 62.04927 
 
Variance 491.8913 
95% 67.79373 
 
Skewness 0.326898 
99% 73.49481  Kurtosis 1.990973 
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Panel A: Nearest-neighbor technique 
Variable Unmatched/ 
Matched  
Mean % Bias % 
Reduct 
bias 
t-test 
Treated Control   t p>|t| 
HH size Unmatched 4.83 5.62 -38.3 
 
-5.37 0.000 
 
Matched 4.97 5.11 -6.7 82.4 -1.62 0.106 
No. of member <10 Unmatched 0.73 1.14 -38.2 
 
-5.58 0.000 
 
Matched 0.79 0.76 2.1 94.4 0.55 0.583 
No. of members 10-15  Unmatched 0.52 0.85 -38.7 
 
-5.58 0.000 
 
Matched 0.57 0.62 -6.5 83.3 -1.71 0.087 
No. of members 15-25 Unmatched 1.10 1.23 -11.0 
 
-1.59 0.112 
 
Matched 1.15 1.23 -6.1 44.1 -1.43 0.153 
No. of members 25-60 Unmatched 2.03 2.11 -9.0 
 
-1.25 0.212 
 
Matched 2.06 2.19 -15.2 -68.6 -3.42 0.001 
Education of head Unmatched 5.76 3.37 62.0 
 
8.42 0.000 
 
Matched 5.16 5.42 -6.8 89.0 -1.70 0.089 
Education of head (squared) Unmatched 47.86 26.41 50.9 
 
6.60 0.000 
 
Matched 40.56 43.32 -6.5 87.1 -1.66 0.097 
Edu. of head * Ethnic Unmatched 1.62 2.94 -38.8 
 
-5.68 0.000 
 
Matched 1.88 2.09 -6.2 83.9 -1.62 0.106 
Gender of head Unmatched 0.85 0.93 -26.4 
 
-3.20 0.001 
 
Matched 0.86 0.90 -13.6 48.5 -3.18 0.001 
Age of head Unmatched 49.94 44.51 42.0 
 
5.51 0.000 
 
Matched 49.25 49.95 -5.4 87.1 -1.27 0.203 
No. of labors for salary Unmatched 0.96 0.69 26.8 
 
3.44 0.001 
 
Matched 0.96 0.80 15.3 43.0 3.75 0.000 
No. of labors in HH agriculture Unmatched 3.21 3.47 -16.4 
 
-2.24 0.026 
 
Matched 3.26 3.52 -16.4 -0.2 -3.52 0.000 
No. of labors in HH business Unmatched 0.42 0.47 -6.3 
 
-0.89 0.376 
 
Matched 0.44 0.48 -5.1 17.9 -1.32 0.185 
Hired labor outside Unmatched 0.43 0.19 54.4 
 
6.77 0.000 
 
Matched 0.37 0.33 9.2 83.0 2.08 0.037 
Loan (ln) Unmatched 4.40 4.95 -11.8 
 
-1.59 0.113 
 
Matched 4.54 3.97 12.2 -2.9 2.93 0.003 
Assistance receipt (ln) Unmatched 3.06 0.88 67.8 
 
7.86 0.000 
 
Matched 2.45 2.70 -7.8 88.4 -1.66 0.097 
Distance to People's 
Committee 
Unmatched 2.64 5.84 -73.5 
 
-12.99 0.000 
Matched 2.84 2.96 -2.8 96.2 -0.88 0.377 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
Unmatched 0.23 0.45 -47.0 
 
-6.76 0.000 
Matched 0.25 0.30 -9.8 79.1 -2.45 0.014 
Paddy land Unmatched 1.90 1.93 -1.0 
 
-0.11 0.910 
 
Matched 1.92 1.52 12.1 -1083.5 2.97 0.003 
Paddy land * Problematic land Unmatched 0.99 1.04 -2.2 
 
-0.25 0.799 
 
Matched 1.03 0.85 7.5 -239.7 1.80 0.073 
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Paddy land * Hybrid seed  Unmatched 0.64 0.63 0.7 
 
0.10 0.924 
 
Matched 0.64 0.46 10.6 -1472.8 2.70 0.007 
Paddy land * Improved seed Unmatched 0.61 0.29 13.6 
 
1.44 0.150 
 
Matched 0.56 0.50 2.6 81.2 0.65 0.519 
Paddy land * Old local seed Unmatched 0.55 0.97 -20.9 
 
-2.43 0.015 
  Matched 0.62 0.53 4.8 77 1.17 0.242 
 
Summary of propensity score after matching  
  Percentiles 
   1% 2.124431 
   5% 2.564249 
   10% 2.811932 
 
Obs 23 
25% 5.425393 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 6.801488
 
Mean 8.33086 
   
Std. Dev. 4.162977 
75% 12.10734
   90% 15.23701 
 
Variance 17.33038 
95% 15.28459 
 
Skewness 0.467389 
99% 16.40006  Kurtosis 2.216279 
     Sample Pseudo R2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias 
Raw 0.266 0 30.3 26.8 
Matched 0.041 0 8.3 6.8 
 
Kernel distribution of propensity score before (red) and after (blue) matching 
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Panel B: Nearest-neighbor without replacement technique 
Variable Unmatched/ 
Matched 
Mean % 
Bias 
% Reduct 
bias 
t-test 
Treated Control   t p>|t| 
HH size Unmatched 4.83 5.62 -38.3 
 
-5.37 0.000 
 
Matched 5.51 5.62 -5.3 86.2 -0.51 0.613 
No. of member <10 Unmatched 0.73 1.14 -38.2 
 
-5.58 0.000 
 
Matched 1.20 1.14 5.3 86.3 0.51 0.612 
No. of members 10-15  Unmatched 0.52 0.85 -38.7 
 
-5.58 0.000 
 
Matched 0.85 0.85 0.6 98.5 0.05 0.957 
No. of members 15-25 Unmatched 1.10 1.23 -11.0 
 
-1.59 0.112 
 
Matched 1.18 1.23 -4.2 62.0 -0.40 0.686 
No. of members 25-60 Unmatched 2.03 2.11 -9.0 
 
-1.25 0.212 
 
Matched 2.08 2.11 -3.7 58.9 -0.41 0.680 
Education of head Unmatched 5.76 3.37 62.0 
 
8.42 0.000 
 
Matched 3.37 3.37 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000 
Education of head (squared) Unmatched 47.86 26.41 50.9 
 
6.60 0.000 
 
Matched 28.04 26.41 3.9 92.4 0.40 0.692 
Edu. of head * Ethnic Unmatched 1.62 2.94 -38.8 
 
-5.68 0.000 
 
Matched 3.30 2.94 10.4 73.1 0.93 0.354 
Gender of head Unmatched 0.85 0.93 -26.4 
 
-3.20 0.001 
 
Matched 0.94 0.93 3.0 88.5 0.39 0.696 
Age of head Unmatched 49.94 44.51 42.0 
 
5.51 0.000 
 
Matched 42.78 44.51 -13.3 68.3 -1.45 0.147 
No. of labors for salary Unmatched 0.96 0.69 26.8 
 
3.44 0.001 
 
Matched 0.60 0.69 -8.0 70.2 -0.93 0.355 
No. of labors in HH agriculture Unmatched 3.21 3.47 -16.4 
 
-2.24 0.026 
 
Matched 3.34 3.47 -7.8 52.1 -0.81 0.417 
No. of labors in HH business Unmatched 0.42 0.47 -6.3 
 
-0.89 0.376 
 
Matched 0.48 0.47 1.1 82.8 0.11 0.914 
Hired labor outside Unmatched 0.43 0.19 54.4 
 
6.77 0.000 
 
Matched 0.16 0.19 -6.4 88.2 -0.78 0.438 
Loan (ln) Unmatched 4.40 4.95 -11.8 
 
-1.59 0.113 
 
Matched 5.31 4.95 7.5 36.5 0.78 0.436 
Assistance receipt (ln) Unmatched 3.06 0.88 67.8 
 
7.86 0.000 
 
Matched 0.51 0.88 -11.3 83.3 -1.82 0.070 
Distance to People's Committee Unmatched 2.64 5.84 -73.5 
 
-12.99 0.000 
Matched 5.74 5.84 -2.4 96.7 -0.21 0.834 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
Unmatched 0.23 0.45 -47.0 
 
-6.76 0.000 
Matched 0.47 0.45 5.2 89 0.49 0.625 
Paddy land Unmatched 1.90 1.93 -1.0 
 
-0.11 0.910 
 
Matched 1.71 1.93 -6.9 -576.3 -0.91 0.365 
Paddy land * Problematic land Unmatched 0.99 1.04 -2.2 
 
-0.25 0.799 
 
Matched 0.94 1.04 -4.4 -101.5 -0.44 0.662 
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Paddy land * Hybrid seed  Unmatched 0.64 0.63 0.7 
 
0.10 0.924 
 
Matched 0.72 0.63 4.9 -628.4 0.44 0.663 
Paddy land * Improved seed Unmatched 0.61 0.29 13.6 
 
1.44 0.150 
 
Matched 0.19 0.29 -4.3 68.3 -1.41 0.160 
Paddy land * Old local seed Unmatched 0.55 0.97 -20.9 
 
-2.43 0.015 
  Matched 0.78 0.97 -9.7 53.8 -0.97 0.331 
 
Summary of propensity score after matching  
  Percentiles 
   1% 0 
   5% 0.5633319 
   10% 1.079894 
 
Obs 23 
25% 3.710848 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 5.158063
 
Mean 5.638401 
   
Std. Dev. 3.409725 
75% 7.833782
   90% 10.434 
 
Variance 11.62623 
95% 11.33679 
 
Skewness 0.438 
99% 13.33279  Kurtosis 2.713205 
     Sample Pseudo R2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias 
Raw 0.266 0 30.3 26.8 
Matched 0.036 0.576 5.6 5.2 
 
Kernel distribution of propensity score before (red) and after (blue) matching 
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Panel C: Caliper without replacement technique 
Variable Unmatched/ 
Matched  
Mean % Bias % Reduct 
bias 
t-test 
Treated Control   t p>|t| 
HH size Unmatched 4.83 5.62 -38.3 
 
-5.37 0.000 
 
Matched 5.34 5.43 -3.9 89.9 -0.36 0.716 
No. of member <10 Unmatched 0.73 1.14 -38.2 
 
-5.58 0.000 
 
Matched 1.05 1.07 -2.1 94.5 -0.19 0.850 
No. of members 10-15  Unmatched 0.52 0.85 -38.7 
 
-5.58 0.000 
 
Matched 0.78 0.76 1.4 96.5 0.12 0.903 
No. of members 15-25 Unmatched 1.10 1.23 -11.0 
 
-1.59 0.112 
 
Matched 1.19 1.20 -0.5 95.8 -0.04 0.967 
No. of members 25-60 Unmatched 2.03 2.11 -9.0 
 
-1.25 0.212 
 
Matched 2.05 2.09 -5.1 43.4 -0.50 0.614 
Education of head Unmatched 5.76 3.37 62.0 
 
8.42 0.000 
 
Matched 3.18 3.69 -13.2 78.7 -1.21 0.226 
Education of head (squared) Unmatched 47.86 26.41 50.9 
 
6.60 0.000 
 
Matched 25.88 28.60 -6.4 87.3 -0.62 0.539 
Edu. of head * Ethnic Unmatched 1.62 2.94 -38.8 
 
-5.68 0.000 
 
Matched 2.75 3.18 -12.4 67.9 -1.03 0.305 
Gender of head Unmatched 0.85 0.93 -26.4 
 
-3.20 0.001 
 
Matched 0.90 0.91 -3.7 86.1 -0.37 0.712 
Age of head Unmatched 49.94 44.51 42.0 
 
5.51 0.000 
 
Matched 46.03 45.76 2.0 95.1 0.19 0.851 
No. of labors for salary Unmatched 0.96 0.69 26.8 
 
3.44 0.001 
 
Matched 0.66 0.75 -9.6 64.0 -0.96 0.338 
No. of labors in HH agriculture Unmatched 3.21 3.47 -16.4 
 
-2.24 0.026 
 
Matched 3.47 3.48 -0.4 97.8 -0.03 0.973 
No. of labors in HH business Unmatched 0.42 0.47 -6.3 
 
-0.89 0.376 
 
Matched 0.43 0.43 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000 
Hired labor outside Unmatched 0.43 0.19 54.4 
 
6.77 0.000 
 
Matched 0.16 0.20 -10.3 81.0 -1.12 0.264 
Loan (ln) Unmatched 4.40 4.95 -11.8 
 
-1.59 0.113 
 
Matched 4.39 4.74 -7.4 37.7 -0.69 0.490 
Assistance receipt (ln) Unmatched 3.06 0.88 67.8 
 
7.86 0.000 
 
Matched 1.10 1.01 2.7 96.1 0.32 0.752 
Distance to People's Committee Unmatched 2.64 5.84 -73.5 
 
-12.99 0.000 
Matched 4.82 4.66 3.8 94.8 0.34 0.734 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
Unmatched 0.23 0.45 -47.0 
 
-6.76 0.000 
Matched 0.42 0.38 8.7 81.4 0.76 0.445 
Paddy land Unmatched 1.90 1.93 -1.0 
 
-0.11 0.910 
 
Matched 1.42 1.79 -11.1 -984.6 -1.64 0.101 
Paddy land * Problematic land Unmatched 0.99 1.04 -2.2 
 
-0.25 0.799 
 
Matched 0.68 0.86 -7.5 -241.2 -0.89 0.375 
Paddy land * Hybrid seed  Unmatched 0.64 0.63 0.7 
 
0.10 0.924 
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Matched 0.68 0.66 1.2 -82.6 0.10 0.918 
Paddy land * Improved seed Unmatched 0.61 0.29 13.6 
 
1.44 0.150 
 
Matched 0.26 0.27 -0.4 96.7 -0.13 0.900 
Paddy land * Old local seed Unmatched 0.55 0.97 -20.9 
 
-2.43 0.015 
  Matched 0.44 0.82 -18.8 10.3 -2.77 0.006 
 
Summary of propensity score after matching  
  Percentiles 
   1% 0 
   5% 0.3636371 
   10% 0.4459245 
 
Obs 23 
25% 1.359767 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 3.881846
 
Mean 5.771028 
   
Std. Dev. 5.029802 
75% 9.644718
   90% 12.42486 
 
Variance 25.29891 
95% 13.2471 
 
Skewness 0.829644 
99% 18.78729  Kurtosis 2.985793 
     Sample Pseudo R2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias 
Raw 0.266 0 30.3 26.8 
Matched 0.036 0.79 5.8 3.9 
 
Kernel distribution of propensity score before (red) and after (blue) matching 
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Panel D: Kernel-based matching technique 
Variable Unmatched/ 
Matched  
Mean % Bias % Reduct 
bias 
t-test 
Treated Control   t p>|t| 
HH size Unmatched 4.83 5.62 -38.3 
 
-5.37 0.000 
 
Matched 4.97 5.33 -17.0 55.6 -4.11 0.000 
No. of member <10 Unmatched 0.73 1.14 -38.2 
 
-5.58 0.000 
 
Matched 0.79 0.91 -11.7 69.4 -3.01 0.003 
No. of members 10-15  Unmatched 0.52 0.85 -38.7 
 
-5.58 0.000 
 
Matched 0.57 0.52 5.2 86.5 1.40 0.161 
No. of members 15-25 Unmatched 1.10 1.23 -11.0 
 
-1.59 0.112 
 
Matched 1.15 1.32 -13.4 -21.6 -3.06 0.002 
No. of members 25-60 Unmatched 2.03 2.11 -9.0 
 
-1.25 0.212 
 
Matched 2.06 2.22 -18.3 -102.1 -4.01 0.000 
Education of head Unmatched 5.76 3.37 62.0 
 
8.42 0.000 
 
Matched 5.16 5.21 -1.4 97.8 -0.33 0.739 
Education of head (squared) Unmatched 47.86 26.41 50.9 
 
6.60 0.000 
 
Matched 40.56 42.15 -3.8 92.6 -0.92 0.355 
Edu. of head * Ethnic Unmatched 1.62 2.94 -38.8 
 
-5.68 0.000 
 
Matched 1.88 2.30 -12.2 68.5 -3.08 0.002 
Gender of head Unmatched 0.85 0.93 -26.4 
 
-3.20 0.001 
 
Matched 0.86 0.90 -14.7 44.5 -3.45 0.001 
Age of head Unmatched 49.94 44.51 42.0 
 
5.51 0.000 
 
Matched 49.25 50.33 -8.4 80.0 -1.93 0.053 
No. of labors for salary Unmatched 0.96 0.69 26.8 
 
3.44 0.001 
 
Matched 0.96 0.86 9.3 65.5 2.18 0.029 
No. of labors in HH agriculture Unmatched 3.21 3.47 -16.4 
 
-2.24 0.026 
 
Matched 3.26 3.63 -23.7 -45.0 -5.13 0.000 
No. of labors in HH business Unmatched 0.42 0.47 -6.3 
 
-0.89 0.376 
 
Matched 0.44 0.47 -3.8 38.7 -1.00 0.318 
Hired labor outside Unmatched 0.43 0.19 54.4 
 
6.77 0.000 
 
Matched 0.37 0.29 18.7 65.7 4.30 0.000 
Loan (ln) Unmatched 4.40 4.95 -11.8 
 
-1.59 0.113 
 
Matched 4.54 4.05 10.4 12.3 2.49 0.013 
Assistance receipt (ln) Unmatched 3.06 0.88 67.8 
 
7.86 0.000 
 
Matched 2.45 2.30 4.7 93.1 1.04 0.299 
Distance to People's Committee Unmatched 2.64 5.84 -73.5 
 
-12.99 0.000 
Matched 2.84 2.93 -2.3 96.9 -0.71 0.475 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
Unmatched 0.23 0.45 -47.0 
 
-6.76 0.000 
Matched 0.25 0.29 -7.1 84.9 -1.78 0.075 
Paddy land Unmatched 1.90 1.93 -1.0 
 
-0.11 0.910 
 
Matched 1.92 1.61 9.3 -813.8 2.22 0.027 
Paddy land * Problematic land Unmatched 0.99 1.04 -2.2 
 
-0.25 0.799 
154 
 
 
Matched 1.03 0.82 8.7 -293.9 2.01 0.044 
Paddy land * Hybrid seed  Unmatched 0.64 0.63 0.7 
 
0.10 0.924 
 
Matched 0.64 0.66 -1.4 -109.3 -0.31 0.754 
Paddy land * Improved seed Unmatched 0.61 0.29 13.6 
 
1.44 0.150 
 
Matched 0.56 0.38 7.8 42.9 1.96 0.050 
Paddy land * Old local seed Unmatched 0.55 0.97 -20.9 
 
-2.43 0.015 
  Matched 0.62 0.53 4.5 78.5 1.10 0.273 
 
Summary of propensity score after matching  
  Percentiles 
   1% 1.359805 
   5% 1.414989 
   10% 2.272079 
 
Obs 23 
25% 4.499206 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 8.669534
 
Mean 9.460793 
   
Std. Dev. 6.029412 
75% 13.35732
   90% 18.27087 
 
Variance 36.35381 
95% 18.66849 
 
Skewness 0.6170245 
99% 23.71946 
 
Kurtosis 2.643281 
     Sample Pseudo R2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias 
Raw 0.266 0 30.3 26.8 
Matched 0.04 0 9.5 8.7 
 
Kernel distribution of propensity score before (red) and after (blue) matching 
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Table 3.13: Propensity score distribution before and after matching of households suffered 
from disasters 
 
Summary of propensity score before matching 
  Percentiles 
   1% 5.145177 
   5% 6.233551 
   10% 8.628268 
 
Obs 23 
25% 10.37722 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 27.12029 
 
Mean 29.59041 
   
Std. Dev. 19.44298 
75% 39.09868 
   90% 50.6022 
 
Variance 378.0293 
95% 72.1411 
 
Skewness 0.8914386 
99% 77.0631  Kurtosis 3.3444 
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Panel A: Nearest-neighbor technique 
Variable Unmatched/ 
Matched  
Mean % Bias % Reduct 
bias 
t-test 
Treate
d Control   t p>|t| 
HH size Unmatched 4.84 5.36 -29.1 
 
-2.09 0.037 
 
Matched 5.04 4.87 9.9 66.0 1.60 0.109 
No. of member <10 Unmatched 0.67 1.13 -46.5 
 
-3.40 0.001 
 
Matched 0.78 0.95 -17.9 61.5 -2.72 0.007 
No. of members 10-15  Unmatched 0.57 0.76 -23.2 
 
-1.820 0.070 
 
Matched 0.66 0.69 -3.5 85.1 -0.59 0.557 
No. of members 15-25 Unmatched 1.22 1.16 5.1 
 
0.37 0.714 
 
Matched 1.23 0.91 27.3 -431.4 4.46 0.000 
No. of members 25-60 Unmatched 2.04 1.96 10.4 
 
0.75 0.456 
 
Matched 2.03 2.04 -1.4 86.8 -0.25 0.802 
Education of head Unmatched 5.82 3.91 50.6 
 
3.63 0.000 
 
Matched 4.88 4.87 0.4 99.2 0.06 0.950 
Education of head (squared) Unmatched 47.73 29.55 45.8 
 
3.10 0.002 
 
Matched 36.43 37.17 -1.8 96.0 -0.32 0.751 
Edu. of head * Ethnic Unmatched 2.52 3.65 -30.7 
 
-2.25 0.024 
 
Matched 3.24 2.52 19.7 35.9 3.25 0.001 
Gender of head Unmatched 0.86 0.89 -9.8 
 
-0.67 0.503 
 
Matched 0.85 0.90 -15.0 -53.2 -2.38 0.017 
Age of head Unmatched 48.84 43.80 39.1 
 
2.93 0.003 
 
Matched 47.87 44.90 23.0 41.1 3.80 0.000 
No. of labors for salary Unmatched 1.04 0.76 27.8 
 
1.84 0.065 
 
Matched 0.99 0.70 29.3 -5.2 4.42 0.000 
No. of labors in HH 
agriculture 
Unmatched 3.35 3.78 -27.1 
 
-1.94 0.053 
Matched 3.55 3.75 -12.9 52.3 -2.14 0.032 
No. of labors in HH business Unmatched 0.34 0.56 -27.1 
 
-2.02 0.044 
 
Matched 0.36 0.29 7.7 71.5 1.29 0.198 
Hired labor outside Unmatched 0.49 0.33 34.0 
 
2.36 0.018 
 
Matched 0.47 0.38 18.0 47.2 2.75 0.006 
Loan (ln) Unmatched 5.63 5.35 6.2 
 
0.44 0.658 
 
Matched 5.41 3.84 35.0 -461.4 5.43 0.000 
Assistance receipt (ln) Unmatched 2.72 0.49 77.1 
 
4.46 0.000 
 
Matched 1.75 1.25 17.6 77.2 2.79 0.005 
Distance to People's 
Committee 
Unmatched 3.14 6.63 -72.1 
 
-6.48 0.000 
Matched 3.51 4.34 -17.2 76.2 -3.58 0.000 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
Unmatched 0.29 0.47 -38.2 
 
-2.84 0.005 
Matched 0.32 0.25 14.3 62.4 2.36 0.019 
Paddy land Unmatched 1.53 1.98 -14.9 
 
-0.97 0.331 
 
Matched 1.50 1.48 0.6 95.9 0.11 0.914 
Paddy land * Problematic 
land 
Unmatched 0.54 0.74 -9.8 
 
-0.76 0.446 
Matched 0.50 0.70 -10.3 -5.2 -2.16 0.031 
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Paddy land * Hybrid seed  Unmatched 0.65 0.39 24.1 
 
1.40 0.161 
 
Matched 0.52 0.91 -36.1 -49.8 -7.29 0.000 
Paddy land * Improved seed Unmatched 0.41 0.58 -8.6 
 
-0.49 0.621 
 
Matched 0.48 0.19 14.5 -68 2.12 0.034 
Paddy land * Old local seed Unmatched 0.42 1.01 -23.2 
 
-1.84 0.066 
  Matched 0.51 0.38 5.0 78.2 1.02 0.308 
 
Summary of propensity score after matching  
  Percentiles 
   1% 0.3867186 
   5% 0.614317 
   10% 1.370329 
 
Obs 23 
25% 5.046937 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 14.49821
 
Mean 14.71951 
   
Std. Dev. 10.5128 
75% 19.68475
   90% 29.27452 
 
Variance 110.519 
95% 34.99508 
 
Skewness 0.4343568 
99% 36.09293  Kurtosis 2.422963 
     Sample Pseudo R2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias 
Raw 0.229 0 29.6 27.1 
Matched 0.135 0 14.7 14.5 
 
Kernel distribution of propensity score before (red) and after (blue) matching 
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Panel B: Nearest-neighbor without replacement technique 
Variable Unmatched/ 
Matched  
Mean % Bias % Reduct 
bias 
t-test 
Treated Control   t p>|t| 
HH size Unmatched 4.84 5.36 -29.1 
 
-2.09 0.037 
 
Matched 5.73 5.36 20.3 30.2 0.95 0.346 
No. of member <10 Unmatched 0.67 1.13 -46.5 
 
-3.4 0.001 
 
Matched 1.56 1.13 44.2 5 2.03 0.045 
No. of members 10-15  Unmatched 0.57 0.76 -23.2 
 
-1.82 0.070 
 
Matched 0.75 0.76 -2.2 90.7 -0.11 0.912 
No. of members 15-25 Unmatched 1.22 1.16 5.1 
 
0.37 0.714 
 
Matched 1.11 1.16 -4.7 9.1 -0.24 0.810 
No. of members 25-60 Unmatched 2.04 1.96 10.4 
 
0.75 0.456 
 
Matched 1.91 1.96 -7.2 30.9 -0.4 0.693 
Education of head Unmatched 5.82 3.91 50.6 
 
3.63 0.000 
 
Matched 3.65 3.91 -6.7 86.7 -0.35 0.726 
Education of head (squared) Unmatched 47.73 29.55 45.8 
 
3.1 0.002 
 
Matched 27.40 29.55 -5.4 88.2 -0.31 0.757 
Edu. of head * Ethnic Unmatched 2.52 3.65 -30.7 
 
-2.25 0.024 
 
Matched 3.44 3.65 -5.9 80.7 -0.3 0.764 
Gender of head Unmatched 0.86 0.89 -9.8 
 
-0.67 0.503 
 
Matched 0.89 0.89 0 100 0 1.000 
Age of head Unmatched 48.84 43.80 39.1 
 
2.93 0.003 
 
Matched 40.29 43.80 -27.2 30.4 -1.4 0.164 
No. of labors for salary Unmatched 1.04 0.76 27.8 
 
1.84 0.065 
 
Matched 0.45 0.76 -31 -11.5 -1.91 0.058 
No. of labors in HH agriculture Unmatched 3.35 3.78 -27.1 
 
-1.94 0.053 
 
Matched 3.73 3.78 -3.4 87.4 -0.19 0.850 
No. of labors in HH business Unmatched 0.34 0.56 -27.1 
 
-2.02 0.044 
 
Matched 0.84 0.56 32.6 -20.3 1.12 0.264 
Hired labor outside Unmatched 0.49 0.33 34 
 
2.36 0.018 
 
Matched 0.22 0.33 -22.4 34.1 -1.28 0.202 
Loan (ln) Unmatched 5.63 5.35 6.2 
 
0.44 0.658 
 
Matched 5.00 5.35 -7.9 -26.9 -0.41 0.685 
Assistance receipt (ln) Unmatched 2.72 0.49 77.1 
 
4.46 0.000 
 
Matched 0.00 0.49 -16.8 78.2 -2 0.048 
Distance to People's 
Committee 
Unmatched 3.14 6.63 -72.1 
 
-6.48 0.000 
Matched 8.13 6.63 31 57 1.23 0.220 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
Unmatched 0.29 0.47 -38.2 
 
-2.84 0.005 
Matched 0.51 0.47 7.6 80.1 0.38 0.706 
Paddy land Unmatched 1.53 1.98 -14.9 
 
-0.97 0.331 
 
Matched 1.75 1.98 -7.6 48.8 -0.28 0.777 
Paddy land * Problematic land Unmatched 0.54 0.74 -9.8 
 
-0.76 0.446 
 
Matched 0.94 0.74 10.5 -6.5 0.28 0.781 
Paddy land * Hybrid seed  Unmatched 0.65 0.39 24.1 
 
1.4 0.161 
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Matched 0.36 0.39 -2.6 89.3 -0.25 0.800 
Paddy land * Improved seed Unmatched 0.41 0.58 -8.6 
 
-0.49 0.621 
 
Matched 0.13 0.58 -23.5 -172.1 -2.74 0.007 
Paddy land * Old local seed Unmatched 0.42 1.01 -23.2 
 
-1.84 0.066 
  Matched 1.26 1.01 9.9 57.4 0.3 0.766 
 
Summary of propensity score after matching  
  Percentiles 
   1% 0 
   5% 2.164152 
   10% 2.583019 
 
Obs 23 
25% 5.402595 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 7.911068
 
Mean 14.37431 
   
Std. Dev. 12.19031 
75% 23.47744
   90% 31.04984 
 
Variance 148.6037 
95% 32.63686 
 
Skewness 0.8609254 
99% 44.16815  Kurtosis 2.635159 
     Sample Pseudo R2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias 
Raw 0.229 0 29.6 27.1 
Matched 0.321 0.001 14.4 7.9 
 
Kernel distribution of propensity score before (red) and after (blue) matching
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Panel C: Caliper without replacement technique 
Variable Unmatched/ 
Matched  
Mean % Bias % 
Reduct 
bias 
t-test 
Treated Control   t p>|t| 
HH size Unmatched 4.84 5.36 -29.1 
 
-2.09 0.037 
 
Matched 4.81 5.40 -33.2 -14.2 -1.57 0.120 
No. of member <10 Unmatched 0.67 1.13 -46.5 
 
-3.40 0.001 
 
Matched 0.98 1.10 -12.0 74.1 -0.53 0.597 
No. of members 10-15  Unmatched 0.57 0.76 -23.2 
 
-1.82 0.070 
 
Matched 0.76 0.93 -19.8 14.6 -0.81 0.419 
No. of members 15-25 Unmatched 1.22 1.16 5.1 
 
0.37 0.714 
 
Matched 0.81 1.14 -28.6 -455.7 -1.43 0.157 
No. of members 25-60 Unmatched 2.04 1.96 10.4 
 
0.75 0.456 
 
Matched 2.00 1.93 9.4 9.5 0.48 0.635 
Education of head Unmatched 5.82 3.91 50.6 
 
3.63 0.000 
 
Matched 4.17 3.83 8.8 82.5 0.40 0.691 
Education of head (squared) Unmatched 47.73 29.55 45.8 
 
3.10 0.002 
 
Matched 31.64 29.02 6.6 85.6 0.33 0.741 
Edu. of head * Ethnic Unmatched 2.52 3.65 -30.7 
 
-2.25 0.024 
 
Matched 3.64 3.50 3.9 87.4 0.17 0.866 
Gender of head Unmatched 0.86 0.89 -9.8 
 
-0.67 0.503 
 
Matched 0.93 0.88 14.3 -45.9 0.74 0.463 
Age of head Unmatched 48.84 43.80 39.1 
 
2.93 0.003 
 
Matched 41.52 44.36 -22.0 43.8 -1.17 0.244 
No. of labors for salary Unmatched 1.04 0.76 27.8 
 
1.84 0.065 
 
Matched 0.64 0.79 -14.3 48.5 -0.70 0.483 
No. of labors in HH agriculture Unmatched 3.35 3.78 -27.1 
 
-1.94 0.053 
 
Matched 3.45 3.88 -26.9 0.8 -1.25 0.215 
No. of labors in HH business Unmatched 0.34 0.56 -27.1 
 
-2.02 0.044 
 
Matched 0.36 0.43 -8.5 68.5 -0.44 0.663 
Hired labor outside Unmatched 0.49 0.33 34.0 
 
2.36 0.018 
 
Matched 0.24 0.36 -24.4 28.1 -1.19 0.238 
Loan (ln) Unmatched 5.63 5.35 6.2 
 
0.44 0.658 
 
Matched 5.54 4.94 13.6 -117.9 0.60 0.548 
Assistance receipt (ln) Unmatched 2.72 0.49 77.1 
 
4.46 0.000 
 
Matched 0.84 0.64 6.8 91.1 0.44 0.662 
Distance to People's Committee Unmatched 3.14 6.63 -72.1 
 
-6.48 0.000 
Matched 6.41 4.56 38.3 46.9 1.57 0.120 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
Unmatched 0.29 0.47 -38.2 
 
-2.84 0.005 
Matched 0.31 0.45 -29.8 21.9 -1.35 0.182 
Paddy land Unmatched 1.53 1.98 -14.9 
 
-0.97 0.331 
 
Matched 1.80 1.71 2.9 80.6 0.09 0.930 
Paddy land * Problematic land Unmatched 0.54 0.74 -9.8 
 
-0.76 0.446 
 
Matched 1.25 0.42 42.2 -329.2 0.92 0.358 
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Paddy land * Hybrid seed  Unmatched 0.65 0.39 24.1 
 
1.40 0.161 
 
Matched 0.40 0.42 -2.3 90.6 -0.19 0.849 
Paddy land * Improved seed Unmatched 0.41 0.58 -8.6 
 
-0.49 0.621 
 
Matched 0.24 0.53 -15.1 -75.3 -1.45 0.151 
Paddy land * Old local seed Unmatched 0.42 1.01 -23.2 
 
-1.84 0.066 
  Matched 1.16 0.75 16.0 30.9 0.40 0.692 
 
Summary of propensity score after matching  
  Percentiles 
   1% 2.274616 
   5% 2.885342 
   10% 3.878768 
 
Obs 23 
25% 8.547748 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 14.33854 
 
Mean 17.38485 
   
Std. Dev. 11.44456 
75% 26.85716 
   90% 33.18887 
 
Variance 130.978 
95% 38.29766 
 
Skewness 0.6049059 
99% 42.20342  Kurtosis 2.370706 
     Sample Pseudo R2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias 
Raw 0.229 0 29.6 27.1 
Matched 0.252 0.134 17.4 14.3 
 
Kernel distribution of propensity score before (red) and after (blue) matching 
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Panel D: Kernel-based matching technique 
Variable Unmatched/ 
Matched  
Mean % Bias % 
Reduct 
bias 
t-test 
Treated Control   t p>|t| 
HH size Unmatched 4.84 5.36 -29.1 
 
-2.09 0.037 
 
Matched 5.04 4.93 5.9 79.8 0.92 0.356 
No. of member <10 Unmatched 0.67 1.13 -46.5 
 
-3.40 0.001 
 
Matched 0.77 0.85 -7.8 83.2 -1.20 0.232 
No. of members 10-15  Unmatched 0.57 0.76 -23.2 
 
-1.82 0.070 
 
Matched 0.66 0.85 -22.9 1.6 -3.78 0.000 
No. of members 15-25 Unmatched 1.22 1.16 5.1 
 
0.37 0.714 
 
Matched 1.22 0.91 26.9 -422.1 4.29 0.000 
No. of members 25-60 Unmatched 2.04 1.96 10.4 
 
0.75 0.456 
 
Matched 2.03 1.91 15.7 -51.5 2.62 0.009 
Education of head Unmatched 5.82 3.91 50.6 
 
3.63 0.000 
 
Matched 4.89 4.49 10.8 78.7 1.81 0.070 
Education of head (squared) Unmatched 47.73 29.55 45.8 
 
3.10 0.002 
 
Matched 36.51 31.50 12.6 72.4 2.27 0.023 
Edu. of head * Ethnic Unmatched 2.52 3.65 -30.7 
 
-2.25 0.024 
 
Matched 3.25 3.06 5.1 83.5 0.81 0.418 
Gender of head Unmatched 0.86 0.89 -9.8 
 
-0.67 0.503 
 
Matched 0.85 0.83 5.8 41.2 0.82 0.413 
Age of head Unmatched 48.84 43.80 39.1 
 
2.93 0.003 
 
Matched 47.87 47.24 4.9 87.5 0.72 0.474 
No. of labors for salary Unmatched 1.04 0.76 27.8 
 
1.84 0.065 
 
Matched 1.00 0.75 25.1 9.7 3.85 0.000 
No. of labors in HH agriculture Unmatched 3.35 3.78 -27.1 
 
-1.94 0.053 
 
Matched 3.54 3.62 -5.0 81.7 -0.81 0.415 
No. of labors in HH business Unmatched 0.34 0.56 -27.1 
 
-2.02 0.044 
 
Matched 0.35 0.30 6.0 77.9 1.04 0.299 
Hired labor outside Unmatched 0.49 0.33 34.0 
 
2.36 0.018 
 
Matched 0.47 0.37 18.7 45.1 2.86 0.004 
Loan (ln) Unmatched 5.63 5.35 6.2 
 
0.44 0.658 
 
Matched 5.40 4.50 20.1 -222.8 3.10 0.002 
Assistance receipt (ln) Unmatched 2.72 0.49 77.1 
 
4.46 0.000 
 
Matched 1.76 1.89 -4.7 93.9 -0.65 0.514 
Distance to People's Committee Unmatched 3.14 6.63 -72.1 
 
-6.48 0.000 
 
Matched 3.50 3.64 -3.0 95.9 -0.60 0.550 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
Unmatched 0.29 0.47 -38.2 
 
-2.84 0.005 
Matched 0.32 0.29 7.3 80.9 1.18 0.240 
Paddy land Unmatched 1.53 1.98 -14.9 
 
-0.97 0.331 
 
Matched 1.48 1.22 8.6 42.4 1.52 0.128 
Paddy land * Problematic land Unmatched 0.54 0.74 -9.8 
 
-0.76 0.446 
 
Matched 0.50 0.56 -2.9 70.1 -0.61 0.542 
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Paddy land * Hybrid seed  Unmatched 0.65 0.39 24.1 
 
1.40 0.161 
 
Matched 0.52 0.62 -9.9 59.1 -2.16 0.031 
Paddy land * Improved seed Unmatched 0.41 0.58 -8.6 
 
-0.49 0.621 
 
Matched 0.48 0.27 10.9 -25.9 1.57 0.116 
Paddy land * Old local seed Unmatched 0.42 1.01 -23.2 
 
-1.84 0.066 
  Matched 0.49 0.33 6.2 73.1 1.32 0.186 
 
Summary of propensity score after matching  
  Percentiles 
   1% 2.939704 
   5% 2.955918 
   10% 4.68328 
 
Obs 23 
25% 5.058248 
 
Sum of Wgt. 23 
     50% 7.803426
 
Mean 10.71517 
   
Std. Dev. 7.288932 
75% 15.72312
   90% 22.85522 
 
Variance 53.12853 
95% 25.1435 
 
Skewness 0.9884122 
99% 26.8647  Kurtosis 2.688389 
     Sample Pseudo R2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias 
Raw 0.229 0 29.6 27.1 
Matched 0.075 0 10.7 7.8 
 
Kernel distribution of propensity score before (red) and after (blue) matching 
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Table 3.14: Estimated treatment effect on outcomes in the case of continuous treatment   
Panel A: All sample 
Treatment level Yield Revenue Agricultural income Total income 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 0.37  0.416    2.064    5.612    6.866    
Intervals         
t0 0.002 0.254 0.049 1.196 0.261 5.595 0.060 6.779 -0.066 
t1 0.222 0.396 0.047 2.062 0.173 5.508 0.119 6.660 0.260 
t2 0.443 0.462 0.011 2.263 0.050 5.654 -0.054 7.082 -0.037 
t3 0.663 0.490 0.016 2.397 0.077 5.594 0.043 6.947 -0.070 
t4 0.883 0.527 0.015 2.568 0.073 5.701 0.037 6.819 -0.026 
t5 1.104 0.557 0.009 2.716 0.048 5.753 -0.013 6.785 0.011 
t6 1.324 0.572 0.001 2.802 0.014 5.695 -0.059 6.828 0.040 
t7 1.545 0.570 -0.006 2.809 -0.024 5.542 -0.096 6.932 0.065 
t8 1.765 0.551 -0.014 2.733 -0.062 5.312 -0.128 7.088 0.086 
t9 1.985 0.515 -0.022 2.575 -0.099 5.012 -0.157 7.291 0.106 
t10 2.206 0.462 -0.030 2.335 -0.136 4.648 -0.186 7.536 0.125 
 
 
Panel B: Without disaster 
Treatment level Yield Revenue Agricultural income Total income 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 0.359 0.417   2.091   5.565   6.877   
Intervals         
t0 0.002 0.228 0.054 1.143 0.269 5.529 0.097 6.851 -0.096 
t1 0.222 0.398 0.055 2.084 0.214 5.493 0.119 6.641 0.295 
t2 0.443 0.471 0.014 2.301 0.067 5.650 -0.090 7.155 -0.076 
t3 0.663 0.507 0.020 2.494 0.115 5.506 -0.003 6.899 -0.137 
t4 0.883 0.551 0.019 2.751 0.112 5.491 -0.043 6.636 -0.072 
t5 1.104 0.590 0.013 2.984 0.085 5.348 -0.123 6.512 -0.019 
t6 1.324 0.614 0.005 3.151 0.049 5.034 -0.191 6.495 0.019 
t7 1.545 0.621 -0.003 3.235 0.011 4.577 -0.250 6.556 0.049 
t8 1.765 0.610 -0.011 3.236 -0.026 3.993 -0.305 6.679 0.074 
t9 1.985 0.581 -0.019 3.157 -0.062 3.289 -0.358 6.856 0.096 
t10 2.206 0.535 -0.027 2.999 -0.097 2.469 -0.410 7.081 0.118 
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Panel C: Flood/ Storm/ Landslide 
Treatment level Yield Revenue Agricultural income Total income 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 0.393 0.452  2.168  5.428  6.644  
Intervals          
t0 0.008 0.489 0.001 2.161 0.051 5.407 -0.133 6.476 -0.062 
t1 0.151 0.476 -0.059 2.191 -0.151 5.264 0.116 6.435 0.188 
t2 0.294 0.411 0.021 2.020 0.073 5.418 0.058 6.677 0.065 
t3 0.438 0.444 0.019 2.140 0.098 5.503 0.042 6.767 0.035 
t4 0.581 0.468 0.011 2.274 0.071 5.546 -0.041 6.798 -0.053 
t5 0.724 0.482 0.007 2.371 0.046 5.477 -0.064 6.709 -0.089 
t6 0.867 0.492 0.003 2.432 0.021 5.391 -0.024 6.585 -0.066 
t7 1.010 0.495 -0.001 2.457 0.001 5.370 0.037 6.499 -0.025 
t8 1.154 0.493 -0.004 2.455 -0.015 5.437 0.097 6.473 0.014 
t9 1.297 0.487 -0.005 2.431 -0.027 5.587 0.149 6.501 0.047 
t10 1.440 0.479 -0.007 2.389 -0.038 5.811 0.195 6.573 0.073 
 
 
Panel D: Drought 
Treatment level Yield Revenue Agricultural income Total income 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 0.352 0.401   2.093   5.737   6.887   
Intervals         
t0 0.013 0.358 0.000 1.868 0.021 5.027 0.361 6.302 0.287 
t1 0.137 0.364 0.038 1.910 0.194 5.551 0.337 6.710 0.281 
t2 0.262 0.412 0.028 2.157 0.149 5.899 -0.055 7.017 0.049 
t3 0.386 0.443 0.001 2.323 0.005 5.826 -0.053 7.070 -0.002 
t4 0.511 0.443 -0.015 2.316 -0.080 5.767 0.004 7.063 -0.039 
t5 0.635 0.423 -0.021 2.211 -0.116 5.779 0.057 7.012 -0.057 
t6 0.759 0.397 -0.020 2.065 -0.130 5.856 0.106 6.940 -0.059 
t7 0.884 0.372 -0.017 1.902 -0.137 5.993 0.147 6.868 -0.053 
t8 1.008 0.352 -0.013 1.730 -0.143 6.180 0.183 6.802 -0.047 
t9 1.132 0.337 -0.009 1.552 -0.149 6.411 0.213 6.744 -0.044 
t10 1.257 0.326 -0.006 1.365 -0.158 6.679 0.239 6.689 -0.044 
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Panel E: Plant disease/ Insect 
Treatment level Yield Revenue Agricultural income Total income 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 
response 
Treatment 
effect 
Average 0.396 0.391   1.836   5.746   6.786   
Intervals         
t0 0.013 0.324 -0.011 1.086 0.329 5.647 -0.110 6.309 0.140 
t1 0.222 0.339 0.047 1.783 0.183 5.518 0.115 6.616 0.164 
t2 0.430 0.426 0.025 2.075 0.062 5.772 0.107 6.953 0.123 
t3 0.639 0.470 0.013 2.187 0.037 5.972 0.069 7.162 0.045 
t4 0.848 0.493 0.007 2.259 0.028 6.105 0.053 7.230 0.007 
t5 1.057 0.505 0.003 2.314 0.020 6.213 0.050 7.236 -0.004 
t6 1.266 0.510 0.000 2.348 0.008 6.319 0.053 7.227 -0.004 
t7 1.474 0.508 -0.003 2.357 -0.007 6.434 0.059 7.222 -0.001 
t8 1.683 0.499 -0.007 2.333 -0.024 6.560 0.065 7.221 0.001 
t9 1.892 0.484 -0.010 2.274 -0.042 6.700 0.072 7.223 0.002 
t10 2.101 0.462 -0.013 2.176 -0.061 6.854 0.079 7.227 0.001 
Note: The marginal effect is computed as:                        , where t is treatment 
level; t0 and t10 correspond to the min and max of chemical fertilizer adoption.   
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Table 3.15: Estimated generalized propensity scores of the continuous treatment 
Dependant var. is amount of 
fertilizer used 
All 
sample 
No 
disaster 
Flood/Storm/ 
Landslide 
Drought Plant 
disease/ 
Insect 
HH size 0.007 0.005 0.097 0.013 0.028 
 
(0.021) 0.023 (0.073) (0.088) (0.091) 
No. of member <10 -0.039 -0.031 -0.08 -0.056 -0.163 
 
(0.026) 0.029 (0.085) (0.102) (0.108) 
No. of members 10-15  0.005 -0.002 -0.117 0.112 -0.051 
 
(0.026) 0.029 (0.081) (0.112) (0.108) 
No. of members 15-25 -0.029 -0.028 -0.129* 0.016 -0.058 
 
(0.022) 0.024 (0.074) (0.096) (0.088) 
No. of members 25-60 -0.049** -0.05** -0.031 0.068 -0.069 
 
(0.022) 0.023 (0.07) (0.091) (0.093) 
Education of head 0.026** 0.022* -0.009 0.001 0.073* 
 
(0.011) 0.012 (0.033) (0.044) (0.042) 
Education of head (squared) -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.0004 
 
(0.001) 0.001 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Edu. of head * Ethnic -0.007* -0.016*** 0.023* -0.024 -0.003 
 
(0.004) 0.005 (0.012) (0.016) (0.017) 
Gender of head 0.02 0.039 0.125 -0.203 -0.106 
 
(0.034) 0.036 (0.099) (0.144) (0.155) 
Age of head 0.001 0.001 -0.0002 0.011** -0.011** 
 
(0.001) 0.001 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
No. of labors for salary 0.033*** 0.036*** -0.011 -0.054 0.069 
 
(0.011) 0.012 (0.035) (0.049) (0.045) 
No. of labors in HH agriculture 0.001 -0.001 -0.014 -0.006 0.051 
 
(0.011) 0.012 (0.035) (0.061) (0.048) 
No. of labors in HH business -0.023 -0.017 0.017 -0.072 -0.104* 
 
(0.014) 0.016 (0.053) (0.07) (0.061) 
Hired labor outside -0.01 -0.053** 0.015 0.005 0.024 
 
(0.023) 0.026 (0.068) (0.095) (0.098) 
Loan (ln) 0.007*** 0.006** -0.004 0.005 0.006 
 
(0.002) 0.003 (0.007) (0.01) (0.01) 
Assistance receipt (ln) 0.006*** 0.008** 0.012 -0.021 0.018 
 
(0.003) 0.003 (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
Distance to People's Committee -0.011*** -0.006 -0.012 -0.016 -0.032** 
 
(0.004) 0.005 (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 
0.075*** 0.042 0.115 0.105 0.072 
(0.026) 0.03 (0.071) (0.098) (0.111) 
Paddy land 0.009 0.005 -0.125 -0.358 -0.084 
 
(0.012) 0.012 (0.176) (0.386) (0.169) 
Paddy land * Problematic land -0.012* -0.005 0.019 0.005 0.075* 
 
(0.006) 0.007 (0.051) (0.078) (0.045) 
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Paddy land * Hybrid seed  -0.011 -0.004 0.08 0.162 0.048 
 
(0.013) 0.012 (0.176) (0.384) (0.17) 
Paddy land * Improved seed -0.009 -0.011 0.071 0.453 0.111 
 
(0.012) 0.011 (0.174) (0.385) (0.169) 
Paddy land * Old local seed -0.01 -0.003 0.075 0.219 0.089 
 
(0.012) 0.011 (0.176) (0.391) (0.168) 
Constant -1.059*** -0.995*** -1.069*** -1.575*** -0.949*** 
  (0.079) 0.086 (0.242) 0.342 (0.325) 
Observations 1995 1360 207 142 215 
Log likelihood -1386 -810 -116 -104 -202 
Note: Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *, **, ***. Standard deviations are 
displayed in parentheses. This is regression of Box-Cox transformation. 
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Table 3.16: Balancing test and generalized propensity score distribution in the case of 
continuous treatment  
Panel A: All sample 
  
Treatment Interval 1             
[.0017, .3694] 
Treatment Interval 2                         
[.3701, 2.2059] 
 
Mean 
Difference 
S. D.  t-value Mean 
Difference 
S. D.  t-value 
HH size -0.136 0.079 -1.729 0.140 0.078 1.792 
No. of member <10 -0.046 0.040 -1.138 0.057 0.041 1.390 
No. of members 10-15  -0.028 0.035 -0.809 0.033 0.035 0.959 
No. of members 15-25 -0.026 0.052 -0.498 0.017 0.052 0.319 
No. of members 25-60 -0.061 0.037 -1.620 0.057 0.037 1.543 
Education of head 0.079 0.133 0.594 -0.127 0.136 -0.934 
Education of head (squared) 0.439 1.580 0.278 -0.685 1.591 -0.431 
Edu. of head * Ethnic -0.099 0.145 -0.682 0.043 0.146 0.296 
Gender of head 0.000 0.016 -0.016 0.001 0.016 0.037 
Age of head 0.450 0.589 0.764 -0.622 0.589 -1.056 
No. of labors for salary -0.007 0.047 -0.159 -0.008 0.047 -0.176 
No. of labors in HH agriculture -0.126 0.066 -1.907 0.121 0.065 1.853 
No. of labors in HH business 0.003 0.038 0.090 -0.002 0.037 -0.052 
Hired labor outside 0.005 0.023 0.242 -0.007 0.022 -0.304 
Loan (ln) 0.361 0.210 1.722 -0.294 0.208 -1.409 
Assistance receipt (ln) 0.234 0.160 1.468 -0.234 0.159 -1.470 
Distance to People's Committee -0.070 0.134 -0.524 0.147 0.134 1.090 
Land independent on public irrigation -0.004 0.020 -0.185 0.001 0.020 0.051 
Paddy land 0.401 0.181 2.214 -0.420 0.184 -2.289 
Paddy land * Problematic land 0.281 0.122 2.314 -0.277 0.122 -2.264 
Paddy land * Hybrid seed  0.098 0.071 1.375 -0.080 0.070 -1.142 
Paddy land * Improved seed 0.093 0.136 0.685 -0.106 0.140 -0.760 
Paddy land * Old local seed 0.170 0.109 1.568 -0.203 0.109 -1.855 
Note: Test that the conditional mean of the pre-treatment variables given the generalized  
propensity score is not different between units who belong to a particular treatment interval 
and units who belong to all other treatment intervals.  
 
GPS evaluated at the representative point of each treatment interval 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GPS of interval 1 1995 0.688 0.095 0.381 0.823 
GPS of interval 2 1995 0.603 0.127 0.120 0.820 
Balancing test  0.01 
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Panel B: Households without disasters 
  
Treatment Interval 1                           
[.0017, .3694] 
Treatment Interval 2               
[.3701, 2.2059] 
 
Mean 
Difference 
S. D.  t-value Mean 
Difference 
S. D.  t-value 
HH size -0.065 0.065 -0.991 0.085 0.065 1.303 
No. of member <10 -0.009 0.034 -0.264 0.018 0.034 0.530 
No. of members 10-15  -0.005 0.029 -0.182 0.003 0.029 0.105 
No. of members 15-25 -0.009 0.043 -0.207 0.013 0.043 0.313 
No. of members 25-60 -0.047 0.032 -1.480 0.058 0.032 1.822 
Education of head -0.054 0.128 -0.425 0.034 0.127 0.268 
Education of head (squared) -1.164 1.498 -0.778 0.857 1.487 0.576 
Edu. of head * Ethnic 0.035 0.107 0.326 -0.023 0.107 -0.212 
Gender of head 0.005 0.014 0.400 -0.007 0.013 -0.495 
Age of head 0.066 0.492 0.134 -0.047 0.488 -0.096 
No. of labors for salary -0.012 0.039 -0.320 0.005 0.039 0.125 
No. of labors in HH agriculture -0.083 0.053 -1.569 0.094 0.053 1.783 
No. of labors in HH business 0.016 0.032 0.511 -0.004 0.031 -0.126 
Hired labor outside -0.005 0.019 -0.245 0.010 0.019 0.542 
Loan (ln) 0.278 0.176 1.576 -0.315 0.176 -1.784 
Assistance receipt (ln) 0.142 0.129 1.104 -0.164 0.127 -1.295 
Distance to People's Committee 0.073 0.103 0.705 -0.030 0.104 -0.288 
Land independent on public 
irrigation -0.013 0.016 -0.793 0.012 0.016 0.747 
Paddy land 0.247 0.159 1.560 -0.283 0.161 -1.755 
Paddy land * Problematic land 0.180 0.110 1.641 -0.208 0.112 -1.855 
Paddy land * Hybrid seed  0.066 0.061 1.095 -0.078 0.061 -1.287 
Paddy land * Improved seed 0.039 0.121 0.323 -0.068 0.125 -0.542 
Paddy land * Old local seed 0.121 0.091 1.329 -0.114 0.090 -1.262 
Note: Test that the conditional mean of the pre-treatment variables given the generalized  
propensity score is not different between units who belong to a particular treatment interval 
and units who belong to all other treatment intervals.  
 
GPS evaluated at the representative point of each treatment interval 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GPS of interval 1 1360 0.764 0.110 0.403 0.909 
GPS of interval 2 1360 0.650 0.142 0.038 0.907 
Balancing test  0.05 
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Panel C: Flood/ Storm/ Landslide 
  
Treatment Interval  1                          
[.0081, .3684] 
Treatment Interval 2                            
[.3714, 1.4400] 
 
Mean 
Difference 
S. D.  t-value Mean 
Difference 
S. D.  t-value 
HH size -0.023 0.025 -0.913 0.020 0.025 0.815 
No. of member <10 0.002 0.014 0.157 0.000 0.014 0.023 
No. of members 10-15  -0.015 0.011 -1.381 0.013 0.011 1.219 
No. of members 15-25 -0.017 0.015 -1.152 0.017 0.015 1.150 
No. of members 25-60 0.003 0.011 0.250 -0.003 0.011 -0.321 
Education of head 0.037 0.049 0.755 -0.033 0.049 -0.679 
Education of head (squared) 0.364 0.571 0.639 -0.274 0.574 -0.478 
Edu. of head * Ethnic 0.036 0.046 0.780 -0.019 0.047 -0.415 
Gender of head -0.003 0.005 -0.596 0.003 0.005 0.586 
Age of head 0.126 0.187 0.674 -0.176 0.189 -0.934 
No. of labors for salary -0.007 0.015 -0.481 0.006 0.015 0.421 
No. of labors in HH agriculture -0.024 0.022 -1.112 0.023 0.021 1.056 
No. of labors in HH business -0.003 0.009 -0.330 0.004 0.009 0.438 
Hired labor outside 0.001 0.007 0.122 -0.001 0.007 -0.212 
Loan (ln) 0.029 0.065 0.441 -0.061 0.066 -0.927 
Assistance receipt (ln) -0.039 0.045 -0.872 0.021 0.046 0.470 
Distance to People's Committee 0.007 0.041 0.179 -0.009 0.041 -0.218 
Land independent on public irrigation -0.003 0.007 -0.435 0.003 0.007 0.499 
Paddy land -0.053 0.044 -1.224 0.034 0.043 0.787 
Paddy land * Problematic land -0.057 0.040 -1.441 0.039 0.040 0.986 
Paddy land * Hybrid seed  0.005 0.013 0.402 -0.006 0.013 -0.492 
Paddy land * Improved seed -0.004 0.014 -0.295 0.005 0.014 0.341 
Paddy land * Old local seed -0.052 0.042 -1.240 0.033 0.042 0.799 
Note: Test that the conditional mean of the pre-treatment variables given the generalized  
propensity score is not different between units who belong to a particular treatment interval 
and units who belong to all other treatment intervals.  
 
GPS evaluated at the representative point of each treatment interval 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GPS of interval 1 207 0.743 0.173 0.055 0.940 
GPS of interval 2 207 0.752 0.159 0.002 0.940 
Balancing test  0.1 
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Panel D: Drought 
  
Treatment Interval 1              
[.0132, .3632] 
Treatment Interval 2                           
[.3852, 1.257] 
 
Mean 
Difference 
S. D.  t-value Mean 
Difference 
S. D.  t-value 
HH size 0.003 0.025 0.116 -0.009 0.024 -0.381 
No. of member <10 -0.009 0.015 -0.596 0.009 0.014 0.621 
No. of members 10-15  0.008 0.010 0.848 -0.009 0.010 -0.952 
No. of members 15-25 0.005 0.015 0.312 -0.003 0.015 -0.195 
No. of members 25-60 -0.001 0.010 -0.078 -0.005 0.010 -0.450 
Education of head 0.014 0.051 0.263 0.005 0.051 0.089 
Education of head (squared) 0.179 0.571 0.313 0.078 0.562 0.138 
Edu. of head * Ethnic -0.042 0.048 -0.867 0.027 0.047 0.585 
Gender of head -0.006 0.004 -1.454 0.005 0.004 1.304 
Age of head 0.106 0.149 0.713 -0.051 0.148 -0.349 
No. of labors for salary 0.009 0.015 0.584 -0.010 0.015 -0.653 
No. of labors in HH agriculture 0.001 0.017 0.079 -0.011 0.018 -0.617 
No. of labors in HH business 0.003 0.009 0.305 0.001 0.010 0.081 
Hired labor outside -0.006 0.007 -0.963 0.004 0.007 0.631 
Loan (ln) -0.045 0.060 -0.754 0.008 0.060 0.137 
Assistance receipt (ln) -0.020 0.052 -0.385 0.028 0.053 0.529 
Distance to People's Committee -0.040 0.067 -0.599 0.056 0.066 0.850 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 0.003 0.006 0.527 -0.001 0.006 -0.097 
Paddy land -0.020 0.018 -1.123 0.000 0.020 -0.008 
Paddy land * Problematic land 0.001 0.010 0.132 0.001 0.010 0.134 
Paddy land * Hybrid seed  -0.028 0.016 -1.770 0.016 0.017 0.926 
Paddy land * Improved seed 0.014 0.011 1.285 -0.018 0.012 -1.456 
Paddy land * Old local seed -0.005 0.009 -0.572 0.001 0.010 0.148 
Note: Test that the conditional mean of the pre-treatment variables given the generalized  
propensity score is not different between units who belong to a particular treatment interval 
and units who belong to all other treatment intervals.  
 
GPS evaluated at the representative point of each treatment interval 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GPS of interval 1 142 0.565 0.203 0.003 0.791 
GPS of interval 2 142 0.483 0.232 0.000 0.791 
Balancing test  0.05 
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Panel E: Plant diseases/ Insects 
  
Treatment Interval 1                          
[.0129, .3650] 
Treatment Interval 2                
[.3712, 2.1008] 
 
Mean 
Difference 
S. D.  t-value Mean 
Difference 
S. D.  t-value 
HH size -0.003 0.026 -0.099 -0.002 0.026 -0.071 
No. of member <10 -0.012 0.014 -0.834 0.010 0.014 0.690 
No. of members 10-15  0.000 0.012 0.037 -0.001 0.012 -0.127 
No. of members 15-25 0.006 0.019 0.285 -0.008 0.020 -0.422 
No. of members 25-60 0.000 0.012 -0.031 0.000 0.012 0.025 
Education of head 0.055 0.050 1.097 -0.038 0.047 -0.808 
Education of head (squared) 0.412 0.542 0.761 -0.276 0.497 -0.555 
Edu. of head * Ethnic 0.017 0.055 0.303 -0.019 0.056 -0.344 
Gender of head 0.005 0.005 0.989 -0.005 0.005 -0.947 
Age of head -0.040 0.190 -0.212 0.051 0.192 0.267 
No. of labors for salary 0.020 0.017 1.142 -0.013 0.017 -0.764 
No. of labors in HH agriculture -0.001 0.026 -0.030 -0.002 0.026 -0.078 
No. of labors in HH business -0.017 0.013 -1.373 0.015 0.013 1.158 
Hired labor outside 0.012 0.007 1.596 -0.012 0.007 -1.591 
Loan (ln) -0.034 0.071 -0.480 0.028 0.072 0.385 
Assistance receipt (ln) 0.069 0.056 1.233 -0.058 0.056 -1.042 
Distance to People's Committee -0.105 0.056 -1.882 0.087 0.056 1.559 
Land independent on public 
irrigation 0.010 0.007 1.472 -0.009 0.007 -1.268 
Paddy land 0.099 0.073 1.356 -0.099 0.074 -1.330 
Paddy land * Problematic land 0.024 0.018 1.310 -0.027 0.018 -1.441 
Paddy land * Hybrid seed  0.002 0.024 0.078 -0.009 0.025 -0.364 
Paddy land * Improved seed 0.042 0.061 0.688 -0.039 0.063 -0.614 
Paddy land * Old local seed 0.058 0.039 1.476 -0.054 0.040 -1.349 
Note: Test that the conditional mean of the pre-treatment variables given the generalized  
propensity score is not different between units who belong to a particular treatment interval 
and units who belong to all other treatment intervals.  
 
GPS evaluated at the representative point of each treatment interval 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GPS of interval 1 215 0.445 0.158 0.031 0.644 
GPS of interval 2 215 0.393 0.189 0.008 0.644 
Balancing test  0.05 
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Table 3.17: Estimates of conditional distribution of treatment given covariates. 
Panel A: Rice yield 
  
All sample Without 
disaster 
Flood/Storm/ 
Landslide 
Drought Plant disease/ 
Insects 
Fertilizer 0.47*** 0.53*** 0.045 -0.11 0.232** 
 
(0.056) (0.069) (0.193) (0.186) (0.104) 
Fertilizer squared -0.17*** -0.177*** -0.037 0.045 -0.081 
 
(0.037) (0.048) (0.142) (0.131) (0.055) 
GPS 0.17** 0.261*** -0.338 0.029 -0.343 
 
(0.076) (0.085) (0.209) (0.241) (0.252) 
GPS squared -0.026 -0.084 0.166 -0.053 0.364 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.165) (0.248) (0.292) 
Fertilizer*GPS -0.237*** -0.31*** 0.285* 0.51** 0.442*** 
 
(0.071) (0.080) (0.166) (0.213) (0.163) 
Cons.  0.253*** 0.227*** 0.489*** 0.359*** 0.321*** 
 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.056) (0.061) (0.053) 
Obs.  1995 1360 207 142 215 
R-squared  0.16 0.19 0.07 0.129 0.347 
Balancing test 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.05 
 
Panel B: Rice revenue 
  
All sample Without 
disaster 
Flood/Storm/ 
Landslide 
Drought Plant disease/ 
Insects 
Fertilizer 2.324*** 2.59*** 0.655 0.292 1.56* 
 
(0.302) (0.376) (0.941) (1.025) (0.603) 
Fertilizer squared -0.818*** -0.791*** -0.346* -0.624 -0.496 
 
(0.199) (0.262) (0.692) (0.724) (0.316) 
GPS 1.658*** 1.869*** -1.01 -0.352 1.068 
 
(0.41) (0.462) (1.028) (1.33) (1.458) 
GPS squared -711* -0.765** 0.415 0.309 -0.443 
 
(0.378) (0.381) (0.805) (1.371) (1.687) 
Fertilizer*GPS -1.91*** -2.292*** 0.848 2.172* 0.064 
 
(0.382) (0.433) (0.809) (1.174) (0.941) 
Cons.  1.192*** 1.138*** 2.156*** 1.864*** 1.066*** 
 
(0.1) (0.126) (0.272) (0.365) (0.308) 
Obs.  1995 1360 207 142 215 
R-squared  0.11 0.127 0.069 0.108 0.183 
Balancing test 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.05 
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Panel C: Agricultural income 
  
All sample Without 
disaster 
Flood/Storm/ 
Landslide 
Drought Plant disease/ 
Insects 
Fertilizer 0.952** -0.935** -0.779 0.683 0.637 
 
(0.401) (0.375) (0.879) (0.921) (0.625) 
Fertilizer squared -0.625** 0.47* 0.559 -0.347 -0.117 
 
(0.625) (0.262) (0.646) (0.651) (0.328) 
GPS -1.151** -0.915** 0.805 2.049* 0.657 
 
(0.545) (0.462) (0.951) (1.195) (1.512) 
GPS squared 1.356*** 0.697* -0.716 -1.669 -1.481 
 
(0.502) (0.381) (0.752) (1.232) (1.749) 
Fertilizer*GPS -0.462 2.402*** 0.966 -0.015 2.212** 
 
(0.507) (0.433) (0.755) ( 1.054) (0.976) 
Cons.  5.594*** 6.852*** 6.482*** 6.292 6.301*** 
 
(0.133) (0.125) (0.255) (0.302) (0.319) 
Obs.  1995 1372 208 142 215 
R-squared  0.009 0.069 0.014 0.058 0.215 
Balancing test 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.05 
 
 
Panel D: Total income 
  
All sample Without 
disaster 
Flood/Storm/ 
Landslide 
Drought Plant disease/ 
Insects 
Fertilizer -0.544* 1.215** -1.544 0.285 0.278 
 
(0.301) (0.494) (1.44) (1.229) (0.797) 
Fertilizer squared 0.401** -1.179*** 1.232 0.826 0.13 
 
(0.199) (0.345) (1.059) (0.868) (0.418) 
GPS -0.856** -1.063* 0.636 3.006* -1.136 
 
(0.409) (0.607) (1.557) (1.594) (1.93) 
GPS squared 0.795** 1.142** -0.665 -1.797 0.654 
 
(0.377) (0.501) (1.232) (1.643) (2.231) 
Fertilizer*GPS 1.934*** -0.285 1.262 -2.247 1.728 
 
(0.381) (0.57) (1.237) (1.406) (1.245) 
Cons.  6.78*** 5.527*** 5.419*** 5.022*** 5.643*** 
 
(0.1) (0.165) (0.417) (0.403) (0.407) 
Obs.  1995 1360 207 142 215 
R-squared  0.05 0.022 0.011 0.066 0.108 
Balancing test 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.05 
Note: Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *, **, ***. Standard deviations are 
displayed in parentheses. 
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Table 3.18: OLS and instrumental variable estimates of the binary treatment 
Panel A: OLS 
  
Yield Revenue Agricultural income Total income 
  
All 
sample  
Without 
disaster  
With 
disasters  
All 
sample  
Without 
disaster  
With 
disasters  
All 
sample  
Without 
disaster  
With 
disasters  
All 
sample  
Without 
disaster  
With 
disasters  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Chemical fertilizer  0.108*** 0.114*** 0.097*** 0.407*** 0.426*** 0.403*** 0.247*** 0.21*** 0.387*** 0.194*** 0.167*** 0.328*** 
  
(0.01) (0.012) (0.02) (0.053) (0.061) (0.107) (0.058) (0.066) (0.125) (0.044) (0.049) (0.092) 
Obs. 2,260 1,570 690 2,260 1,570 690 2,260 1,570 690 2,260 1,570 690 
R-squared 0.19 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.21 0.13 0.27 0.29 0.25 0.36 0.41 0.3 
 
Note: Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *, **, ***.  Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses.  
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Panel B: 2 SLS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Chemical fertilizer  0.218*** 0.217*** 0.281*** 1.039*** 1.134*** 0.982*** 0.957*** 0.715*** 1.276*** 0.487*** 0.219*** 0.281*** 
  
(0.037) (0.039) (0.084) (0.193) (0.209) (0.421) (0.213) (0.222) (0.5) (0.155) (0.163) (0.084) 
Excluded IV 
            
 
Fertilizer information 
(dummy) 
0.192*** 0.238*** 0.075*** 0.192*** 0.238*** 0.075*** 0.192*** 0.238*** 0.075*** 0.192*** 0.238*** 0.075*** 
 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.031) (0.019) (0.023) (0.031) (0.019) (0.023) (0.031) (0.019) (0.023) (0.031) 
 
Crop insurance (dummy) 0.125*** 0.114*** 0.136*** 0.125*** 0.114*** 0.136*** 0.125*** 0.114*** 0.136*** 0.125*** 0.114*** 0.136*** 
  
(0.013) (0.016) (0.031) (0.013) (0.016) (0.031) (0.013) (0.016) (0.031) (0.013) (0.016) (0.031) 
Included IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity test 
            
 
Hausman t-test -0.12*** -0.113*** -0.197*** 0.353*** 0.354*** 0.362*** 0.185*** 0.159** 0.325*** 0.169*** 0.162*** 0.25*** 
Weak IV test 
            
 
Relevance condition, F-test  96.13*** 77.45*** 23.06*** 96.13*** 77.45*** 23.06*** 96.13*** 77.45*** 23.06*** 96.13*** 77.45*** 23.06*** 
 
Overidentifying, Sargan test 7.75*** 6.61*** 0.81 1.75 2.68 0.01 21.33*** 27.7*** 0.05 13.9*** 13.59*** 0.22 
Obs.  2,260 1,570 690 2,260 1,570 690 2,260 1,570 690 2,260 1,570 690 
Centered R-squared 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.1 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.27 0.18 0.35 0.41 0.15 
Note: (i) Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *, **, ***.  
 (ii) The null hypothesis of  the Hausman test is that the IV is exogenous, i.e., an OLS estimator of the same equation would yield consistent 
estimates, hence the IV process is unnecessary.  
(iii) The null hypothesis for relevance condition is that the parameters of exclued IVs are jointly equal to zero, or the excluded IVs are jointly 
uncorrelated with treatment variable.  
(iv) The null hypothesis of Sagan test for exclusion restriction or overidentifying restrictions is that the IVs are valid instruments, i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. The statistic is chi-
squared distributed.  
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Table 3.19: OLS and instrumental variable estimates of the continuous treatment 
Panel A: OLS 
  
Yield Revenue Agricultural income Total income 
  
All sample  Without 
disaster  
All sample  Without 
disaster  
All 
sample  
Without 
disaster  
All 
sample  
Without 
disaster  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Chemical fertilizer  0.192*** 0.216*** 0.796*** 
0.909**
* 0.186*** 0.002 0.219*** 0.035 
  
(0.012) (0.015) (0.063) (0.082) (0.074) (0.095) (0.053) (0.069) 
Obs.  1,955 1,360 1,955 1,360 1,955 1,360 1,955 1,360 
R-squared 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.30 0.35 0.40 
 
Panel B: 2SLS 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Chemical fertilizer  0.313*** 0.319*** 1.412*** 1.559*** 3.033*** 3.148*** 1.713*** 1.44*** 
  
(0.074) (0.081) (0.4) (0.438) (0.608) (0.673) (0.393) (0.413) 
Excluded IV 
        
 
Fertilizer information 
(dummy) 
0.063*** 0.052** 0.063*** 0.052** 0.063*** 0.052** 0.063*** 0.052** 
 
(0.02) (0.023) (0.02) (0.023) (0.02) (0.023) (0.02) (0.023) 
 
Crop insurance (ln) 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 
  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Included IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity test 
        
 
Hausman t-stat. -0.124* -0.107 0.78*** 0.885*** 0.111 -0.117 0.18*** -0.017 
Weak IV test 
        
 
Relavance condition, F test  25.81*** 24.76*** 25.81*** 24.76*** 25.81*** 24.76*** 25.81*** 24.76*** 
 
Overidentifying, Sargan test 2.18 1.27 0.39 8.53*** 8.54*** 6.15*** 7.01*** 5.38** 
Obs. 1,955 1,360 1,955 1,360 1,955 1,360 1,955 1,360 
Centered R-squared 0.17 0.23 0.13 0.18 -0.27 -0.26 0.1 0.22 
Note: (i) Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *, **, ***.  
 (ii) The null hypothesis of  the Hausman test is that the IV is exogenous, i.e., an OLS estimator 
of the same equation would yield consistent estimates, hence the IV process is unnecessary.  
(iii) The null hypothesis for relevance condition is that the parameters of exclued IVs are jointly 
equal to zero, or the excluded IVs are jointly uncorrelated with treatment variable.  
(iv) The null hypothesis of Sagan test for exclusion restriction or overidentifying restrictions is 
that the IVs are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. The statistic is chi-squared 
distributed.  
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Panel C: OLS 
  
Yield Revenue Agricultural income Total income 
  
Flood/ 
Storm  
Drought   Plant 
diseases  
Flood/ 
Storm  
Drought   Plant 
diseases  
Flood/ 
Storm  
Drought   Plant 
diseases  
Flood/ 
Storm  
Drought   Plant 
diseases  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Chemical fertilizer  0.092*** 0.046 0.167*** 0.577*** 0.052 0.673*** 0.051 0.508 0.836*** 0.034 0.25 0.714*** 
  
(0.036) (0.048) (0.027) (0.179) (0.262) (0.159) (0.241) (0.307) (0.195) (0.158) (0.223) (0.144) 
Obs.  207 142 215 207 142 215 207 142 215 207 142 215 
R-squared 0.25 0.37 0.45 0.24 0.37 0.28 0.37 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.4 0.47 
 
Panel D: 2SLS 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Chemical fertilizer  -0.119 1.663 0.477*** -0.385 13.524 2.122*** -2.808 -16.232 1.462** -1.611 -15.648 1.914*** 
  
(0.355) (4.122) (0.121) (1.727) (33.429) (0.656) (2.878) (41.442) (0.69) (1.793) (39.05) (0.58) 
Excluded IV 
            
 
Fertilizer information 
(dummy) 
0.049 0.015 0.107 0.049 0.015 0.107 0.049 0.015 0.107 0.049 0.015 0.107 
 
(0.06) (0.058) (0.09) (0.06) (0.058) (0.09) (0.06) (0.058) (0.09) (0.06) (0.058) (0.09) 
 
Crop insurance (ln) -0.009 -0.002 0.036*** -0.009 -0.002 0.036*** -0.009 -0.002 0.036*** -0.009 -0.002 0.036*** 
  
(0.09) (0.009) (0.01) (0.09) (0.009) (0.01) (0.09) (0.009) (0.01) (0.09) (0.009) (0.01) 
Included IV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity test 
            
 
Hausman t-test 0.214 -1.619 -0.335*** 0.588*** 0.036 0.557*** 0.083 0.528* 0.786*** 0.052 0.269 0.618*** 
Weak IV test 
            
 
Relavance condition, F-test  1.00 0.07 7.6*** 1.00 0.07 7.6*** 1.00 0.07 7.6*** 1.00 0.07 7.6*** 
 
Overidentifying, Sargan test 0.3 0.16 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.46 0.49 0.08 0.97 0.8 0.04 0.09 
Obs.  207 142 215 207 142 215 207 142 215 207 142 215 
Centered R-squared 0.11 -13.94 0.06 0.12 -15.74 -0.03 -0.11 -15.74 0.29 -0.14 -25.66 0.28 
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Table 3.20: Distribution of non-users and natural disaster shocks by provinces in the sample  
 
 
Total 
sample 
Non-user 
(fertilizers) 
Flood/Storm/ 
Landslide 
Drought Plant diseases/ 
Insects 
 Obs. 2,280 267 217 151 251 
1 Ha Tay 15.91 3 2.3 3.31 8.37 
2 Phu Tho 9.9 0 3.23 35.76 1.99 
3 Lao Cai 11.5 0 6.91 22.52 1.2 
4 Lai Chau 12.15 40.82 3.23 2.65 23.11 
5 Dien Bien 12.11 48.69 3.69 8.61 14.34 
6 Nghe An 5.49 0.75 0.92 7.28 11.95 
7 Quang Nam 8.82 0.37 44.7 0 0.4 
8 Khanh Hoa 1.25 0.37 0.92 0.66 1.2 
9 Dak Lak 9.81 2.62 30.88 9.93 10.36 
10 Dak Nong 5.23 2.62 0 3.97 19.92 
11 Lam Dong 0.73 0.37 2.76 5.3 1.2 
12 Long An 7.09 0.37 0.46 0 5.98 
 Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Calculation from the 2010 VARHS. 
 
Table 3.21: The treatment effect in two mountainous provinces 
    
Before 
matching 
After matching 
  
  
Nearest 
neighbor 
Nearest 
neighbor 
noreplacement 
Caliper 
norepalcement 
Kernel 
based 
matching 
Yield 0.264*** 0.02 0.026** 0.019 0.014 
  
(0.01) (0.023) (0.011) (0.014) (0.016) 
Rice revenue 0.224*** 0.038 0.14** 0.041 0.007 
  
(0.062) (0.13) (0.065) (0.084) (0.092) 
Agr. income 0.195*** 0.178* 0.138** 0.119* 0.15** 
  
(0.054) (0.092) (0.058) (0.072) (0.076) 
Total Income 0.081 0.114 0.028 0.069 0.049 
  
(0.053) (0.096) (0.057) (0.072) (0.077) 
Treatment 
assignment           
 
Untreated 237 237 237 237 237 
 
Treated 318 308 237 154 308 
Balancing test 16.74 9.08 10.7 3.32 6.42 
Note: Significant at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted as *, **, ***. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 3.1: Development of paddy cultivation in Vietnam, 1961-2010 
 
Source: Calculation from FAOSTAT database. 
 
Figure 3.2: Ratio between imported and consumed nutrient fertilizers in Vietnam, 2002-10 
  
Source: Calculation from FAOSTAT database. 
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Figure 3.3: Paddy cultivation by regions of Vietnam  in 2010 
 
Source: Calculation from GSO database.  
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Figure 3.4: Eight regions of Vietnam and twelve provinces in the sample  
Source: The Vietnamese regions map from wikimedia.org 
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Figure 3.5: Dose-response and marginal effect of continuous treatment 
5A: Rice yield 
Without disasters                                                                       Flood/ Storm/ Landslide 
 
       Drought                                                                                    Plant diseases/ Insects 
 
0
.5
1
1.
5
E
[y
ie
ld
(t
)]
0 .5 1 1.5 2
Treatment level
Dose Response Low bound
Upper bound
Confidence Bounds at .95 % level
Dose response function = Linear prediction
Dose Response Function
-.
1
-.
05
0
.0
5
.1
E
[y
ie
ld
(t
+
.1
)]
-E
[y
ie
ld
(t
)]
0 .5 1 1.5 2
Treatment level
Treatment Effect Low bound
Upper bound
Confidence Bounds at .95 % level
Dose response function = Linear prediction
Treatment Effect Function
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
E
[y
ie
ld
(t
)]
0 .5 1 1.5
Treatment level
Dose Response Low bound
Upper bound
Confidence Bounds at .95 % level
Dose response function = Linear prediction
Dose Response Function
-.
15
-.
1
-.
05
0
.0
5
E
[y
ie
ld
(t
+
.1
)]
-E
[y
ie
ld
(t
)]
0 .5 1 1.5
Treatment level
Treatment Effect Low bound
Upper bound
Confidence Bounds at .95 % level
Dose response function = Linear prediction
Treatment Effect Function
0
.2
.4
.6
E
[y
ie
ld
(t
)]
0 .5 1 1.5
Treatment level
Dose Response Low bound
Upper bound
Confidence Bounds at .95 % level
Dose response function = Linear prediction
Dose Response Function
-.
1
-.
0
5
0
.0
5
.1
E
[y
ie
ld
(t
+
.1
)]
-E
[y
ie
ld
(t
)]
0 .5 1 1.5
Treatment level
Treatment Effect Low bound
Upper bound
Confidence Bounds at .95 % level
Dose response function = Linear prediction
Treatment Effect Function
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
E
[y
ie
ld
(t
)]
0 .5 1 1.5 2
Treatment level
Dose Response Low bound
Upper bound
Confidence Bounds at .95 % level
Dose response function = Linear prediction
Dose Response Function
-.
1
-.
05
0
.0
5
.1
E
[y
ie
ld
(t
+
.1
)]
-E
[y
ie
ld
(t
)]
0 .5 1 1.5 2
Treatment level
Treatment Effect Low bound
Upper bound
Confidence Bounds at .95 % level
Dose response function = Linear prediction
Treatment Effect Function
185 
 
5B: Rice revenue 
Without disasters                                                                             Flood/ Storm/ Landslide 
 
Drought                                                                                                Plant diseases/ Insects 
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5C: Agricultural income 
Without disasters                                                                             Flood/ Storm/ Landslide 
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5D: Total income 
Without disasters                                                                               Flood/ Storm/ Landslide 
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Figure 3.6: Provincial poverty incidence in 2002 (left) and area of paddy cultivation in 2009 
(right) of Vietnam 
 
Source: GSO estimates base on the VHLSS 2002 data (left) and Nel Garcia & Andy Nelson, 
IRRI (right) 
 
Figure 3.7: Map of soils (left) and slopes (right) in Vietnam 
 
Source: K. Hoang, Pham, and Howeler (2000) (left) and V. B. Nguyen, Mutert, and Cong 
(2003) (right) 
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Figure 3.8: Maps of temperature and precipitation in Vietnam 
 
Figure 3.9: Proportion of years in which 300 millimeters of rain fell in a consecutive 5‐day 
period (left) and proportion of riverine and coastal flooding 1985‐2007 (right) in Vietnam 
 
Source:  Thomas et al. (2010) 
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Chapter 4 
 
Farmland and child labour  
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), child labour refers to children 
engaging in any work that is mentally, physically, socially or morally dangerous and harmful 
to children, and interferes with their schooling. The definition of child labour varies in the 
literature. Based on the ILO classification, working children generally consist of three 
groups: children in employment, child labourers and children in hazardous work. The 
categories of children in employment are the broadest range, containing children in all 
types of paid and non-paid activities. The categories of child labourers are narrower, which 
exclude children over 14 years old in hazardous work and include children over 11 engaging 
in light work (i.e. work that does not influence children’s ability to attend school and 
vocational training). Children in hazardous work include those who are involved in any work 
that may harm their safety, moral development, and physical and mental health (Diallo, 
Hagemann, Etienne, Gurbuzer, & Mehran, 2010). The paper uses child labourer and child 
worker interchangeably.  
The ILO estimates that around 176 million children between the ages of 5 and 14 were 
engaged in economic activities in 2008, which accounts for 14.5 percent (Diallo et al., 2010). 
Categorised into four groups of economic activity – agriculture, industry, service and other 
uncategorised activities – the data show that child labour in agriculture accounts for 60 
percent of children 5 to 17 years old, and is the highest rate among other sectors. The 
service and industrial sectors and the uncategorised group, respectively, follow with 26 
percent, 7 percent and 7.5 percent. Two-thirds of child labourers are engaged in unpaid 
family activities, with 64 percent for boys and 73 percent for girls. Paid employment and 
self-employment account for 21 percent and 5 percent in the same age group. Thus, the 
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majority of child labourers are predominantly employed in agricultural activities on family 
farms.  
Over the past two decades, studies on child labour have increasingly gained attention in 
both theoretical and empirical directions. The main issues concentrate on addressing three 
relevant areas, including the causes, the consequences and the policies of child labour. 
Understanding the causes of child labour plays an important role in designing appropriate 
policies for governing and reducing child labour. In terms of causes, there are five major 
groups of factors that have been studied and found to be associated with child labour: 
poverty, credit market imperfections, land and labour market imperfections, parental 
characteristics, and macroeconomic factors (Fors, 2010). Among these factors, poverty has 
been analysed widely and found as a dominant cause of child labour. The effects of poverty 
that are correlated with imperfect markets, household characteristics and other external 
factors generate a complicated mechanism affecting child labour. Most empirical findings 
show a positive relationship between poverty and child labour. However, the results are 
diverse depending on differences in not only the sample characteristics but also the 
definitions and methodologies.  
Child labour prevalently occurs in rural and agricultural settings where land is the primary 
source of wealth in agriculture and for farm households. Farmland has been taken into 
consideration as another factor that may affect child labour. Additionally, in developing 
countries, the economies are commonly characterised by the presence of imperfections in 
the goods, financial and labour markets. The decision of employing children may also be 
affected by the situation of the labour market and credit market. This study therefore 
focuses on investigating the impacts of farmland on child labour in the context of an 
agrarian economy.  
Taking the case study of Vietnam, child labour has been studied in several papers using data 
from the 1990s. Figure 4.1 graphs the evolution of poverty and child labour in Vietnam from 
1993 to 2008. Both poverty and child labour rates remarkably decreased over this period. In 
particular, poverty declined from 58 percent to 14.5 percent, while child labour declined 
from 45 percent to 10.5 percent. However, the progress of child labour reduction was less 
significant over the period of 2002-2008, reaching only around 2 percent. Intuitively, a 
question arises whether farm households had any incentives or constraints to employ their 
children, which resulted in poorer progress in child labour reduction and better progress in 
poverty reduction.  
Moreover, around 70 percent of the population in Vietnam live in rural areas. Associated 
with the characteristics of the agricultural economy, rural households mainly depend on 
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income sources from agriculture. According to a report by the World Bank in 2006, about 80 
percent of rural households are directly or indirectly dependent on agriculture; about one-
third of rural households are wage earners with only 4 percent being full-time labourers; 
and about 34 percent of households engage in non-agricultural business, with only 3 
percent in full-time work (B. T. Hoang, 2009). We observe that, although the economic 
activities are diversifying, the rural households still prevalently work on their farms. The low 
rate of full-time workers reflects the immobility in the labour market.  
Given this context, the paper aims to examine whether the farm size of rural households 
has an effect on child labour. This paper is organised into seven sections. The following 
section, section 2, reviews the major trends of child labour in literature. Section 3 develops 
the theoretical model of farm households. Section 4 describes survey and descriptive 
statistics. Section 5 introduces econometric specifications. Section 6 reports the empirical 
results. Finally, section 7 discusses the concluding remarks.  
4.2. Literature review 
This section briefly introduces the relevant directions in the literature about child labour. 
We divide it into three directions, i.e. the impacts of poverty, farmland, and both farmland 
and market failures on child labour. Then we present a literature review on child labour in 
Vietnam.   
In general 
First, considered as the primary cause of child labour, poverty has been substantially 
focused on in the majority of the literature. Basu and Van (1998) contribute a fundamental 
framework on child labour. The authors proposed an assumption that child labour is caused 
by subsistence poverty. Basu (2000) extends the model to analyse the effect of the 
minimum adult wage on child labour. The study demonstrated that child labour incidence 
may fall or rise as the adult wage is raised by the minimum law. A number of empirical 
studies show the relationship between living standards and child labour. Krueger (1996) 
presents an obvious trend in a cross-country sample that employment of young children is 
common in low-income countries and uncommon in high-income countries. Kambhampati 
and Rajan (2005) find a relationship in India that an increase in parents’ wage reduces child 
labour, but the effects of the mother’s wage and father’s wage are different. Beegle, 
Dehejia and Gatti (2006) show that crop shocks are significantly related to household 
wealth and found a strong effect, that an unexpectedly poor harvest led to an increase in 
the level of child labour. Duryea, Lam, and Levison (2007) find that an unemployment shock 
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of male household heads increases the probability of children entering the labour force in 
urban Brazil.  
Second, related to farmland, Bar and Basu (2009) use an overlapping generation model to 
investigate the effect of landholding on child labour. Under the assumption of an imperfect 
labour market, the authors revealed that landholding has a positive effect on child labour in 
the short run but negative in the long run. However, in the short run, there exists a critical 
level below which landholding will cause a decrease in child labour. Basu, Das, and Dutta 
(2010) propose a similar model that exhibits an inverted-U curve relationship between land 
size and child labour. The framework is supported by the significant relationship of the data 
set in Northern India. The existence of a turning point shows that land size increases child 
hours worked if it is below such a level of land size, and then decreases the hours worked if 
the land size continues to increase over that level.   
Third, regarding farmland and market failures, a paper by Bhalotra and Heady (2003) has 
been widely referred to in the literature recently. This study is motivated by the remarkable 
observation that children of land-rich households are often more likely to be employed than 
the children of land-poor households. The authors call it a “wealth paradox” and challenge 
the assumption that poverty is the primary cause of child labour. The paper suggests that 
this paradox can be explained by imperfect land and labour markets. An imperfect credit 
market is likely to weaken the effect of this paradox. Based on an analysis of these effects, a 
model was constructed and applied to a survey in rural Pakistan and Ghana. The findings 
show that a wealth paradox exists for girls in both countries, whereas it is not statistically 
significant for boys after conditioning on other covariates. Dumas (2013) looks into the 
relationship between market imperfections and child labour. The study developed a rural 
household model and found that, on average, market imperfections increase child labour 
but the effects are heterogeneous by land ownership using a sample in Madagascar. 
Households with medium-sized plots may increase child labour when the labour market 
improves, contrary to other sizes (small or large size). Similar evidence was also found in 
rural India (Congdon Fors, 2007) and Burkina Faso (Dumas, 2007).  
In Vietnam 
In Vietnam, child labour has been investigated in relation to household characteristics and 
external factors after its economic reforms. During the 1990s, child labour in Vietnam 
declined sharply. Several studies used the household living standard surveys (VLSS) in 1992-
93 and 1997-98 to analyse the determinants of this decline.  
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Firstly, child labour is found to be correlated with living standards. Using nonparametric 
decomposition on panel data in the period of 1993-1998, Edmonds (2001) shows that an 
increase in per capita expenditure can explain the 59 percent decline in the incidence of 
child labour. This rate is highest in the group of households moving out of poverty, at 80 
percent. By applying the multinomial logit equation and altruistic model, Rosati and 
Tzannatos (2006) find that household income had a negative impact on child labour in both 
the 1993 and 1998 surveys and the relationship is non-linear. The study examines for 
groups of child labour across schooling status (with and without schooling). The extent of 
the effect tends to diminish for higher income households. This impact was also revealed in 
the Vietnam household living standards survey (VHLSS) in 2006 by using the bivariate probit 
model (UCW Project, 2009).  
Secondly, other household characteristics are also examined. Edmonds and Turk (2002) 
further analyze impacts on the decline of child labour using parametric and non-parametric 
methods. Child labour in rural areas and ethnic minority groups declined at a slower pace 
than in urban areas. Children in households owning businesses are likely to work more than 
children in households without a business. In terms of migration, child labour in households 
where the head had moved decreased less than in households where the head had never 
moved. In addition, the education of the parents significantly influences the probability of 
working, especially the education of the mother (Rosati and Tzannatos, 2006; UCW Project, 
2009). Children of highly educated parents are less likely to work.  
Therefore, previous studies on child labour in Vietnam have left room for investigating the 
impact of land and market failures. Especially over the previous decade, child labour 
reduction has been going at a slower pace compared to the 1990s. We will attempt to 
develop a rural household model and apply appropriate econometric techniques to test the 
impact of land on child labour using a survey carried out in 2008. Although the model 
focuses on the land factor and does not take imperfect markets into account, we still show 
evidence of an incomplete labour market in this sample.  
4.3. Theoretical framework 
We suppose that farm household has one adult and one child. The utility function of 
household is:  
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where x is total household consumption,         is the amount of children’s work (i.e. 
take value 0 if children do not work and value 1 if children work with all effort). And      is 
cost function of child labour with      and       (and where subscripts indicate 
derivatives), because the cost of child labour rises in the quantity of supplied. Let assume 
adult always work regardless of the wage or leisure and his labour input is denoted as   . 
First consider the special case in which the two types of labor are identical the production 
function becomes  , f k e  where k is the land holding. We assume 0f  and 0kf . 
The household maximizes  
     , 1    u f k e w c e          (2) 
subject to 0e  , i.e. the child cannot take off-farm work.  
 
The first order conditions for an internal solution are   
 
 ef f w      (3) 
An internal solution with respect to in ensured by the Inada condition  0lim , f k  . 
An internal solution with respect to the child’s labor input is ensured by the condition 
 0 ec w  , i.e. the cost of the child undertaking a small amount of work is lower than the 
wage the parent can obtain (or pay) in the labor market. If this is not satisfied and 
 0 ec w  the child will not work. 
Differentiation with respect to the land holding gives 

 

k ee
e
f f c
k            (4)
 
implying     
 


ee ke c f
k f
        (5)
 
The sign is ambiguous and depends on whether increased land holding increases the 
marginal product of labor (and hence of the child’s labor) by more or less than it increases 
the marginal cost associated with the child’s labor. 
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In the more general case, the farm production function is  , ,f k e . We assume 
, , 0k ef f f  , , , 0kk eef f f , , 0k kef f  (the marginal products of each labor type is 
increasing in the land holding) and 0ef (the child and the parent are complementary 
factors). We also assume 2 0 ee ef f f  to guarantee concavity of the production function. 
We hold land fixed. The first order conditions for the two labor inputs give 

e e
f w
f c
      (6) 
Now vary the land holding. We get 
0
 
  
 
 
  
 
k e
ke e ee ee
e
f f f
k k
e
f f f c
k k
        (7) 
which we may rewrite as 
 
     
    
    
 
 
e k
e ee ee ke
f f fk
f f c fe
k
       (8) 
It follows that  
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The impact of the increased land holding on the child’s labor input is therefore 
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The denominator of this expression is positive by assumption. In the numerator, the first 
term 0 ee kf f . The second term   ee ke ec f f  may be either positive or negative.  Child 
labor may therefore either increase or decrease with land-holding.  It will be negative if eec  
is sufficiently high, i.e. if the costs associated with child labor increase sufficiently fast. The 
result is similar to that obtained in the simple case. 
4.4. Survey and descriptive statistics 
There are two important household surveys: Multi-Purpose Household Survey (MPHS) and 
Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS) conducted in the 1990s. Since the two surveys are 
partly overlapped, General Statistics Office of Vietnam decided to merge MPHS and VLSS to 
become a new Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS). The VHLSS was 
implemented biennially during the period 2000-2010 with technical assistance from UNDP 
and the World Bank. This paper uses the 2008 VHLSS which contains more detailed 
information on farm land. There are two modules of questionnaire: short household 
questionnaire (including income information) and long household questionnaire (including 
income and consumption expenditure information) in all waves of the VHLSS. The study 
employs the long questionnaire.  
Based on the relevant documents and manual instruction of Phung & Nguyen (2006) and 
GSO (2008), the survey could be briefly summarized as the following. The interviews in each 
survey were conducted from May to November in each year. Sampling was at three levels: 
communes/wards at the first stage, census enumerate on areas (EA) at the second stage 
and households at the third stage. At the first stage, the sample was selected from the 
master frame designed for four waves of the VHLSS in this period which included 3,063 
communes/wards from 1999 Population Census. At the second stage, wards and communes 
were partitioned into EAs and three EAs in communes/wards selected. Only one EA 
constitutes for each wave of survey and the two others are used for the sequential rotated 
waves. At the third stage, a sample of households was selected systematically with twenty 
households in each rural EA and ten households in each urban EA. This is technically a 
three-stage design (including the selection of   households), but it is operationally 
equivalent to a two-stage design since only one EA is selected within each commune for 
each wave of survey. The sample is rotated 50 percent from one wave to the successive 
wave of the VHLSS based on the master sample. More specifically, the current survey keeps 
50 percent of households in the previous survey, and randomly selects another 50 percent 
of households from EAs which are different to the ones used in the previous survey, as 
mentioned at the second stage.  
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4.4.1. Basic information in the survey 
Table 4.1 reports the basic information in the survey. The communes/wards and EAs are 
randomly selected with the probability proportional to size. Based on the ratio of the urban 
population to the rural population, the sample size in rural areas is around three times 
larger than that in urban areas. Out of a total of 9,189 households, the urban and rural 
households account for 26 percent and 74 percent. The number of households in the 
sample accounts for only 0.05 percent of the country. The ratio of households between the 
two areas is almost equal to the ratio of the population distributed in the 1999 Population 
Census, with around 23.7 percent in urban areas and 76.3 percent in rural areas. The 
household size in the survey is 4.12 and the household size in rural areas is slightly larger 
than that in urban areas’. The education levels of the household heads are divided into five 
groups, including without education, primary, lower-secondary, upper-secondary, and 
college and beyond. Around 41 percent of the household heads had attended a lower-
secondary school, making up the largest fraction. This is followed by primary, upper-
secondary, without education, and college and beyond, at around 28 percent, 19 percent, 7 
percent and 5 percent, respectively. The data show a noticeable gap in the education of the 
household heads between the two areas, as the proportion with upper-secondary level and 
college and above level are higher in urban areas. Female headship, which could affect 
household expenditure, and children’s investment should also be tracked (Joshi, 2004). The 
female headship is higher in urban households than in rural households, approximately 38 
percent and 21 percent.    
The per capita total expenditure and living expenditure in the urban areas are nearly twice 
as high as that in the rural areas. The poverty rate is measured by the percentage of 
households having an average income or expenditure per capita under the poverty line. 
There are two methods to compute poverty in Vietnam. The first method is based on 
international standards that were developed by the General Statistics Office (GSO) with 
support from the World Bank.21 The second method relies on the poverty line of the 
Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs. We compute the poverty rate based on the 
poverty line of GSO. The poverty rate of the whole survey is 17 percent, while the rate of 
rural areas is 22 percent and of urban areas is only 3 percent.  
As in other developing countries, a large share of the labour force is engaged in agricultural 
activities, especially in rural areas. In the survey, 69 percent of households are involved in 
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 The poverty line developed by GSO and the World Bank is VND 280.000 (2008 Statistical Yearbook of 
Vietnam, 2009).  
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agricultural, forestry, aquaculture and fisheries activities.22 This rate is 87 percent in rural 
areas and 28 percent in urban areas. These farming activities heavily rely on land, which is a 
primary factor of production. The ratio of households managing land in farming activities is 
nearly the same as the ratio of farming households. Almost all farm households report that 
they use their land for farming activities.23  
Moreover, Table 4.2 shows more details about land used by households for farming 
activities. Approximately 23 percent of households use one piece of land, and 26 percent of 
households use more than five pieces of land.24 Households report all the pieces of land 
depending on the features of their management in production at the time of interviewing. 
These pieces are assigned one of eight categories: annual crops, perennial crops, forestry, 
water surface, grass field, resident, shifting cultivation and others.25 Annual crop land is 
used for growing plants that have a time period from cultivating to harvesting not exceeding 
one year. Perennial crop land is used for the cultivation of plants with a growing cycle of 
more than one year, from planting to harvesting. Forestry land is land with natural forest or 
planted forest that has forest standards. Water surface land is used for growing aquaculture 
products. Grassland is used to grow grass for cattle. A pond or garden adjacent to the 
residential land is the area that lies in or surrounds the residential land area of the 
household. Shifting cultivation land refers to an area that is managed by mountainous 
households by clearing trees or creating forest fires for cultivation of some crops. Other 
agricultural land includes areas to build glasshouses and other kinds of development 
purposes for farming activities. Table 4.3 shows that the majority of land used by 
households is annual crop land, which accounts for 59 percent on average. Perennial crop 
land and residential land follows with around 9 percent and 7 percent, respectively. 
In Vietnam, the land belongs to all the people, with the State as the representative owner. 
The State grants land use rights to land users via the form of allocation of land, lease of land 
and recognition of land use rights for persons currently using the land stably; it regulates 
the rights and obligations of land users (Vietnam National Assembly, 2003). According to the 
law on land amended in 2001 by government, the quota on the allocation of agricultural 
                                                     
22
 In this paper, we mention agricultural or farming activities, which include agricultural (crops, livestock), 
forestry, aquaculture and fisheries activities.  
23
 The differences may be due to missing data, since there are households with positive outputs of production 
but with zero land area.  
24
 The different pieces of land used by households are attributed by different characteristics, such as type of 
land (annual crops, forestry, grass field, water surface, etc.), type of irrigation (gravity, pump, etc.), type of 
ownership (long-term contract, rent, borrow, etc.) and others.  
25
 Residential land is still reported here because I find that there are households who use it and generate a low 
revenue of output, for instance planting vegetables, or households rent it out to others.  
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land varies with the type of land.26 The quota on the allocation of land to each household or 
individual for planting annual crops, for aquaculture and for salt production is no more than 
3 hectares (or 7.4 acres) of each type of land. The quota on the allocation of land for 
perennial crops is no more than 10 hectares (or 24.7 acres) in the plains and no more than 
30 hectares (or 74 acres) in the midlands and in mountain regions. However, in this survey, 
the average area of agricultural land per household is 2.35 acres, which reflects that the 
production activities of the households are small-scale (Table 4.1).  
In the survey, since child labourers under 10 years of age account for a small fraction, the 
analysis focuses on children between the ages of 10 and 14.27 In Table 4.1, households 
having child labourers, out of all the households having children from 10 to 14 years old, are 
estimated at around 7 percent in urban areas and 15 percent in rural areas. As expected, 
child labour in rural areas is remarkably higher than in urban areas. When child labour is 
estimated in terms of the individual (not in terms of households employing child), the rate is 
lower. Out of the total 11 percent of working children, as high as 82 percent of the children 
participate in agricultural activities (including 83 percent working for their households), 
followed by 14 percent in the industrial sector and 4 percent in the service sector.  
4.4.2. Land, labour and product markets 
In 1986, after the transition, the government decentralised agricultural land from a 
collective system and assigned it to individuals and households for a period of up to 15 
years. In 1993, government implemented a new land law that allowed land-use rights to be 
transferred, exchanged, leased, mortgaged and inherited. This important reform was 
expected to bring benefits for landholders, particularly in the agricultural sector. First, the 
security of land usage is enhanced, which may affect agricultural investment decisions. 
Second, access to credit could be facilitated if the land served as collateral. Based on the 
two rounds of the survey, VLSS 1992-93 and 1997-98, the additional land rights were found 
to increase long-term investment but were irrelevant for credit access (Do & Iyer, 2004). In 
this survey, the data also reveal similar results. In Table 4.4, the long-term land-use 
certificate possession of households with loans and those without loans is equal at around 
77 percent.  
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 Land allocation by the State means granting land use rights by the State by way of an administrative decision 
to an entity that has requirements for land use (Vietnam National Assembly, 2003). 
27
 According to the labour laws of Vietnam, the minimum age for full-time employment is 18. Workers 
between 15 and 18 years of age have special provisions. Many children have reportedly worked in violation of 
this law. The law established working hours as eight hours per day with a mandatory 24-hour rest period per 
week. 
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In Vietnam, the procedure for issuing land-use certificates to farmers is time-consuming and 
proceeded at an unequal pace across the regions. For instance, after three years of the new 
law taking effect, 72 percent of the farmers in the Mekong delta sample reported that they 
possessed a certificate, while the Red River delta had only 8 percent (Hare, 2008). Empirical 
evidence suggests that the certificate contributes rather small in the absence of the 
appropriate conditions and constitutions. Hence, the land-use certificate seems to be 
inadequate to represent the actual land property rights and could cause bias among 
regions. The possession of land could be alternatively distinguished by the information 
which was provided in the questionnaire: how the household got their plot of land. 
Depending on the security level of the land, we divide it into two groups: long-term and 
short-term land. Long-term land includes long-term use allocation, signing a contract, gifted 
or inherited land, purchased land, proclaimed land and bartered land. The land users in this 
group are the landowners. Short-term land includes auctioned, rented and borrowed land. 
This makes sense because the ratio of land-use certificates in the long-term group is more 
than twice as that in the short-term group, at around 79 percent and 30 percent, as shown 
in Table 4.4.  
Panel A of Table 4.5 shows properties of land use. The majority of land operated in farming 
activities is long-term land, consisting of 93 percent. Short-term land is around 6 percent, 
and the rest is uncategorised land. As the assumption in a study by Basu et al. (2010), land is 
considered immobile. We are aware that farmers still sell land and move, but this is rare 
and harmless. The high ratio of long-term land in the sample could also make it appropriate 
to use that assumption.28 Furthermore, the land is investigated to determine whether each 
plot is managed by the households or for other purposes, such as renting, lending without 
payment, in exchange for other plots, fallowing and others. Nearly 91 percent of the land 
area is managed by the households themselves.  
Over the past two decades, rapid urbanisation and industrialisation have been witnessed as 
the primary attributes of the economic development progress. Consequently, labourers 
have moved out of the agricultural sector to participate in the industrial and service sectors. 
Despite the structural changes in the labour force, labour in agriculture still constitutes the 
largest fraction. In this survey, 55 percent of labourers work in agriculture, forestry and 
aquaculture, and 65 percent of labourers engage in at least one agricultural activity for their 
household. As in other developing countries, the labour market is underdeveloped due to a 
shortage of labour incentives, labour mobility and information. In particular, the labour 
market in rural areas may be characterised by seasonal labour demand and high transaction 
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 In this survey, around 7 percent of land was attained through purchase.  
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costs. That salient feature leads to the situation that workers in family enterprises or unpaid 
family labourers are pervasive in agriculture as well as non-agriculture.  
The labour market in Vietnam is not an exception. Panel B displays the labour usage of 
households involved in farm production or farm service. The work information was 
retrieved from the questions that asked whether the individuals work for a salary, whether 
they work for their household’s farm or whether they do non-farm work for their 
household. The household members could work in more than one of these types of jobs. A 
household belongs to the working category in panel B if there is at least one member that 
participates in household production or service in agriculture, forestry or fishery. The 
information on hiring outside labour is computed indirectly from the expenditure of the 
household’s production, which includes an item for hiring outside labour. As predicted, 
around 84 percent of households only employed their household members, whereas merely 
0.2 percent of households hired outside labourers exclusively. Households using both 
household members and hired labour make up around 12 percent. There were around 4 
percent of farm households without family workers or hiring expenses. It could be the case 
that households rent out land, share land and production, or exchange products for the 
labour cost. The distribution is similar between the rural and urban areas. The imperfect 
labour market may contribute to the effects that cause child labour.    
Regarding the final use of agricultural output, the households could sell either all or some of 
their products. The remaining products could be consumed by the household or left for 
other purposes. We measure this indicator as the percentage of revenue obtained from sold 
products out of the total revenue. To check the product market and household output use, 
Panel C shows that the majority of farm households utilise farm output for both purposes: 
sell in the market and household consumption. This rate is higher in rural areas than in 
urban areas: at 91 percent and 72 percent, respectively. The ratio of households retaining 
or selling all of the output is lower in rural areas than in urban areas. As an essential feature 
of the agrarian economy of developing countries, in the situation of imperfect markets, 
farm households are typically dependent on agriculture as both consumers and producers. 
There is no separability between consumption and production.  
4.4.3. Child labour situation  
As the basic information of the survey in Table 4.1 shows, child labour occurs mostly in rural 
areas. This analysis therefore focus on child labour in rural areas. Table 4.6 shows child 
labour in rural areas across industries. Children are involved prevalently in agricultural 
(crops and livestock) activities, at 90 percent out of the total, followed by aquaculture and 
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silviculture, at only 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively. In the industrial sector, children 
are engaged in the processing industry and mining industry at around 5 percent and 3 
percent, followed by construction and utility production and distribution. A small 
proportion of child labour appears in the service sector at merely 2 percent, including hotels 
and restaurants, finance and credit, and public and personal service. These figures reflect 
the typical traits of the economy in rural areas, in which agriculture is a dominant source of 
livelihood and self-employed households.  
Table 4.7 summarises the distribution of child labour in relation with other main factors that 
may influence child labour in rural areas. Child labourers are observed in two categories of 
work: farm work and non-farm work. Child labourers of 10-14 years old engaging in farm 
work is around 11 percent, whereas those engaging in non-farm work is more than 2 
percent.  
Children may occasionally work, for example, during periods of harvest, summer holidays, 
etc. The questionnaire records the number of hours worked per day, days worked per week 
and weeks worked during the last 12 months. Based on these numbers, the working hours 
are calculated using the average per week from the previous 12 months. The data show that 
children who are employed in farm work work less hours than those in non-farm work, 
around 11 hours and 21 hours correspondingly. In terms of days per year, children are 
involved in farm work for 118 days and non-farm work 180 days. Thus, the probability of 
being employed in farm work is higher than in non-farm work, but with less hours worked.  
Although the analysis does not focus on the relationship between schooling and child 
labour, we will still look at that common phenomenon of whether schooling has a negative 
effect on child labour. In Table 4.7, child labour in farm work and non-farm work is 
substantially higher in the group of children without schooling. So children are more likely 
to be employed and work longer if they do not go to school.   
To check the distribution of child labour over household living expenditure, the sample is 
divided into three groups at two cut-off points: 25th and 50th percentile. Child labour in farm 
work clearly decreases in richer households in the three groups defined by living 
expenditure. However, child labour in non-farm work in the richest group is slightly higher 
than that in the middle group. In terms of hours worked, children in the richest households 
(both farm work and non-farm work) work more than those in the poorest households but 
less than those in the households in the middle group.  
To observe the relationship between child labour and land size, we split the per-capita 
managed land by percentiles in the group of households who have children aged 10 to 14 
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years old. The distribution of land by percentiles partly reflects that the agricultural sector 
in Vietnam is characterised by small-scale farm households. We divide this roughly into 
three groups at two breaking points at the 50th percentile and 80th percentile, which 
correspond to an average land area of 0.23 and 0.68 acres. In the farm work group, the 
figures suggest that child labour increases if the farmland is larger. Children also work 
longer in larger farmlands. This trend is opposite to that for the non-farm work group. The 
child labour rate for doing non-farm work is highest for the group of households with the 
smallest size. Apparently, this is because farm work is dependent on the land.  
Another important asset of agricultural activities is cattle. This factor may affect child labour 
in rural areas as well. The cattle information in the survey includes three types: drafting, 
ploughing and breeding cattle; breeding pigs; and basic herds of poultry and cattle. These 
types are normalised to be the same unit as the number of cattle. The cattle per capita is 
also divided into two groups at the 50th percentile point. Child labour in the group over the 
50th percentile is higher than the group below the 50th percentile, at around 20 percent and 
9 percent. Nonetheless, the hours worked by child labourers in the higher group is one hour 
and a half less than in the group below the point.  
The data suggest the potential impact of land use for farming activities on child labour. Child 
labour in the group of households employing only their household members is higher than 
child labour in the group of households who hired outside labour. In contrast, the hours 
worked is slightly lower in the group of households who employed only their household 
members. Households with outside labour account for around 10 percent of the total. As 
shown in Table 4.7, the majority of households use their products both for household 
consumption and to sell in the market. In Table 4.8, child labour incidence appears to 
decrease when the ratio of sold output increases. However, the data appear to be in the 
opposite direction for the hours worked. Children in households who sell more are likely to 
work longer.    
Capturing an overview of these main factors, the specifications of the model could be 
appropriately identified to investigate the effects on child labour. The descriptive statistics 
initially reflect a quite clear impact of farmland on the possibility of being employed but still 
an ambiguous impact on the hours worked.  
4.4.4. Variable summary  
To examine the impact on child labour in rural areas, the model includes the variables of the 
child, household characteristics and regional indicator, which are shown in Table 4.8. The 
gender of the child labourers is fairly equal, although the empirical evidence reports mixed 
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results on gender. The existence of gender bias may be derived from parental gender bias, 
labour market discrimination, the type of work and differences in the return of human 
capital. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) examined data for 36 countries and found that child 
labour for girls is higher than for boys when including market work and domestic work; but 
when the data on domestic work is excluded, child labour for girls is less than for boys. 
According to a report by Diallo et al. (2010) in 2008, there were 176 million boys in 
economic activity compared to 130 million girls. It is expected that child work is affected by 
the availability of labour and the household size. Larger households and more adult 
labourers are expected to decrease child labour. The education level of the parents or head 
affects the decision of child labour. An increase in parental education has a direct positive 
effect on their children’s education and job opportunities, resulting in a decrease in child 
work. The gender of the head represents the bargaining power in the household. Table 4.8 
shows the gap of child work, especially in the ratio of participation across the regions. 
Therefore, the regional factor is included to capture different demographic characteristics, 
conditions and economic levels. There are eight socio-economic regions in Vietnam, 
including Red River Delta, North East, North West, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, 
Central Highlands, South East and Mekong River Delta.  
4.5. Econometric specifications 
This study’s main objective is to examine the effects of farm land on child labour. Since the 
unemployed children account for a larger share of the sample, almost all values of the 
dependent variable are equal to zero. The linear regression OLS produces biased and 
inconsistent estimates when a significant ratio of dependent variable’s value is equal to 
zero. The Tobit model is a traditional approach to deal with data with many zeros, which 
estimates the relationship between non-negative dependent variable and an independent 
variable (Tobin, 1958). The marginal effect of an independent variable is treated conditional 
on limited fraction of dependent variable which takes positive values as in this case.  
There is an argument pointing out an inadequacy of the Tobit model in solving that 
problem. In the Tobit model, the choice of being censored (participation) and expected 
value conditional on un-censored (level of participation) are determined by the same 
factors. The model considers dependent variable to be censored at zero but ignores the 
source of zeros, in which could be caused by deliberate household’s decision or certain 
circumstances (e.g. financial conditions, characteristics of demographic (Newman et al, 
2003; Martinez-Espineira, 2006).  
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Heckman (1979) proposes the two-stage estimation procedure to deal with zero 
observation. The author pointed out that estimation on selected subsample results in 
selection bias. The first stage is Probit estimation and the second stage is censoring 
estimation on selected subsample. In other words, the first stage estimates the probability 
of observed positive outcome or participated decision. The second stage estimates the level 
of participation conditional on observed positive values. The model assumes that these two 
stages are affected by different sets of independent variables, which is contrast to Tobit 
model. Another extended point in the Heckit model is that all zero observations are 
assumed to be derived from respondent’s deliberate choices.  
Cragg (1971) proposes the double-hurdle model, which is developed from Tobit model and 
Heckit model. The double-hurdle and Heckit models are similar in building two stages of 
decision. The first hurdle refers to the participation decision and the second hurdle refers to 
the level of participation decision. Both models are allowed to be affected by different sets 
of explanatory variables. However, the Heckit model assumes there is no zero observation 
in second stage of decision, whereas the double-hurdle model permits potential zero values 
in the second hurdle which appear from deliberate choice or random circumstances.  
In this paper, the first stage or the first hurdle is a decision on whether a child is employed, 
and the second stage is decision on how many hours that child engages in. According to the 
assumption of the Heckit model, all the observed observations are positive in second stages 
However, in the double-hurdle model, there are zero observations which have potential 
positive hours worked. The zero working hours reported may be due to imperfect labour 
market.  
Both Heckit and double-hurdle models have been used widely in previous empirical studies, 
mainly in consumption decision and labour supply. The two-stage Heckman model was used 
in demand analysis of fish in Cheng and Capps (1988), habit of consuming seventeen goods 
in Heien and Durham (1991), etc. The Tobit model has been applied in labour supply by 
Blundell and Meghir (1987), Blundell et al (1987, 1998);  in household consumption by 
Deaton and Irish (1984),  Yen and Jones (1997), Burton et al (1996); or in loan default 
analysis by Moffatt (2005), land investment by Bekele and Mekenon (2010), etc.  
4.5.1. The standard Tobit model  
The model is defined as:    
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where   
  is a latent unobserved endogenous variable which presents the optimal working 
hours;     is the corresponding observed variable which measures actual hours worked; 
     and     are vectors of independent variables and their parameters, respectively;    is a 
homoskedastic and normally distributed error term. The condition (12) implies that the 
observed number of hours are positive continuous if the positive number of hours are 
desired, and zero otherwise. Due to the non-negative values of hours worked, dependent 
variable    is censored at zero. This means that the observed zero on the dependent 
variable can be either “true” zero (i.e. individual deliberate choice) or censored zero (i.e. 
data collection methods, certain circumstances). Using maximum likelihood method, the 
likelihood function of standard Tobit is:   
             
       
 
 
        
 
 
  
          
 
 
                    
Where “0” denotes the zero observations (hours worked    is zero) in the sample and “+” 
indicates the positive observations (hours worked    is positive);      and      denotes 
standard normal cumulative distribution function and standard normal probability density 
function, respectively.  
4.5.2. The generalized Tobit or Heckit 
As the argument above, Heckman (1979) propose the two-stage estimation method to 
correct for the selection bias. The first step estimates the participation decision and the 
second step estimates for level of participation. According to Heckman (1979) and Flood 
and Gråsjö (1998), the Tobit model is modified as:  
The participation decision:   
   
                                                 
                                              
         
   
            
                 
The level of participation decision:   
   
                                   
                
    
   
         
            
                 
In this model,      and      are vectors of explanatory variables in two stages of decision. 
Hence, the model assumes that the decisions of participation and level of participation are 
affected by separated sets of factors. As in Tobit model,    and    are corresponding 
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vectors of parameters;    
  is a latent variable that denotes binary censoring;    is the 
observed value representing the participation decision. The observed number of hours 
worked equals to unobserved latent value when a positive number of hours worked is 
reported; otherwise it takes the value zero. The error terms      and      are assumed to be 
independently distributed. This assumption implies that there is no relationship between 
the two stages of decision.  
However, Heckman (1979) assumes that the two error terms are correlated and the first 
stage dominates the second one. Thus the error terms follow the bivariate normal 
distribution:  
 
  
  
      
 
 
    
        
        
                
Where    is correlation coefficient of the error terms. The domination assumption means 
that if the child reports positive hours worked, this is the intentional purpose of their 
parents. In other words, the participation is a deliberate choice. Then the model is 
estimated by Probit for the decision on participation and standard OLS for the positive 
hours worked. The log-likelihood function for this approach is:  
             
     
 
 
          
       
 
           
     
  
 
 
   
         
 
 
         
If the error terms are independent, ρ=0, the equation (23) is simplified as:  
             
     
 
 
                   
 
 
   
         
 
 
                
4.5.3. The double-hurdle model 
The double-hurdle extends the standard Tobit and Heckit models to overcome the zero 
hours worked.  This model is similar as the Heckit model, but there is a slight modification in 
the equation (17) as following:  
    
   
                 
   
         
              
 This equation implies that the observed hours worked can be either censored at zero or by 
data processing, and other circumstances. Household may be willing to send children to 
work in the market but there is not any opportunities. In other words, household would 
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send their children to work if there exits the perfect labour market. Assuming the error 
terms are independent, the log-likelihood function of double-hurdle is expressed as:  
                      
     
 
 
                  
 
 
  
         
 
 
               
The first term demonstrates for the observations with zero values. It implies that the zero 
observations are affected by both participation and level of participation decisions. It is 
contrast to Heckit model which indicates that all zero observations are only from 
participation decision. The different point is shown by the additional term in equation (22), 
  
     
 
 , which contributes for the effect of possible zero values in second stage decision. 
The second term in equation (22) expresses the conditional distribution and density 
function of censoring rule and observed positive values.  
Under the assumption of independence between two error terms, the log-likelihood 
function of the double-hurdle is the summation log-likelihood of  Probit model and 
truncated regression model (McDowell, 2003; Aristei et al, 2007). We estimate the model 
by maximizing two components separately (John, 1989; McDowell, 2003). Although this can 
be estimated by the user-written program of Burke (2009) in Stata, but the package cannot 
compute the marginal effect after each stages.   
4.5.4. Test for model appropriateness 
To select the more appropriate model, we can employ the likelihood ratio (LR) test. The test 
uses the log likelihood of the models being compared to test whose parameter estimates 
are a more proper fit for the data.  The LR statistic is defined as two times the log of the 
ratio of the likelihood functions of two models evaluated at their log likelihood (Greene, 
2000). We test the Heckman model against the Tobit model, and the double-hurdle model 
against Tobit model by comparing each pair of log likelihood values. The log likelihood of 
double-hurdle model is the sum of the log likelihoods of the truncated regression model 
and probit model. The LR statistic can be expressed as:  
                                       
                                                      
LR statistic is chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the difference 
between the numbers of parameters estimated in the two models. The null hypothesis in 
the equation (23) is that the Heckman model provides a better fit than the Tobit model, and 
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in the equation (28) is that the double-hurdle model provides a better fit than the Tobit 
model. The LR statistic is compare with the critical value at a specific significance level.   
4.6.  Empirical results 
This analysis emphasises on evaluating the impact of farmland on child labour. We also 
track child labour in different types of work and in relation to education. We test the 
models for three groups of children: those who work on family farms, those that do all kinds 
of work and those that do on-farm work but without school enrolment. If the results vary 
across these groups, we could further observe how households allocate differently their 
children’s time endowment, conditional on alternative characteristics of the children and 
households as well.  
The marginal effects of the explanatory variables are evaluated at the sample means based 
on the three models. The marginal effects are estimated for participation (probability of 
working) and the level of participation (hours worked). Since the assumption in the 
Heckman and double-hurdle models allows different explanatory variables in the two 
stages, several insignificant ones are dropped from the second stage. 29  
Model selection  
Table 4.9 shows the result of the likelihood ratio test for three categories of child labour. In 
the groups of child labourers engaging in all kinds of work, and on-farm work and without 
schooling, the log likelihoods are fairly equal in the test with the Heckman model and with 
the double-hurdle model, which are 240 and 214 for the former group and 60 for latter 
group. For the group of child labourers on-farm work, the log likelihoods is 236 in the test 
with the Heckman model and is 588  in the test with the double-hurdle model.  
Since the critical value of       is equal to 36 at significance level of 1 percent, the LR 
statistics show that the null hypothesis is strongly rejected in all three groups. The test 
confirms a better fit of the Tobit model over the Heckman model and the double-hurdle 
model. This indicates that the decision whether to employ child labourers and to what 
extent to employ child labourers are affected by the same set of factors.   
 
                                                     
29
 The selection of explanatory variables in the second stage of the Heckman model and the double-hurdle 
bases on the descriptive statistic of this sample and tries of running regression in an attempt to choose a more 
appropriate set of factors.   
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Main variables 
As an overview, the results of these models show the identical impacts in terms of the sign 
of the parameters. The parameters have almost a similar level of significance in the first 
step of the three models, but less significance in the second step of the Heckman and the 
double-hurdle models. However, the magnitude of the parameters is less different between 
the Tobit and the double-hurdle models. The changes in the impact of the three models 
across the three categories of child labour are relatively consistent.  
First of all, we check the effect of farmland. Table 4.10 reports the estimated parameters 
for child labour in all sorts of work, which includes family farm work, non-family farm work 
and work for wage. Farmland used in agricultural activities by households has a positive 
effect on the possibility of being employed but the effect is not statistically significant. The 
marginal effect of land on child labour decreases, which is shown by the negative 
parameters of land squared, but the effect is still not statistically significant.  
To diminish the endogenity problem of household welfare, we include the interaction term 
between farmland and poverty, instead of poverty or income variable alone. This variable 
has statistically significant positive effect in the first stage of decision in three models. The 
effect is significant in the second stage of decision in the Tobit model only. The result can be 
understood as the poor household is more likely to employ their children keeping farmland 
constant; or among the poor households, the land-rich household is more likely to employ 
their children than the land-poor household. In the Tobit and the double-hurdle models, if 
households is living in poverty, each additional unit (acres per capita) of farmland increases 
the probability of child labour by about 4 percent points. This impact is higher in the 
Heckman model, and the probability of child labour increased by approximately 25 percent 
points.  
Moreover, cattle also appear to have a positive effect on the participation decision of child 
labour in the Heckman and double-hurdle models. An increase of one unit (number of cattle 
per capita) of cattle leads to an increase of 4 percent points in the Heckman model and 
around 0.8 percent points in the double-hurdle model. The interaction term of cattle and 
poverty is statistically insignificant in the Heckman model and the double-hurdle model, but 
significant positive in both stages in the Tobit model. So similar to the interaction term of 
land, if households are poor, a household with more cattle is more likely to employ their 
children and employ longer than a household with less cattle,  
Table 4.11 examines the impact on child labour in the groups of children working only on 
their household farm. As expected, farmland appears to have a positive and statistically 
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significant on the possibility of child labour. This is understandable that children working on 
farm are more influenced by their family’s farmland than children working on non-farm 
activities. The effect is around 2 percent points in the Tobit model and the double-hurdle 
model, and 15 percent points in the Heckman model. Land size also has a statistically 
significant positive effect on the hours worked in the Tobit model and the double-hurdle 
model, but not in the Heckman model, which are 44 percent and 219 percent points, 
correspondingly. The marginal effect of land on child labour declines when the land 
increases in the second stage of only the double-hurdle model. Again, the interaction term 
of land and poverty cause positive impact on participation decision of three models, but a 
positive impact on hours worked of the Tobit model. Similarly, cattle also has a positive 
impact on the probability of child labour in the Heckman and the double-hurdle models, 
and the impact of the interaction term with poverty is statistically significant in both stages 
in only the Tobit model.  
Table 4.12 shows the results of the group of children without school enrolment. The effect 
of farmland on the probability of being employed is positive in the Heckman model and the 
double-hurdle model, and nearly greater than in the other two categories of the sample in 
Table 4.10 and Table 4.11, which are around 125 percent points in the Heckman model, and 
52 percent points in the double-hurdle model. The impact of land size is statistically 
insignificant in the Tobit model. Interestingly, the outside labour variable has a negative 
effect on child labour, in both stages of the Tobit model and in the first stage of the 
Heckman model and the double-hurdle model. The result indicates that hiring outside 
labour is associated with a decline in the probability of children working on farms by around 
23 percent points in the Tobit model, 84 percent points in the Heckman model and 32 
percent points in the double-hurdle model. The impact suggests that there is a trade-off 
between child labour and outside labour. Hence, this provides informative clues to imply 
the effect of the labour market, which was introduced in the literature review. Although we 
do not analyse imperfect market in the theoretical model, this empirical evidence 
demonstrate a potential relationship of labour market and child labour. A household may 
have an incentive to use their children’s effort on farm rather than hiring outside labour. 
This could caused by imperfect labour market, the shortage of seasonal labour in rural 
market, or the moral hazard problem (Bhalotra & Heady, 2003).  
Other variables 
Along with the main variables of interest in this analysis, we explored other determinants 
that may also be connected with child labour. Tracking children’s characteristics, the results 
show that significantly more older children are employed than younger children in both 
stages of the decision in the Tobit model, except in the second stage of the Heckman model 
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the double-hurdle model.30 The possibility of being employed between boys and girls is 
statistically indifferent, as the descriptive data shows in the previous section.  
In addition, the structure of the household provides clues on the allocation of labour 
sources within the household that influences child labour. Children in households are 
categorised by age in order to investigate whether there is a supplement or substitute 
effect on child labour within the household. The number of children under 10 years old has 
a positive impact in the three models in the group of children working on farms, except the 
second stage of the Heckman and the double-hurdle models. Household members from 15 
to 19 years of age have statistically insignificant effect on child labour. Therefore, children 
are likely to be employed and work more hours on farms if their households have younger 
children. A possible reason is that households that have younger children probably need to 
employ the older ones to trade-off with the cost of the younger ones.  
Regarding the head of household, we test for the educational level and female headship. 
The education of the household head is tested on four levels: without education, primary, 
secondary, high school and beyond. The expected negative impact appears to be the 
highest in the group of household heads with higher education. The effects are strongly and 
consistently significant for the three groups and in the three models in the first stage, and 
less significant in the second stage. This implies that children are more likely to be 
employed if their household head has lower education. In addition, the female headship 
variable has no effect on child labour.  
Furthermore, the regional differences are controlled by the dummy variables of the eight 
socio-economic regions. The estimated parameters show that children from the North East, 
North West and North Central Coast are likely to work more than those from other regions. 
The evidence is in line with the fact that these regions have lower incomes on average 
compared to the other regions. These regions also have the highest poverty rates over the 
country. Therefore, we are aware that poverty is still a significant factor affecting child 
labour, as shown in the descriptive statistics. We, however, exclude the income due to 
endogeneity. So the regional dummies employed in the model, instead of the income 
variable, partly capture the household living standard.   
                                                     
30
 I test these excluded variables in the second stage of the Heckman model and the double-hurdle, then 
decide to drop due to their insignificance.  
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4.7. Conclusion 
This paper used the sub-sample of rural areas and for children from 10 to 14 years old from 
the 2008 Vietnam household living standard survey. Although the preliminary data showed 
child labour occurs in low-income households, the study aimed to test another factor, 
farmland, which may potentially affect child labour. The results support the hypothesis that 
child labour on family farm increases in land-rich households and decreases in land-poor 
households. Although the theoretical model does not take into account imperfect markets, 
the evidence shows a substitute between outside labour and domestic child labour in the 
group of children without school enrolment. 
The hypothesis was investigated by comparing across three models, where the dependent 
variables were examined for the two stages of decision-making, including the possibility of 
participation and the extent of participation. Then the effects were decomposed into two 
stages of decision: probability to participate in economic activities and the level of 
participation. Livestock also plays a similar role in causing child labour. This reflects that 
productive assets are crucial determinants affecting child labour, together with the poverty 
factor.  
In short, these findings demonstrated the effects of land as another important indicator 
that causes child labour, which supports the theoretical framework. Furthermore, the 
findings suggest the implication that a mechanism should be operated for both poverty and 
child labour reduction. In the case of the credit subsidy policy or poverty alleviation 
programme, poor households receive money and invest in the agrarian sector. On the one 
hand, the programme may increase living standards and decrease poverty, but on the other 
hand, it may also increase child labour. With that concern, policies should be implemented 
along with other programmes that eliminate the constraints of imperfect markets and 
improve the knowledge of parents about the negative effects of child labour.   
By investigating children in different groups, the findings showed a critical point that the 
effect of labour market on children without schooling. Hence, child labour also has a 
negative effect on their education. To improve children’s education, it is worth paying 
attention to the child and adult labour markets problem as well.   
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